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Background
An advance statement in psychiatric care is a statement of a person’s preferences 
for treatment,  should he or she lose capacity to make treatment decisions in the 
future.  The  underlying  principle  for  implementing  these  instruments  is  the 
promotion of patients’ self-determination and autonomy.
Objective
To  evaluate  whether  use  of advance  statements  by patients  with  severe  mental 
illness leads to lower rates of compulsory readmission to hospital.
Design
Randomised controlled trial.
Setting
Two inner city psychiatric hospitals in North London.
Participants
One  hundred  and  fifty  six  in-patients  about  to  be  discharged  from  compulsory 
treatment under the Mental Health Act were recruited. To be included, participants 
had  to  be  18  years  old  and  over,  with  mental  capacity,  able  to  read  and  write 
English and on section 2, 3 or 4 of the Mental Health Act.
Intervention
The preference for care group and the control group both received standard 
psychiatric care plus a number of standardised questionnaires at baseline and a 
year after discharge from section. In addition to that the preference for care group 
received the psychiatric advance statement at baseline.
Outcome measures
The  main  outcome  measure  was  the  rate  of  compulsory  re-admission.  Other 
outcome  measures  involved:  the  patients’  self-efficacy  and  satisfaction  with 
psychiatric  services,  their mental health  status  assessment,  their views  about the 
usefulness of the advance statements, assessment of the content of the  statement 
and the views of mental health professionals in relation to the usefulness of the 
statement.
Results
Fifteen patients (19%) in the intervention group and 16 (21%) in the control group 
were readmitted compulsorily within 1   year of discharge. There was no difference
2in  the  numbers  of  compulsory  readmissions,  numbers  of  patients  readmitted 
voluntarily,  self-efficacy or satisfaction with psychiatric  services.  Patients with 
severe and enduring mental health problems were capable of drawing up advance 
statements with their views in relation to  signs  of lapses  and relapses,  and their 
preferences  and  refusals  on  certain  aspects  of their treatment  and  needs  whilst 
hospitalised.  Patients  did  not  use  the  advance  statements  as  an  opportunity  to 
refuse all subsequent treatment. Although 40% of patients did not find the advance 
statements useful,  this may have occurred because the professionals  involved in 
their  care  did  not  refer  to  or  take  account  of  them.  Most  mental  health 
professionals  who  returned  questionnaires  did  not  find  the  advance  statements 
useful in the management of the patients.
Conclusion
Users’ advance statements for psychiatric care had little observable impact on the 
outcome of care at twelve months. Even if rates of compulsory treatment were not 
affected,  one cannot rule out possible beneficial  effects such as improvement of 
therapeutic  alliance  and  communication with mental  health professionals.  Thus, 
the impact of advance statements on other aspects of care requires further study.
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17Introduction
Patients’  advance  statements  for  psychiatric  care  are  usually  oral  or  written 
statements  with  the  patient’s  specific  or general  preferences  and/or  refusals  for 
various psychiatric treatments, executed before they become incompetent. Patient 
advance statements can only be understood in the context of the development of 
psychiatric  services  and  the  development  of  patients’  autonomy  and  self- 
determination in general and mental health services.
Autonomy and self-determination in general and mental health care
According to Feinberg, autonomy has many meanings (1). “It can refer to capacity 
to govern oneself, which of course is a matter of degree; or to the actual condition 
of self-government and its associated virtues (e.g. self-identity, authenticity, self- 
determination,  self-legislation);  or  to  an  ideal  of character  derived  from  that 
conception;  or (on the analogy to  a political  state) to the sovereign  authority to 
govern  oneself,  which  is  absolute  within  one’s  own  moral  boundaries  (one’s 
‘territory,’  ‘realm,’  ‘sphere,’ or ‘domain’).”  (p. 28) In this thesis, autonomy and 
self-determination will be explored in relation to patients’  advance statements for 
psychiatric  care.  However,  in  order  for these  concepts  to  be  understood  in  the 
context  of psychiatric  care,  their  relation  to  general  health  settings  has  to  be 
outlined first.
Modem  medicine  has  moved  a  long  way  from  medical  paternalism  towards 
practices  that  take  into  account  patients’  individual  needs  and  increase  doctor- 
patient  communication.  Today  we  talk  about  patients’  self-determination  and 
autonomy, their right to consent to treatment, their right to refuse treatment and 
their right to decide about their body after death. National health policies (e.g. The 
National Service Framework for Mental Health) have been developed to promote 
and protect these rights.  However, the process of shifting the power and control 
from doctors to patients  and towards  shared decision making in health care has 
created  a  difficult  dynamic  that  is  expressed  by  conflict,  uneasiness  and 
discomfort between the two groups in most post-industrial societies. It is common 
to hear on the news or read in the newspapers stories that exemplify this conflict.
18A  woman yesterday  told of her  horror at  discovering  that  hospital  doctors  had decided not  to 
resuscitate her. Jill Baker,  67,  who has stomach cancer,  only found out after she left hospital that 
the words,  "inappropriate for resuscitation" ,  had been written  on her hospital notes.  Neither she 
nor her husband had been asked for their views.  She said she was  "written  o ff by a doctor who 
never  met  her.  But  today,  nine  months  later,  she  is  enjoying  a good quality  of life  (Guardian, 
Thursday April 13, 2000).
Medical law and ethics, a new breed of disciplines in the medical curriculum, have 
been bom out of the need to protect both patients’  and doctors’ rights. However, 
the  exercise of doctors’  paternalism is  still evident.  Mrs  Baker’s  case is  a clear 
example of how medical practice can undermine patients’  self-determination and 
autonomy in the 21st century.
To protect patients’ autonomy and self-determination, English law has recognised 
that  a  competent  patient  has  the  right  to  refuse  treatment,  even  life  sustaining 
treatment. This has been illustrated in the case of Miss B, a 43- year-old woman 
who won her high court battle for the right to die peacefully and with dignity (The 
Guardian,  Friday  March  22,  2002).  Her  case,  which  is  described  below,  is 
significant, not only because it sets a legal precedent that other patients may wish 
to  follow,  but  also  because  it  addresses  important  issues,  such  as  how  far  the 
doctor’s  duty  of care  extends,  assessment  of patients’  mental  capacity  and  the 
importance  of advance  statements  (patients’  refusals  for  treatment)  in  advance 
care planning.
Miss B was informed by her doctors,  in August 1999,  that a malformation of blood vessels in her 
spinal column could result in severe disability. As a result of that consultation, she wrote out a will 
stating that she did not wish  to receive treatment if she was left suffering from a  life threatening 
condition, permanent mental impairment or unconsciousness.  When her condition  improved,  Miss 
B  left  hospital  optimistic  about  her future  and  eventually  returned  to  work.  However,  at  the 
beginning o f2001, she began to suffer weakening on the left side of her body and numbness in her 
legs. In February a massive recurrence of the bleeding left her tetraplegic, with complete paralysis 
from  the  neck  down.  She  was  transferred  to  an  intensive  care  unit,  where  she  has  been  since, 
entirely  dependent on  a  ventilator.  At  the  time  of her  transfer she  referred the  two  consultants 
treating her to her will,  which stated that she did not want to be kept alive on a ventilator. But the 
doctors  said  her  will  was  not  specific  enough  to  authorise  them  to  end  treatment.  After  an 
operation that relieved her condition, allowing her to move her head and to speak, she again asked 
for the ventilator to be switched off. By April, Miss B gave formal instructions via her solicitors for 
her treatment to cease and the hospital responded by calling in  two  independent psychiatrists  to 
assess her competence to make the decision. Both initially found she did have such a capacity,  but 
then  reversed  their findings.  While  this  was  going  on,  preparations  had  been  made for  the 
ventilator to  be switched off,  and Miss B held discussions  with  one of the doctors,  agreeing she 
should have three days to say goodbye to her friends and family and to finalise her affairs.  These 
preparations  were  called  off when  the  psychiatrists  changed  their  reports  and  Miss  B  was 
prescribed antidepressants. It was at this time that Miss B did agree she was relieved the ventilator 
had not been switched off and in May said she would try rehabilitation.
19But  in  August  Miss  B  authorised  a  doctor  to  reassess  her  ability  to  make  decisions  on  her 
treatment and he found that she was competent.  The hospital said it respected her decision, but did 
not turn off the ventilator. Doctors at the hospital said it would be against their ethics to switch off 
the machine needed to keep the patient alive (The Guardian, Friday March 22, 2002).
As Miss B  said in reply to the court ruling,  “the law on consent to treatment is 
very  clear  and  this  has  been  a  long  and  unnecessary  and  personally  painful 
process.” (The Guardian, Friday March 22, 2002)
Could  this  painful  process  for Miss  B  be  avoided?  What  were  the  factors  that 
hindered the process of honouring her wishes? One factor relates to the clarity of 
her wishes.  Her doctors  said her advance  statement was  not  specific  enough to 
authorise them to end treatment. The second factor points in a different direction, 
that of her mental capacity to make treatment decisions. Psychiatric evaluation on 
two occasions showed that she was competent to make the decision to refuse but 
still her wishes were not honoured.  Miss B’s example reiterates the complicated 
nature of our society’s dilemma: honouring patients’ wishes may put doctors and 
nurses in the position of carrying out euthanasia which is not acceptable to English 
law and against their duty of care, while disobeying their patients’ wishes may be 
a case of battery.
If patients with sound mind face difficulties convincing their doctors about their 
abilities to make treatment decisions, what happens with those who  are ascribed 
the status of a psychotic patient?
Mr C was a patient in Broadmoor, detained under section 3 of the Mental Health 
Act  1983.  He  suffered  from  delusions  that  some  of the  Broadmoor  staff were 
torturing  him  and  that  he  had  been  a  doctor  who  could  cure  damaged  limbs 
without resource to amputation.  On September 9  1993, the hospital staff noticed 
he had a swollen leg. The Broadmoor surgeon diagnosed gangrene in the foot and 
he  was  transferred  to  a  surgical  hospital.  The  consultant  vascular  surgeon 
suggested that Mr C would die imminently if the leg were not amputated below 
the knee. Mr C refused to allow his leg to be amputated in any circumstances then 
or  at  any  time  in  the  future.  He  applied  to  the  High  Court  for  an  injunction 
restraining amputation on that basis. “His competency to consent to treatment was
20assessed but no link was found between C’s refusal and his persecutory delusions. 
In addition to that, C was found to be quite content to follow medical advice and 
to co-operate in treatment appropriately as long as his rejection of amputation was 
respected.” (2) (p.  623) His application to the High Court was successful and he 
became the first English psychiatric patient detained under a section of the Mental 
Health Act  1983  to  have the right to  refuse medical  treatment recognised by  a 
court (3).
The  case  of  Mr  C  pointed  to  another  major  shift  towards  patients’  self- 
determination  and  autonomy  in  the  complex  context  of  psychiatric  care: 
recognition that detention under the Mental Health Act and a psychiatric diagnosis 
do  not  necessarily  lead  to  mental  incapacity  to  make  treatment  decisions. 
However,  things  become  more  complicated  when  psychiatric  patients  refuse 
hospitalisation and treatment for their psychiatric condition.
In Rennie v. Klein, in which a repeatedly admitted patient argued for his right to 
refuse psychiatric treatment, the District Court in the United States articulated that 
mental illness was not equivalent to incompetence and that the mentally ill had a 
right  to  refuse  treatment  for  the  reason  of side  effects  in  the  absence  of an 
emergency (4).  More recently, Nancy Hargrave a patient with history of paranoid 
schizophrenia and multiple admissions to the Vermont State Hospital, had written 
a  psychiatric  advance  statement  that  refused  “any  and  all  antipsychotic, 
neuroleptic, psychotropic, or psychoactive medications” if she became ill and was 
involuntarily  committed  (5).  The  U.S.  District  Court  allowed  the  advance 
statement to stand as written even when the patient was involuntarily committed 
(5).
By citing the above legal cases, I have tried to paint a picture of the difficulties 
associated with the concept of autonomy and self-determination in the context of 
general  and  mental  health  care.  In  the  pages  that  follow,  I  will  discuss  the 
complexities underlying these concepts within the context of psychiatry in Britain 
and the USA, focusing on patients’ advance statements for psychiatric care.  Most 
of the academic and legal discussion to date has not been in this area, but on end- 
of-life decisions.
21I will begin with a discussion of psychiatric and medical advance statements and 
will  explore  their  underlying  conceptual  basis,  their  potential  value  and  the 
difficulties  in  implementing  them.  Inherent  in  psychiatric  advance  statements’ 
implementation is the concept of mental  capacity,  which  I will  explore next.  In 
chapter three,  I will  discuss the concept of self-efficacy and its relevance to the 
preference for care study. The final chapter of the literature review will focus on 
an overview of randomised controlled trials.  I will then describe the research I 
carried out and the findings in relation to psychiatric advance statements.  In the 
final chapters, I will discuss these findings in relation to previous research in the 
area  and the new ways  this project has  opened  in terms  of future  research  and 
policy making in relation to psychiatric advance statements.
22CHAPTER 1 
PSYCHIATRIC ADVANCE STATEMENTS
In the following pages, I will first look at the changes in psychiatric services and 
the advocacy movement that gave rise to psychiatric advance statements, patient 
autonomy and  self-determination in the  last half-century.  Then I will  attempt to 
unfold the historical development of advance statements before I move on to the 
legal and philosophical issues underlying the design and implementation of such 
documents in the context of general medicine and psychiatry. Finally, I will look 
at  the  effectiveness  of  such  documents  in  medicine  and  psychiatry  and  the 
challenges of implementing them in today’s NHS.
23Changes in psychiatric services during the last half-century that 
led to users’ autonomy and self-determination
Patient  advance  statements  can  only  be  understood  in  the  context  of  the 
development of psychiatric  services  and the development of patients’  autonomy 
and self-determination in general and mental health services.  In this part of the 
thesis, the development of psychiatric services will be explored.
From asylums to community care and treatment
In the USA, there was a 34% decrease in psychiatric hospitals from  1954 to  1998 
while the year-end census of patients between  1954 and  1996 decreased by 89% 
(6). The decrease in the size of state hospitals was mainly due to reduced inpatient 
care (e.g. from 44 days median length of stay in  1971  to 26 days in  1975) (6). A 
similar trend was observed in England. The number of psychiatric beds decreased 
from 152,000 in 1954 to 39,500 in 1993, a reduction of 74% (7).
The main reasons for the closure of many state hospitals in the seventies involved 
overcrowding, under-funding and low standards of care (6;8).  Muijen (1996) in 
his chapter on “Scare in the Community”, summarises very eloquently the public’s 
feeling of loathing  for the rigid care of the mentally ill  in  state hospitals which 
ignored  human  values  and  were  “dominated  by  a  self-satisfied  medical  model 
insensitive  to  patients’  experiences.”  (p. 144)  Issues  such  as  patient 
institutionalisation and families’ and patients’ resistance to discharge led the state 
hospital managers of that decade to seek integration with community services (e.g. 
geographical matching of state hospital wards  and catchment areas)  in the USA 
(6).  In England, the care of acutely mentally ill people was to be provided locally, 
in district general hospitals while those with long-term psychiatric problems were 
cared for in rehabilitation hostels in the community which were funded by local 
authorities  (8;9).  However,  the  decrease  in  hospital  beds  and  the  discharge  of 
patients in the community was poorly co-ordinated which led to new problems in 
the eighties (6;8;9).  Patients with severe problems were not admitted due to lack 
of  hospital  beds  and  those  still  at  risk  were  discharged  early  (6;8;9).  Poor 
coordination of psychiatric services led to shocking events such as the killing of
24Isabel Schwarz a social worker by her former patient Sharon Campbell at Bexley 
Hospital (8). That event shifted the anger of the public from the hospital staff (who 
were previously viewed as abusers and oppressors) to the mentally ill people and 
the inadequacy of community care (6;8).  The public’s fear that community care 
was out of control was further reinforced by more publicised scandals committed 
by  mentally  ill  people  in  the  early  nineties  (8).  “Concerns  were  repeatedly 
expressed that the movement towards community care had resulted in excessive 
burden  on  carers,  an  increase  in  the  homeless  mentally  ill,  diversion  of  the 
mentally ill into the criminal justice system and a poor quality of life for people 
released from hospital without adequate further care and  support.  One recurring 
theme  was  that  people  were  ‘falling  through  the  cracks’.”  (10)  (p.235)  As  a 
consequence, in England, the Royal College of Psychiatrists was asked to produce 
guidelines  on  good  practice  for  discharge  and  aftercare  procedures.  Statutory 
revisions  of the  1959  and  1983  Mental  Health  Acts  led  to  the  Mental  Health 
(Patients  in  the  Community)  Act  (8; 11).  Service  evaluation  interventions  that 
started in the seventies offered new insights and led to the development of ‘case 
management’  and  ‘assertive  community  treatment’(6).  The  aims  of  case 
management  are “to  ensure continuity of care,  accessibility to  often  fragmented 
and  independently  managed  services,  accountability,  and  efficiency.  The  core 
functions usually include:  assessing patients’ needs; developing a comprehensive 
care  plan;  arranging  service  delivery;  monitoring  and  assessing  services; 
evaluating  progress  and  follow-up.  Although  the  practice  of case  management 
varies,  two  general  approaches  can  be  identified.  Service  ‘brokerage’  case 
management sees the ‘case manager’ as an enabler, systems coordinator, or broker 
of services. In ‘clinical’ case management on the other hand, the professional has a 
direct treatment relationship with the patient, often being personally involved with 
aspects of the patient’s psychological, physical and social care.” (7) (p. 364)  The 
new focus on evaluation research including the effectiveness of case management 
in the eighties did not support simple implementation of case management (12; 13) 
turning  the  attention  of  service  providers  to  ‘assertive  community  treatment’. 
“Assertive community treatment aims to provide  a comprehensive  care package 
including treatment and  support services via a multidisciplinary team within the 
community. It includes frequent contacts with patients in the community (often at
25home),  24-hour  availability,  direct  responsibility  of staff for  a  broad  range  of 
interventions, and low staff/patient ratios.” (7) (p.365)
In summary, the psychiatric services of the 20th century were mainly characterised 
by closure of the asylums and transfer of patients’  care in the community.  Apart 
from acute inpatient care that happens in general and state psychiatric hospitals, at 
present,  community care  is mainly delivered by multidisciplinary teams  such as 
‘assertive outreach teams’.
26Consumer advocacy and empowerment
Along with the changes in the organisation and delivery of psychiatric  services, 
consumer- advocacy and empowerment has been growing fast and strong.
At the beginning of 20th century, people with serious mental illness were usually 
isolated  from  society by being  locked  in  state psychiatric  hospitals  (14).  Those 
with less  severe mental  illness  could probably try to  live  a  ‘normal’  life  in the 
community but hide their disability because of the stigma associated with it (15). 
In his historical overview of the consumer-advocacy movement, Frederick Frese
(1998)  a clinical psychologist diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia writes:  “as 
long as persons with schizophrenia and their family members were too ashamed to 
openly identify themselves,  practically  speaking,  no  one  who  had  any personal 
experience with these disorders could give any effective feedback concerning their 
satisfaction, or lack thereof, with the mental-health services.” (15)  (p.236)  With 
the closure of many public psychiatric hospitals and the exodus of patients in the 
community,  a  small  number  of ex-inpatients  who  recovered  sufficiently  started 
gathering together and sharing their views  (15).  “Many of these  former patients 
had  been  forced  into  treatment  and  felt  they  had  been  abused  during  their 
experience.  They believed that they had not been given respect or dignity while 
they were hospitalised. Many became angry at the psychiatric establishment, and 
looked  for  examples  of  psychiatry  being  portrayed  as  uncaring  and 
oppressive.”(15)  (p.237)  These groups viewed psychiatrists  as  oppressors,  they 
identified themselves with members of other traditionally excluded and oppressed 
racial, religious and ethnic groups and gave themselves names such as the ‘Mental 
Patients’  Liberation  Project  in  New  York’  (15).  In  the  USA,  the  government 
started  to  take  notice  of these  groups  and  in  1976  established  the  President’s 
Commission on Mental Health.  Furthermore, in  1985,  consumer advocates were 
funded  by  the  federal  government’s  Community  Support  Program  to  attend 
national conferences (15).
In the UK, the Mental Patients’ Union and the ‘anti-psychiatry movement’  in the 
seventies, encouraged a number of ex-inpatients to get involved in groups such as 
the  British  Network  for  Alternatives  to  Psychiatry  and  the  Campaign  Against
27Psychiatric  Oppression.  These individuals went on to organise the first National 
Mind  Annual  Conference  which  took  place  in  1985  and  gave  birth  to  two 
user/survivor  organisations:  Nottingham  Advocacy  Group  and  Survivors  Speak 
Out (16).
According to  Frese  (1998),  a schism  followed those  first conferences  (15).  One 
group of ex-inpatients opposed forced treatment under any condition and viewed 
psychiatric  treatment  and  psychiatrists  as  oppressors.  They  preferred  to  call 
themselves  survivors.  The  other  group  was  more  moderate  regarding  forced 
treatment and called themselves users or advocates.  Szasz (1982) using the term 
‘psychiatric  will’,  offered  a  solution  to  this  debate  by  suggesting  to  users  to 
document their preferences  for or  against psychiatric  treatment  and  make  them 
known  to  their  care  providers  (for  a  detailed  definition  and  explanation  of 
psychiatric wills see the following section).  The principles and identities of the 
above groups have changed over the years in order to reflect the changes in society 
and  psychiatric  care  (15; 16).  However,  their  principles  about  patient 
empowerment and improvement of their human rights have grown even stronger 
and  have  given  rise  to  the  “current,  pragmatically-oriented  user/survivor 
organisations.” (16) (p. 219)  Local service user groups play a very important role 
in mutual  support,  combating stigma,  helping people to recover and  stay out  of 
services, and participating in local service planning and development. Nationally, 
the  most  prominent  current  advocacy  issues  related  to  user  empowerment, 
autonomy  and  self-determination,  have  been  informed  consent,  involuntary 
admission,  users’  participation  in  research  projects  and  psychiatric  advance 
statements (15).
In summary, during the first half of the 20th century doctors had monopoly over 
the practice of medicine in general and psychiatry in particular. With a change of 
focus on cost-effective care, politicians and those responsible for financing health 
care turned to  service  recipients  for input  as to  what  is the best  care  for them. 
Through the debates of consumer-advocacy groups psychiatric advance statements 
have been at the forefront of modem psychiatric care.
28Definition of psychiatric advance statements
Psychiatric  advance  statements  are  a  person’s  written  or  oral  preferences  for 
treatment should he or she lose capacity to make such decisions in the future.  In 
the literature, psychiatric advance statements appear under different names.
The oldest definition is that of ‘psychiatric will’ proposed by Szasz in  1982. His 
response aimed to provide a solution to the debates among user groups and anti­
psychiatry  campaigners  in  relation  to  involuntary  commitment  and  coercive 
psychiatry (17).  He wrote:
“The  imagery of ‘sudden madness’  or  ‘acute psychosis’  sketched  earlier represents  the  dreaded 
situation  that  some  persons  may  want  to  anticipate  and plan  for.  Since  involuntary psychiatric 
confinement is a tradition-honored custom in modem societies, the situation such persons need to 
anticipate  must be  their own  sudden  madness  managed by  others  by  means  of commitment  and 
coerced treatment.  To forestall such an event, we need a mechanism enabling anyone reaching the 
age of maturity, who so desires, to execute a ‘psychiatric will’ prohibiting his or her confinement 
in a mental hospital or his or her involuntary treatment for mental illness. Those failing to execute 
such a document before an actual encounter with coercive psychiatry would,  of course, have the 
opportunity to do so as soon as they have ‘recovered’ from their first episode of ‘mental illness’ or
otherwise  regained  their  competence  This  would  leave  everyone  who  has  not  executed  a
psychiatric will free from psychiatric coercion, much as we are free, without having to go to such 
troubles, of theological coercion.” (17) (p. 768)
Survivors  Speak  Out,  one  of the  UK’s  leading  user  groups  proposed  the  term 
‘crisis  cards’  or  ‘treatment  contracts’(18).  These  documents  are  made  by  the 
patient and include ‘packages of care’ that should be used by treatment providers 
in a crisis.  In order to  evaluate the effectiveness  of ‘crisis cards’  Sutherby et al
(1999)  and Henderson et al (2004) borrowed the term ‘crisis card’ and extended it 
to ‘joint crisis plans’ to document patients’ choice of information and preferences 
for care that are drafted in collaboration with their treatment provider (18; 19).
Another frequently quoted definition is that of ‘Ulysses contract’  (see  following 
section for more information on the development of the term)  (20-22).  ‘Ulysses 
contracts’ contain the patient’s refusals of treatment and do not direct or authorise 
specific procedures for care (22).  To express their opposition to Ulysses contracts 
and psychiatric wills, Rogers and Centifanti (1991) came up with the term ‘Mill’s 
will’ which should include both the acceptance and refusal of particular forms of 
treatment (23).  The authors state that “unlike a consumer giving a blanket yes or 
no  in the Ulysses  and psychiatric  wills,  respectively,  the  consumer setting up  a
29Mill’s will would be exercising the right to plan in an intelligent, self-actualising 
manner and demonstrating his or her awareness of how the courts have recently 
been approaching the substituted judgement issues in both the right-to-refuse and 
right-to-die cases.” (23) (p. 11)
Other  definitions  refer  to  substantive  versus  procedural  directives  or  advance 
instruction directives  versus  Health  Care Proxies  or durable  powers  of attorney 
(24;25).  Substantive or advance  instruction directives  are  similar to Mill’s wills 
and  contain  instructions  detailed  by  the  patient  in  advance  that  tell  treatment 
providers  what  to  do  or  not  to  do  in  a mental  health  crisis  should  the  patient 
become incompetent and unable to communicate his or her wishes. Procedural or 
Health  Care  Proxies  or  durable  powers  of  attorney  allow  the  individual  to 
designate  someone else to make decisions on his or her behalf should he or she 
become incompetent. In the USA, these two types of documents (substantive and 
procedural) often appear together to produce a mixed directive which is considered 
a more powerful tool than either the substantive or proxy directive (24;25).
More  recently,  Williams  and  Rigby  have  made  a  further  distinction  between 
advance statements and advance directives (26).
According to them, advance statements are:
•  Usually positively framed treatment choices or  requests,
•  Not legally binding, but should be honoured where possible,
•  Can be vague and open to interpretation.
While advance directives are:
•  One of many types of advance statement,
•  Treatment refusals, therefore more specific,
•  Legally binding if capacity and applicability criteria fulfilled.
The report of the expert committee on the review of the Mental Health Act  1983 
and the new Mental Capacity Act (2005) use the terms advance decisions to refer 
to  legally binding  documents  which  contain  refusals  of treatment  and  advance 
statements to refer to documents that include a patient’s wishes and feelings which 
are not legally binding but should be taken into account in future care decisions
30(27;28).  Although advance decisions will not be valid  for psychiatric treatment, 
advance  statements  are  highly  recommended  for  psychiatric  treatment  in  both 
Acts.
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidelines for schizophrenia 
and  depression  uses  the  term  advance  directives.  NICE  is  the  independent 
organisation responsible for providing national guidance on the promotion of good 
health  and  the  prevention  and  treatment  of ill  health  (www.nice.org.ukh  The 
following tables outline the institute’s approach:
1.1.8 Advance directives_____________________________________________
1.1.8.1  Although there are limitations with advance directives regarding the 
choice  of treatment  for  individuals  with  schizophrenia,  it  is  recommended 
that  they  are  developed  and  documented  in  individuals’  care  programmes 
whenever possible.
1.1.8.2 When advance directives have been agreed, copies should be placed 
in primary-care and secondary-care case notes/care plans, and copies given to 
the service user and his or her care coordinator. If appropriate, and subject to 
agreement with the service user, a copy should be given to his or her carer.
Table 1: NICE guidelines for schizophrenia: 
http://www.nice.ora.uk/pdf/CG
1.1.1 Advance directives_____________________________________ _ _____
1.1.1.1  Although  there  are  limitations  with  advance  directives  about  the 
choice of treatment  for people who  are  depressed,  it is recommended  that 
they are developed and documented in care plans, especially for people who 
have recurrent severe or psychotic depression, and for those who have been 
treated under the Mental Health Act.____________________________________
Table 2: NICE guidelines for depression: 
http://www.nice.org.uk/pdf/word/CG023NICEguideline.doc
MIND  a  leading  UK  mental  health  charity  uses  the  term  “advance  statement 
(personal crisis plan for mental healthcare advance decision making)” to describe 
patients’ preference for care (www.mind.org.ukT
The report of the expert committee on the review of the Mental Health Act  1983 
and the Mental Health Foundation another leading mental health charity, introduce 
the  term  “advance  agreement  (a plan  for  future  crisis,  developed  in  agreement
31between  service  user  and  service  provider)”  in  addition  to  the  terms  advance 
statements and advance directives (28;29).
Taking into  consideration that such instruments  are as unique as the individuals 
who design them and the highly subjective nature of interpreting their contents, 
it’s very difficult to make distinctions between advance statements  and  advance 
directives  as they are  defined by Williams  and  Rigby and  in the  draft  Code  of 
Practice  of the  Mental  Capacity  Act  (30).  As  the  preference  for  care  study 
showed, patients tend to use both positively framed treatment choices and refusals 
in the same document (31 ;32).
In the literature, authors with an interest in psychiatric advance statements use the 
above mentioned terms rather arbitrarily to describe statements of preferences for 
future  mental  health  care.  For  example,  a  lot  of authors  use  the  term  Ulysses 
contracts  and  psychiatric  wills  for  documents  that  contain  both  refusals  and 
preferences  for  care  and  more  recently  Ulysses  contracts  are  associated  with 
irrevocability (24;33). To avoid confusion I will use the term psychiatric advance 
statements throughout the text (except when  I quote  studies  that use  any of the 
above terms) to describe patients’  preferences for care in mental health contexts 
and  medical  advance  statements  to  describe  patients’  preferences  for  care  in 
medical contexts.
32Historical overview of the development of advance statements
From Homer to 21st century
The first oral advance statement was created by Ulysses, Homer’s hero, who had 
braved  a  10-year  voyage  home  with  his  men  following  the  Trojan  War.  Their 
journey involved a passage near the Sirens, notorious for their enchanted singing, 
who had tempted many an unsuspecting sailor close, only to be shipwrecked upon 
the rocks on which they sang. Ulysses, longing to hear their song, instructed his 
crew to stop up their ears with wax and to tie him firmly to the mast of his ship. 
Thus deafened, the crew would not give in to the enchantments of the Sirens or to 
Ulysses’s request to  sail toward them as he fell under their charms.  Similarly,  a 
Ulysses statement would allow the physician to give priority to the patient’s prior 
competent  instructions  when  these  are  at  odds  with  the  wishes  expressed  in  a 
subsequent incompetent state (34).
The first written living will was described in 1969.  Luis Kutner used the term to 
describe a document in which a competent adult could direct health care providers 
about medical treatments in the event of his or her subsequent incompetence.  In 
1975,  the  New  Jersey  Supreme  Court  case  of  Karen  Quinlan  focused  public 
attention  on  the  living  will  and  led  to  the  nation’s  first  living  will  statute:  the 
California Natural Death Act in 1976. Karen Quinlan was 21 years old when a mix 
of  alcohol  and  drugs  caused  brain  damage,  leaving  her  in  a  permanently 
unconscious  state.  Her biological  functions were maintained by a respirator and 
artificial  nutrition  and  hydration.  Her  father  sought judicial  appointment  to  be 
Karen’s legal guardian with authority to remove the respirator.  Opposition to the 
father’s  petition  was  grounded  primarily  on  claims  that  detachment  of  the 
respirator would constitute murder and that courts  should not  interfere  with her 
physician’s professional judgement in favour of continued life support.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court unanimously upheld the father’s petition. The court posited 
that Karen, if competent, would be constitutionally entitled to resist life-sustaining 
medical intervention (35;36).
33The  first cases  of oral  advance  statements  that  appeared  in court were those  of 
Brother  Fox  and  Mary  O’Connor  in  the  1980s.  In  Re  Eichner,  Brother  Fox,  a 
member of a Catholic religious order,  had discussed Karen Quinlan’s  case with 
other  members  of  the  order  and  he  indicated  that  if  he  was  permanently 
unconscious,  he  would  not  like  his  life  to  be  sustained.  During  a  surgical 
procedure,  some  years  later,  he  suffered  a  cardiac  arrest  and  remained  in  a 
persistent vegetative state. Father Eichner, acting on behalf of Brother Fox, filed a 
petition to remove all life support. The court examined the seriousness of Brother 
Fox’s  statements  and  concluded that  they “constituted  solemn pronouncements, 
and  therefore  met  the  clear  and  convincing  evidence  standard  applied  in  such 
cases.”  (37)  (p.  68)  The  patient  Mary  O’Connor,  was  demented  as  a  result  of 
several strokes and while in hospital she required the insertion of a feeding tube 
for  adequate  nutrition  and  hydration.  Her daughters  refused  to  consent  and  the 
hospital petitioned the court for authorising the placement of the tube.  Although 
the  initial  court  denied  the  petition,  the  hospital  appealed  and  the  case  was 
considered  by  the  same  court  that  decided  Brother  Fox’s  case.  The  majority 
decided that Mrs  O’Connor’s statements were not  ‘solemn pronouncements’  but 
“immediate  reactions  to  the  unsettling  experience  of  seeing  or  hearing  about 
another’s unnecessarily prolonged death.”(37) (p.  69)  In the literature, these two 
cases  are presented  as  an  example  of the  gender bias  that  underlined  the  court 
proceedings in honouring male versus female oral advance statements at that time. 
For example, Mary O’Conor’s oral statement was characterised as an ‘emotional 
response’  rather  than  ‘solemn  pronouncement  made  after  reflection’  and 
dismissed  while  the  one  made  by  Brother  Fox  was  honoured  because  of  its 
cognitive superiority (37).
Following the above legal cases and changes in law to accommodate individuals’ 
wishes  regarding  their health  care,  mental  health professionals  (17;20;38),  user 
groups  and  lawyers  started  to  look  at  the  possibilities  of extending  living  will 
documents  and  statutes  to  mental  health  care.  As  a  consequence,  the  terms 
‘psychiatric wills’  and  ‘Ulysses  Contracts’  started to  appear during the  eighties 
and legislation to cover them appeared in the early nineties in the USA (see the 
following section for a more detailed analysis).
34The Nancy Cruzan case, again in the USA, endorsed the durable power of attorney 
for health care in 1990. Nancy Cruzan entered a persistent vegetative state (PVS) 
at the age of 24 after a car accident.  Her family and friends provided “clear and 
convincing  evidence”  that  Nancy would not  have wanted  to be  kept  alive  in  a 
persistent  vegetative  state  by  medical  technology.  The  legal  standard  of 
substituted judgement  was  used  to  designate  a  surrogate  health  care  decision­
maker (that is, a durable power of attorney for health care). The durable power of 
attorney document authorises the decision-maker to permit withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition  or  other  treatments  in  the  event  of a  medically  pointless  situation  or 
permanently unconscious state (36;39).
Following  these  and  a  number  of other  cases,  two  major  events  happened  in 
America in 1990:
•  The  Supreme  Court  recognised  that  a  person  has  a  constitutional  liberty 
interest  in  refusing  life-sustaining  medical  treatment,  including  artificial 
nutrition and hydration.
•  The  Patient  Self-Determination  Act,  which  states  that  all  patients  upon 
admission to  a  facility or on  engagement with  services  covered  by the  Act, 
should be provided with information about medical advance directives in their 
jurisdiction.
Compliance  with  this  federal  law  is  a  requirement  for Medicare  and  Medicaid 
reimbursement.  Additional  provisions  address  documentation  of  pre-existing 
advance statements, staff education and legal immunity for physicians who honour 
advance statements (37).
Although  congress  passed  the  Patient  Self-Determination  Act  to  promote 
completion of advance statements, the statute did not create any new substantive 
rights. As Gallagher states, “because the Patient Self-Determination Act does not 
purport to create substantive standards  for the recognition of advance directives, 
and because it omits to provide any meaningful mechanism for enforcement, the 
significance of the Act is largely precatory.” (33) (p. 769)
35All  fifty  states  now  recognise  advance  statement  documents,  and  each  state’s 
version  is  widely  available  to  the  public  through  health  care  providers,  public 
libraries and the state bar association (36). Psychiatric advance statements are also 
recognised under the generic advance directive law unless a state clearly excludes 
some kinds of mental health care from the generic law or has established a specific 
psychiatric advance statement law (see the following section for more detail) (40).
So far I have looked at the development of medical advance statements that gave 
rise  to  psychiatric  advance  statements.  I  will  now  turn  to  the  legal  and 
philosophical aspects underlying psychiatric advance statements in the USA and 
Europe.
36Legal status of  Psychiatric Advance Statements in the USA
The constitution in the USA recognises the competent individual’s right to accept 
or refuse medical treatment (even life-sustaining) as superior to the state’s parens 
patriae (the need to care for people who are not able to care for themselves due to 
illness) interest in prolonging life. One would expect this right to be even stronger 
than the state’s parens patriae interest in providing treatment to  a patient whose 
life  is  not  at risk  as  in the  cases  of mentally ill  individuals.  Legal  analysis  of 
statutes (constitutional,  common law and statutory)  in the USA (33;40)  suggests 
that in theory both  those  suffering  from medical  conditions  and those  suffering 
from mental illness may “exercise this  liberty interest when they are competent, 
even though they may be incompetent when their choice is given effect.”(24) (p. 
28) In his analysis of State Statutes, Fleischner (1998) has found that “the majority 
of state  advance  directive  statutes  expressly  or by  implication  apply  to  mental 
health care.  Some  states,  however,  have  also  enacted  advance  directive  statutes 
that apply specifically and solely to mental health treatment or to  some kinds of 
mental health treatment.” (40) (p. 791)
Legal analysts also suggest that several states prevent the mental health provider 
and/or proxy from  authorising certain intrusive  forms of treatment  such as ECT 
and psychosurgery even when the patient is involuntarily committed and a clinical 
finding of incompetence is established (24;33;40).
In terms of revocation, psychiatric advance statements are irrevocable after loss of 
competence in all except two states that have adopted the instruments. Maine and 
Illinois,  that  have  both  a  generic  and  a  mental  health  directive  law,  offer  the 
individual a choice in terms of revocability (40). Individuals, who due to previous 
mental health illness want their psychiatric advance statements to be irrevocable, 
may feel that writing a document that is revocable while they are incompetent is a 
useless exercise. While others who either have no previous experience with mental 
illness or have experience with mental illness but feel that anticipation of all future 
contingencies  is  impossible,  may  not  want  to  be  bound  by  their  previously 
expressed preferences  in circumstances  of an uncertain  future.  It  seems  that the
37example of Maine and Illinois may provide the solution for the long run debate 
about irrevocable psychiatric advance statements (40).
However, the major concern of legal analysts in the USA, is not about the validity 
of psychiatric advance statements but the challenges of their enforceability under 
involuntary commitment laws and especially the distinction between instruments 
electing and refusing treatment (24;33). As Gallagher points out “whereas in the 
general medical sector extraordinarily compelling state interests (e.g. the interests 
of dependent children) have been required to override a person’s right to  forego 
even  lifesaving  interventions,  in  the  involuntary  psychiatric  arena,  sufficiently 
‘compelling’  interests  include  not  only  the  prevention  of physical  harm  to  the 
patient and others but the prevention of ‘substantial deterioration’ in the patient’s 
psychiatric  condition  and  the  avoidance  of prolonged  hospitalisation.”  (33)  (p. 
774) Winick (1996) suggests that this dilemma could be answered by applying the 
same  principles  one  applies  to  medical  advance  statements.  When  a  patient  is 
detained under the state’s parens patriae power (the need to care for people who 
are not able to care for themselves due to mental health illness) and has executed a 
valid  psychiatric  advance  statement  (e.g.  the  document  was  executed  and 
witnessed  when  the  patient  was  competent)  which  provides  a  reasonable  and 
effective  alternative  to  the  mental  health  provider’s  intervention,  his/her 
psychiatric  advance  statement  should  be  respected  (24;33).  If the  psychiatric 
advance  statement  includes  treatments  that  are  ineffective,  unlawful  or 
unapproved,  then the  state immunises mental  health providers  for not  following 
the  directive  as  in  the  cases  of  medical  advance  statements.  In  cases  of 
involuntarily detained patients  due to  the  risk  of harm  to  themselves  or  others, 
with  psychiatric  advance  statements  that  refuse  detention  and/or  treatment,  the 
state should overwrite the instruments as it would do in cases of people suffering 
from infectious diseases who  refuse treatment or quarantine  (24).  “Committable 
but untreatable patients” that could clog up the hospitals when courts established 
the right to refuse psychiatric treatment as in the case of Hargrave v. Vermont that 
was  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  has  not  happened  yet  in  the  USA  because 
courts usually override more than 90% of such cases (5;41). To honour patients’ 
autonomy  and  self-determination  in  “committable  but  untreatable  cases”,  the 
courts  usually  allow  the  terms  of  the  patients’  advance  statement  to  be
38implemented  for 45  days before non-consensual medication is  administered (5). 
However, when involuntarily detained patients who are in danger to themselves or 
others  have  executed  psychiatric  advance  statements  that  provide  rational  and 
effective treatment alternatives, these documents should be used in order to inform 
mental health providers, reduce coercion and preserve the patient’s autonomy and 
self-determination.  Winick  (1996)  and  Gallagher  (1998)  doubt  that  the  courts 
would object to implementation of such documents under the Mental Health Acts 
(24;33).  Moreover,  Swanson  et  al  (2000)  suggest  that  psychiatric  advance 
statements could be an ideal solution for those patients on outpatient commitment 
because an outpatient commitment order could cover transport to a facility while a 
psychiatric  advance  statement  could  cover  prior  consent  for  admission  and 
treatment (42).
Furthermore, enforceability of psychiatric advance statements may be hindered by 
the appointment of a health care proxy. In the absence of an instruction directive, a 
conflict  of interest  (e.g.  a  relative  who  wants  the  patient  to  be  involuntarily 
committed  due  to  the  burden  of  care)  and  other  abuses  (e.g.  mental  health 
professionals  may  coerce  patients  to  sign  such  documents)  may  expose  the 
psychiatric patient to unwanted treatment. Legal analysts suggest that states have 
to police  the process  of proxy psychiatric  statements  more  intensely  and  create 
sanctions when the  safeguards they have in place are not  followed  (24;33).  For 
example, proxy decision makers  should not be allowed to  elect certain forms of 
experimental and intrusive treatments (e.g. psychosurgery, ECT) and they should 
not be  allowed  to  act  as  substitute  decision makers  when  there  is  a  conflict  of 
interest.  Psychiatric patients should provide some general  standards to  guide the 
proxy’s decision-making.
In legal circles in the USA, a psychiatric advance statement can assist treatment 
and  limit  court  intervention  even  over the  patient’s  incapacitated  objection.  A 
psychiatric advance statement takes effect when the patient loses capacity to make 
treatment decisions. If the patient objects to a determination of incapacity made by 
a medical team or to a health care decision made by a health care proxy,  a legal 
determination of incapacity is required.  This is  an exception to the  general rule 
that  a  medical  determination  of incapacity  is  sufficient  to  trigger  the  proxy’s
39power  under  the  directive,  making  resort  to  the  courts  unnecessary  when  an 
advance statement is unchallenged (43). A more detailed analysis of the concept of 
capacity and its role in execution and revocation of psychiatric advance statements 
will  follow in chapter two.  Here I will provide  an example of the usefulness  of 
psychiatric advance statements in legal terms. The psychiatric advance statement 
retains an inherent legitimacy as the best expression of the patient’s wishes. Even 
if a hearing is  necessary to  determine  the  capacity of the patient to  revoke  the 
advance  statement,  its  function  can  be  limited  to  the  question  of the  patient’s 
competency.  As a consequence, the broader hearing commonly required when a 
patient  refuses  detention  and  treatment  for  mental  illness  will  be  unnecessary. 
McArdle (2001) illustrates this point with the following case (43).
“  The New York patient, diagnosed with a severe mental illness,  had completed a health care proxy 
several years earlier.  The proxy was modelled on the form contained in the statute and issued by 
the state department of health.  It had been properly executed and witnessed as  required by New 
York  law.  The patient  had  not  been  adjudged  incompetent  or  had  a  committee  or  guardian 
appointed  before  signing  the proxy;  accordingly,  a presumption  of competence  arose from  its 
signing.  The patient appointed a friend as her agent, but as is typical, she provided no instructions 
in the proxy about specific types of medical decisions. As in other states,  unless the agent knew the 
patient’s actual or likely wishes about medical treatment, she was required under New York law to 
make treatment decisions based on the patient's actual or likely wishes about the administration of 
antipsychotic  medication.  The patient’ s psychiatrist  determined  that  the patient  was  no  longer 
competent,  thereby triggering the agent’ s ability to make medical decisions  under the proxy.  The 
psychiatrist recommended treatment with antipsychotic medication.  The patient refused to consent 
to the treatment.  The medical staff informed the agent,  who,  based on  the recommendation of the 
patient’ s psychiatrist, provided a written consent to the administration of antipsychotic medication. 
The  consent form  contained a full  recitation  of the patient’ s  medical  diagnosis  and prognosis, 
described the treatment determined to be medically necessary,  and informed the agent of the risks 
and benefits  of the treatment.  The patient’s court-appointed attorney did not object to  treatment 
with antipsychotic medications.  The facility sought a court order because of the lack of  precedent 
on the use of a health care proxy to administer antipsychotic medication when the patient refused 
to  consent  to  treatment.  The  court,  based  on  the  agent’ s  consent  to  the  treatment,  ordered 
treatment and waived the hearing ordinarily required in  New  York before  treating a patient for 
mental illness over objection. ”  (pp 154-155)
In summary,  the  legal validity of psychiatric  advance  statements  in the  USA  is 
unquestionable.  Legal  analysts  believe  that  psychiatric  advance  statements  not 
only could bridge the gap between the rights of health and mental health patients 
but also could reduce court involvement. However, great attention is still needed 
in terms of judicial, police and other official resources for the implementation of 
such instruments.
40Legal status of  Medical and Psychiatric Advance Statements in Europe
In  the  European  Union  there  is  no  clear  legislation  as  yet,  about  medical  and 
psychiatric advance statements.
The World Health Organisation for Europe authorized in March  1994 an article 
called “Principles of the Rights of Patients in Europe.” According to this article, 
when  a patient  is  unable  to  express  his  or her will  and  medical  intervention  is 
urgently  needed,  the  consent  of the  patient  may  be  presumed  unless  there  is 
evidence  from his/her previous declaration that consent would be refused in the 
situation (44).
The  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  Biomedicine  of the  Council  of Europe 
contains an article on “previously expressed wishes.” According to  article 9 the 
“previously expressed wishes relating to a medical intervention by a patient who is 
not, at the time of the intervention, in a state to express his or her wishes shall be 
taken into account.” (44) (p. 186)
A  characteristic  of  the  above-mentioned  legislation  and  declarations  is  their 
vagueness  surrounding the functions and implementation of advance  statements. 
These  laws  limit  themselves  to  the  recognition  of the  validity  of an  advance 
refusal but practical problems are in general neither explained nor regulated. This 
is in a certain sense paradoxical because under existing law it is not so much the 
principle  of  an  advance  refusal  that  is  disputed  but  its  implementation.  This 
paradox  is  observed  in  the  legislation  and  declaration  of individual  European 
countries  within  the  European  Union  such  as  Finland,  with  the  exception  of 
Danish law. Danish law about an advance refusal is not integrated in the patients’ 
rights legislation and contains some rules about its implementation. For example, 
on 14 May 1992, an amendment of the medical law incorporated a new section 6a 
that states: “Any person who has attained the age of majority shall have the right 
to draw up a living will. The will shall express the testator’s wishes concerning the 
treatment to be administered in the event of his being in a situation where it is no 
longer possible to exercise the right of self-determination in any other way.”(44)
(p. 186).
41According to Nys (1997), European law should clarify many aspects of advance
statements, some of which are outlined below (44):
•  Who  will  decide  and  according  to  what  criteria  the  (in)competence  of the 
patient?
•  From what age can an advance statement be made?
•  Is  an  advance  statement  limited  to  refusal  of  life-sustaining  treatment 
(Denmark) or has it a larger scope (Finland)?
•  Is it limited to terminal conditions; can “basic care” be refused?
•  Are there any formalities to be respected;  how can an advance  statement be 
revoked?
•  How can one  ensure that physicians  are informed  about the  existence of an 
advance statement?
42Legal status of  Medical and Psychiatric Advance Statements in Britain 
Medical advance statements
Medical advance statements have legal effect in England in common law, providing 
they meet the following criteria for validity:
1.  the patient is competent (be competent) at the time the decision is made,
2.  anticipatory consent is based upon adequate information,
3.  the  patient  is  free  from  undue  influence  or  coercion  (in  other  words,  gives 
voluntary consent),
4.  the patient intends his refusal to apply to the circumstances which subsequently 
arise (3).
As  far  as  the  enduring  power  of attorney  is  concerned,  under  the  1985  Act  for 
Property and Affairs, the granting of a power of attorney may survive after the onset 
of the  creator’s  incompetence.  However,  the  Act  does  not  cover  decisions  about 
medical treatment since it is restricted to the “property and affairs” of an individual
(3).
Comprehensive  statutory  legislation  covering  medical  and  psychiatric  advance 
statements has been approved in 2005  (27).  The new Mental Capacity Act and the 
report of the expert committee on the review  of the Mental Health Act  1983  both 
tackle the issue of advance agreements about care and advance  decisions to refuse 
treatment in general health and mental health contexts (27;28).  As it is the case in 
common law, a patient has the right to refuse medical treatment but does not have the 
right to suggest his/her preference for particular treatments.  Both Acts establish the 
right of a proxy decision maker (Lasting Power of Attorney) to make mental health 
and  medical  treatment  decisions  on  behalf  of  the  incompetent  patient.  More 
specifically,  the  Mental  Capacity  Act  2005  establishes  the  right  of  a  competent 
person  of  18  years  or  over  to  state  orally  or  in  writing  his/her  wishes  to  refuse 
specified medical treatment (even life-sustaining treatment)  at a point in the future 
when that person is no longer competent to make treatment decisions. The new Act 
makes  a  distinction  between  “the  legal  status  of  a  general  advance  statement 
reflecting an individual’s wishes and feelings about how s/he wishes to be treated and 
a valid and applicable advance decision to refuse a specified medical procedure or
43treatment.  Both  general  advance  statements  and  advance  decisions  are  a  means 
whereby patients, through advance planning, can continue to influence the treatment 
they receive in the event that they lack capacity to express their views in the future. A 
general advance statement about wishes and feelings operates in a different way by 
influencing the way doctors determine best interests. A general advance statement is 
an  expression  of past wishes  and  feelings  and  so  forms  part  of the  best  interests 
checklist.”(30) (p.84)
The draft  Code  of Practice doesn’t provide  a prescribed  form  for writing  advance 
decisions but  suggests  that  such  forms  should  include  as  many  details  as possible 
about  the  identification  of the  person who  executed  the  document  and  should  be 
signed by independent witnesses.  An advance  decision is  valid when  specifies  the 
treatment refused, is applicable to the actual situation and has been reviewed and is 
updated regularly. The draft Code of Practice specifies three events that invalidate an 
advance decision:
•  That the person has withdrawn the decision while s/he still had capacity to do so;
•  That after making the advance decision, the person has created a Lasting Power 
of Attorney  (LPA)  giving  power  to  a  donee  to  give  or  refuse  consent  to  the 
treatment specified in the advance decision (an LPA conferring different powers 
would not affect the advance decision); or
•  That  the  person  has  done  something  which  is  clearly  inconsistent  with  the 
advance decision which implies that s/he has had a change of mind.
A competent adult has the right to withdraw and change advance decisions at  any 
stage. The new laws immunise health care professionals when they follow valid oral 
and written advance decisions but could also subject them to a claim for damages for 
battery or to criminal liability for assault if they don’t honour such valid documents. 
Health care professionals who have conscientious objections should transfer care of 
the patient to another health care professional (30).
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 has been welcomed by most professional bodies and 
advocacy groups in this country (45). However, certain criticisms have been voiced 
on a number of issues and in particular to the provisions on advance decisions (45). 
The Making Decisions Alliance, which comprises of a wide range of organisations
44and groups working with people who have difficulty in making or communicating 
decisions, expressed their dissatisfaction in the exclusion of advance preferences for 
care from the bill. They strongly suggested that advance preferences for care should 
have the same legal status as advanced refusals of treatment (45).  The Royal College 
of Physicians  expressed their opposition to the tight criteria of validity of advance 
decisions  because  of  the  difficulty  inherent  in  accurately  predicting  the  exact 
circumstances one would be for their advance decision to apply.  They fear that they 
would  still  have  to  interpret patients’  oral  and  written  advance  decisions  with the 
advice  of  the  patient’s  relatives  which  may  make  them  vulnerable  to  liability. 
Another  of their  concerns  was  about  increase  of their  workload  and  the  lack  of 
guidance regarding the best means of registration and availability of such documents 
especially when they would be most needed  (e.g.  emergency situations)  (45).  The 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 puts the responsibility for drafting advance decisions to 
the individual which may leave general practitioners to cope with the extra time and 
resources  for helping  individuals  who  would  want  their  GP  to  be  responsible  for 
registering and disseminating such documents (27).
Psychiatric advance statements
Regarding  the  validity  and  implementation  of psychiatric  advance  statements,  the
Mental  Capacity Act  2005  and the  revised draft  Mental  Health  Act  1983,  paint  a
rather  confusing  and  disappointing  picture  (27;28).  On  the  one  hand  the  Expert
Committee’s  Report  on  the  review  of the  Mental  Health  Act  1983  suggests  that
advance  statements  about  care  and  treatment  for  mental  disorder  will  not  have
statutory validity and on the other hand it suggests that patients and mental health
professionals should routinely create psychiatric advance statements (see Table 3).
12.12 In our Draft Proposals we canvassed the possibility of recommending that, 
in reflection of the principle of patient autonomy,  advance  statements be  given 
statutory recognition in any future mental health legislation.  We  suggested that 
advance  statements be recognised as  expressions  of a patient’s  capable wishes, 
and that they be allowed to prevail in the same circumstances under the new act 
as those in which the wishes of the patient with capacity at the time would be 
allowed  to  prevail.  Although  the  proposals  attracted  considerable  support,  we 
now acknowledge that it would be difficult to accord statutory recognition only to 
directives about care and treatment for mental disorder.
12.13.  However, we recognise that certain forms of advance healthcare statement 
already have full effect in common law, although they have yet to be recognised
45by act of Parliament.  We therefore recommend that the necessary provisions be 
introduced in statute and complemented by the Code of Practice, to ensure both 
that the creation of an ‘advance agreement about care’ is routinely considered by 
care  teams  and  patients  and  that  when  created  these  agreements  would  have 
sufficient  formality to  be  regarded  as  proper  statements  of a patient’s  capable 
wishes. In essence an advance agreement about care would represent the written 
outcome of a discussion between a patient, with the necessary capacity, and his or 
her care team.  It would address the patient’s treatment
preference (if any) in relation to any possible future care and treatment for mental 
disorder, and it would have to be taken into account as a capable expression of the 
patient’s preferences should treatment become necessary at a future point when 
the patient has lost capacity.
12.14.  We  are  firmly  of the  view  that  the  creation  and  recognition  of  such 
agreements  would  greatly  assist  in  the  promotion  of  informal  and  certainly 
consensual  care.  Patients  and care teams would become used to  negotiating  an 
agreed package of care to be implemented in the case of relapse.
12.15.  Accordingly, we recommend that an obligation be placed on the care team 
to  provide  all  patients,  prior  to  discharge  from  compulsion,  with  information 
about and assistance with the creation of an advance agreement about care.  We 
further recommend that any discussion concerning an advance agreement should 
involve the patient’s nominated person  and/or advocate  and,  with the patient’s 
consent,  any  relevant  carer.  The  details  of the  form  to  be  taken  by  advance 
agreements and the matters they might include should be contained in the Code of 
Practice,  which  should  set out guidance  as to how  advance  agreements  can be 
constructed in such a way as to achieve recognition in law.
Table 3: Expert Committee’s Report on the review of the Mental Health Act 1983 (pp 106-107)
The  Mental  Capacity  Act  2005  and  its  Code  of Practice  reinforces  the  disparity 
between  medical  and  psychiatric  advance  statements  by  allowing  detained 
psychiatric patients to refuse medical treatment but not psychiatric one (see Table 4) 
(27;30).
468.31  Where a patient is liable to be detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, 
the contents of any advance decision to refuse treatment for mental disorder may 
be overridden by the compulsory treatment provisions of section 63  of that Act 
which provides that “the consent of a patient shall not be required for any medical 
treatment given to him for the mental disorder from which he is suffering” [and is 
not treatment that falls under section 57  or 58  of the  1983  Act].  Treatment  for 
mental disorder may therefore be given under the  1983 Act without the patient’s 
consent and even where the patient is making or has made a decision to refuse a 
particular treatment for that particular condition. However, an advance decision to 
refuse treatment  for a physical  condition,  as  opposed to  a mental  disorder that 
falls within the application of section 63 of the 1983 Act, could still be valid and 
effective  regardless  of  whether  the  patient  was  liable  to  be  detained  or 
compulsorily treated under mental health legislation._________________________
Table 4: Extract from the draft Code of Practice for the Mental Capacity Bill (p. 91)
With the new Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the draft revisions of the Mental Health 
Act  1983,  a  great  opportunity to  give  statutory recognition  to  psychiatric  advance 
statements  is  lost  as  well  as  is  the  opportunity to  bridge  the  gap  between  mental 
health  patients’  rights  and  the  rights  of  patient’s  in  general  medical  settings. 
Furthermore,  in  what  way  could  one  differentiate  between  psychiatric  advance 
statements as they are defined by the above Acts and the Care Programme Approach 
Plans?
Care Programme Approach
In  1991  the Care Programme Approach and the Health of the Nation policies came 
into  effect  (The  Department  of  Health)  in  order  to  maximise  user  and  carer 
involvement. The Care Programme Approach (CPA) is the "cornerstone" of current 
policy for mental health services. It arose out of concern about inadequate follow-up 
care  for  people  leaving  psychiatric  hospitals,  as  evidenced  in  a  number  of well- 
publicised scandals. The Care Programme Approach emphasises various elements of 
good practice including: the assessment of the user's health and social care needs by a 
multidisciplinary team; an agreed plan of care and treatment; the allocation of a "key 
worker"  with  responsibility  for  maintaining  contact  and  monitoring  the 
implementation of the plan; and regular reviews (7).
47Users and their carers should be involved in discussions  about their proposed care 
programmes (CPs) so that they can discuss different treatment possibilities and agree 
the programme. Carers’ involvement is crucial because they often know a great deal 
about the user's life, interests and abilities as well as having personal experience of 
the user's mental health problems.
Research  on  the  effectiveness  of the  CPA  has  yielded  mixed  results.  Tyrer  et  al 
(1995)  suggested that the  supervision register (a form of at risk register-  aimed to 
ensure that someone at risk was actively followed-up, and to reduce the chances that 
he  or  she  will  slip  through  the  community  care  net)  led  to  greater  success  in 
maintaining  contact  with  vulnerable  patients,  but  was  likely  to  lead  to  more 
psychiatric admissions (46).  Phillips (1998) suggested that when there were serious 
disagreements between the  users  of mental  health  services  and professional  carers 
(e.g. their psychiatrist) over the nature of their problems or aspects of their treatment, 
the users felt that their viewpoint was not being heard and that they had to struggle to 
get changes in treatment (47). Lawson et al (1999) suggested that user involvement 
in needs  assessment  and  decision-making  in  a  survey of fifty  CPA  meetings  was 
poor,  as was knowledge  of care planning  and  information provision to  users  (48). 
Furthermore, Allen (1998) in her study of experiences and views of carers reported 
that  carers  felt  excluded  and  ignored  by  mental  health  professionals  (49).  This 
suggests that the Care Programme Approach  system may be meeting the needs  of 
professionals by ensuring regular client review and clear documentation of the care 
plan but that patients  and carers  can  feel  subject to  a degree  of coercion  in  Care 
Programme Approach meetings.
Psychiatric  advance  statements  are  designed  to  promote  patients’  empowerment, 
autonomy and self-determination. Therefore, the opportunity to complete psychiatric 
advance statements outside the Care Programme Approach meetings would closely 
involve patients in their care and consequently improve their autonomy. In addition, 
independent  researchers  and  patient  representatives  who  could  help  patients  to 
complete psychiatric advance statements outside Care Approach Meetings, would be 
more  likely  to  advocate  patients’  rights  and  preferences.  Furthermore,  this 
arrangement would not burden clinicians whose time and expertise were limited in 
terms of advance care planning.
48The validity of the preference for care study and qualification of the preference
for care booklet as ‘advance statement about care’
According to the new Mental  Capacity Act 2005,  the preference  for care booklets 
qualify  as  advance  statements  about  care  because  they  contain  information  for 
preferred  psychiatric  treatments,  treatment  refusals  and  proxy  decision  makers. 
Conducting  the  preference  for  care  study  on  patients  who  were  about  to  be 
discharged from section falls within the recommendations of both the report of the 
expert  committee  on  the  review  of the  Mental  Health  Act  1983  and  the  Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (27;28).
Due to medico-legal implications associated with psychiatric advance statements at 
that time, an academic lawyer (John Dawson) was consulted prior to the design of the 
preference for care booklet.  The legal issues considered in planning this  study and 
designing the booklet were (50):
•  The criteria and process for assessing the competence of patients to complete the 
booklet.
•  Whether completion of the booklet by a competent patient might later preclude 
provision of treatment a clinician believed was indicated.
•  Whether  clinicians  might  be  exposed  to  any  additional  forms  of  liability  if
treatment  did proceed contrary to patients’ stated preferences.
•  Whether  completion  of  the  booklet  might  mean  that  clinicians  invoked  the
authority of the  Mental  Health  Act  even  more  frequently  in  order  to  override
patients’ preferences.
Many  statements  in  the  preference  for  care  booklets  completed  as  part  of  this 
research would meet the validity requirements that are outlined at the beginning of 
this section and might therefore bind clinicians in certain respects  concerning later 
treatment options (see booklet in the pocket attached at the back of the thesis). There 
were even aspects of the methods which enhanced the validity of the booklet as an 
advance statement.
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approached  for  consent.  However,  to  be  absolutely  certain  that  the  patients  we 
approached were able to understand the process of the trial and the meaning of their 
advance statements, we asked them to re-state in their own words their understanding 
of both the aim of the study and the purpose for drafting their advance statements. 
Therefore, the competence of the patient was to be specifically assessed at the time 
their  statement  of preferences  was  made;  those  statements  would  often  relate  to 
particular  forms  of treatment  (even  named  medications)  of which  these  patients 
would have had considerable experience; the patients’ preferences would be clearly 
evidenced  in  writing;  and  the  booklet's  completion  would  be  supervised  by 
experienced health professionals (myself and  another researcher)  who  could verify 
the circumstances. These features of the research context would buttress the case that 
the patient’s statements in the booklet would meet the law's criteria for an effective 
psychiatric advance statement that should ordinarily be honoured.
One  question  in  the  booklet  was  particularly  significant  in  this  regard.  It  asked 
patients to  specify treatments they would not want to receive.  Typical responses to 
this  question  (‘No  HaloperidoT,  ‘No  injections’)  could  be  viewed  as  specific 
prohibitions  of  treatments  that  would  intrude  upon  the  patient’s  person.  For  a 
clinician then to provide that treatment,  despite that prohibition, might constitute a 
battery  of the  patient,  unless  this  was  authorised  by  mental  health  legislation  or 
justified under common law principles of necessity (51).
The limitations of psychiatric advance statements in the preference for care 
study
There  are  nevertheless  distinct  limits  to  the  effectiveness  of advance  statements 
concerning mental health care. An advance statement cannot require treatment to be 
provided  that  is  unlawful  or  unethical  or  which  is  not  clinically  indicated  or  for 
which the resources  are  not  available:  i.e.,  it  does  not  create  any  duty to  provide 
inappropriate  or  additional  care.  And  the  patient’s  stated  preferences  can  still  be 
overridden if the clinician can rely on some form of legal authority or justification for 
providing treatment without consent. Sectioning the patient under the Mental Health 
Act  1983  will usually provide that  authority,  in  the case  of treatments  ‘for mental
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suicide or other serious physical harms, provided the patient is sectioned as soon as 
practical if compulsion continues (50).
Elevating use of the Mental Heath Act due to the preference for care study
In relation to this research, the rule that the authority to treat provided by the Mental 
Health Act may override an advance statement raised the prospect that patients who 
completed the booklet might be more exposed than the control group to compulsory 
treatment  under the  Act.  That  is,  faced  with  clear  evidence  in  the  booklet  of the 
patient’s negative preferences for care (‘No injections’), clinicians who felt the need 
to override such preferences might perhaps invoke the compulsory treatment process 
more often than they otherwise would.
It was decided that even if this was the case this research would not be unlawful for 
this reason. It is not unlawful to listen carefully to patients’ preferences or to record 
them. Nor need there be any illegality in the subsequent sectioning of a patient to 
obtain  the  authority  to  override  their  preferences.  Provided  the  patient  meets  the 
relevant legal criteria, that is a proper use of the Mental Health Act, and one which is 
arguably in such patients’ interests, because it ensures they receive the benefits - of 
the procedures,  documentation and review  entitlements -  that the  Act  deliberately 
provides  for  those  treated  under  compulsion.  Completion  of the  booklet  simply 
provides one additional means through which patients’ preferences might be known.
The disclaimer at the end of the booklet
One change made in the methods was to add at the end of the booklet a disclaimer, 
the aim of which, was to reduce the chance of a patient considering they had been 
misled or misinformed as to the binding character of their statement of preferences. 
The disclaimer was to alert the patient to the fact that they might still competently 
alter their own preferences at a later time; and to make it clear that in some situations 
their preferences might be lawfully overridden.  This disclaimer had to be carefully 
worded. We did not wish to indicate the booklet was meaningless (its contents would 
still provide good evidence of the patient’s views); but nor did we wish patients to 
overestimate its legal effects.
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have been  given  statutory validity in the UK under the new Mental  Capacity Act 
2005.  However,  psychiatric  advance  statements  will  continue  being  valid  under 
common law but will not be given statutory validity.  This may not only undermine 
the  value  of  such  documents  but  could  put  off patients  from  completing  such 
documents altogether.  In contrast to USA where psychiatric advance statements are 
seen as means of bridging the gap between medical patients and psychiatric patients, 
in the UK this gap still remains wide open.
So far I have looked at the changes in psychiatric services, the development of the 
consumer  advocacy  movement  and  the  passage  from  Ulysses  initial  advance 
statement to modem medical and psychiatric advance statements.  The legal aspects 
underlying the design,  implementation and revocation of such documents has been 
discussed in different geographical contexts such as the USA, European Union and 
the United Kingdom. In the following section I will turn to the philosophical issues 
underlying medical and psychiatric advance statements.
52Philosophical issues underlying medical and psychiatric advance 
statements
Medical advance statements
The cases in court (e.g. the Nancy Cruzan case) brought forward a variety of moral 
and  ethical  debates  concerning  the  use  of  medical  advance  statements.  For 
example,  one  argument  would  run  as  follows:  young  and  healthy  individuals 
should  not  be  allowed  to  create  directives  refusing  treatment  in  the  event  of 
serious and permanent injury because of their lack of experience in such adverse 
circumstances  and  because  their  values  might  change  if a  disastrous  illness  or 
injury comes years later. Another point made was that no competent person may 
ever prospectively decline treatment for a future period of incompetence because 
the person will have no first-hand experience of what life is like as an incompetent 
individual (37). However, the same argument could apply to marriage or choice of 
profession, decisions we make when we are young. How do people know that they 
want to spend the rest of their lives with the same partner or in the same job?
Two particular views are associated with advance statements at present:
•  The  conservative  view  that rejects  the  terminal  label  until  death  is  about to 
happen (a matter of hours), therefore cancelling out much of the impact of the 
advance statement.
•  A  liberal  view  that  takes  the  position  that  any  irreversible  condition  that 
ultimately will  result  in the patient’s  death  should be  considered  a terminal 
condition,  including  a  persistent  vegetative  state.  Proponents  of this  view 
accept advance statements as the cornerstone of promoting self-determination 
and autonomy.
In the following section the debate surrounding the liberal view will be explored. 
Liberalism
Medical  ethics  in  the  USA  and  the  post-industrialised  countries  of Europe  are 
powerfully influenced by liberalism.  Liberalism is  a political point of view that 
people  should be  left  as  far  as possible  to  decide  their  own  course  of life  and
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translated  in  the  practice  of  medical  decision  making?  How  do  medical 
professionals  decide  what  is  right  or  wrong  in  a  case  like  Miss  B?  Western 
medicine uses the analysis and balancing of four main principles:
•  Autonomy: the right to make decisions about one’s own life and body without 
coercion by others.
•  Beneficence: doing good to others.
•  Nonmaleficence: not harming others.
•  Justice:  a people should be treated equally (39).
However,  there  are  limits  to  the  extent  to  which  an  advance  statement  can  or 
should promote individual autonomy (39).
Some have objected to the priority advance statements may give to the wishes of 
the individual, abstracted from the context of their social group (52). Proponents 
of  this  view  believe  that  the  individualism  inherent  in  liberalism  induces 
selfishness  because  it  would reject  the  individual’s  obligations  to  family,  state, 
ethnicity,  etc.  However,  the  majority  of people  do  commit  themselves  to  such 
obligations and can, in any case, make rational medical decisions apart from their 
‘significant others’.  However,  in reality our individual  decisions  and wishes  are 
shaped  through  the  process  of  identification  with  significant  others  within  a 
specific social and historic context.  An individual who is still able to reflect on the 
process of their views’ formation is not only a wise person but also an autonomous 
one. His or her advance statements will probably express their character within the 
social  and cultural  conditions that  shaped it.  As  flconomidis  and  Singer  (1999) 
state,  “it  is  impossible  to  think  of  ourselves  except  as  part  of  ongoing 
communities, defined by reciprocal bonds of obligation,  common traditions,  and 
institutions.  Therefore,  liberal  conceptions  of  autonomy  are  not  purely 
individualistic  as  critics  say.”  (52)  (p.  523)  This  objection,  it  seems,  can  be 
overstated.
A second objection  against the use of advance  statements  states that  giving too 
much priority to liberal autonomy could restrict social justice (52). A patient could 
express their preference for a variety of medical resources regardless of the impact
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very  scarce  and  expensive  treatment  when  other people  are being  denied  basic 
medical resources?  Does promotion of autonomy guarantee that the patient will 
get  whatever  she/he  wants?  Surely not.  So  patient  self-determination  is  to  be 
understood in the context of “informed consent” or “informed refusal” rather that 
in the context of “consumer sovereignty.” (52) (p. 524) Within this context, social 
justice can be protected by taking into account the concerns for equitable resource 
allocation that may arise in advance care planning.
A  third  objection  refers  to  justifiable  paternalism.  A  strong  liberalism  would 
accept  that  the  right  to  be  self-determining  is  inviolate  and  therefore  no  act  of 
paternalism  is justifiable  unless  to  protect  others  from  harm  (52).  However,  in 
most societies some paternalistic acts are accepted, such as those from parents to 
children, from a competent adult to another who is chronically incapacitated (e.g. 
someone with severe brain damage), and even when the beneficiary is competent 
(e.g.  all  drivers  should  wear  seat  belts).  Critics  of advance  statements  wonder 
whether they should be respected in cases when medical treatments could clearly 
benefit the individual who is now incompetent.  To answer the dilemma one can 
make  the  distinction between two  forms  of paternalism:  ‘hard paternalism’  and 
‘soft patemalism’(l;52).  ‘Hard paternalism’  refers to  the enforcement  of certain 
values  and judgements  upon people  for their own  good  (e.g.  one  should  avoid 
recreational drugs, wear seat belts).  ‘Soft paternalism’, on the other hand, focuses 
only  on  the  right  of  the  state  to  prevent  self-harmful  behaviour  that  is  not 
voluntary (e.g.  the behaviour is the result of severe brain damage).  While most 
liberals  will  discard  ‘hard  paternalism’  as  a  principle,  they  may  accept  ‘soft 
paternalism’ in cases of incompetent individuals who are unable to give informed 
consent by acting on that person’s best interests. In cases of competent individuals 
who have become incompetent due to  a disastrous illness  like Miss  B,  advance 
statements might then be overridden only when there is evidence that the patient’s 
wishes were not voluntarily made or when there is evidence that the person was 
not adequately informed about their condition at the time the directive was made. 
I  believe  that  if the  patient  has  not  referred  to  a particular  treatment  option  in 
his/her advance statement (e.g. has only given a general statement such as “do not 
resuscitate”) when competent but there is evidence that they might benefit from
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beneficence  and  non-maleficence  and  acting  according  to  the  best  interests 
standards, that advance statement should be overridden.
Finally,  another  argument  against  the  concept  of liberal  autonomy  underlying 
advance statements comes from feminist ethics (39;52). Feminist ethics may reject 
liberal autonomy because of its emphasis on questions of justice over questions of 
care. In the 1970s a group of dissatisfied female physicians in Harvard published a 
“how-to”  book  that  covered  a  broad  spectrum  of health  problems.  They  used 
simple language and their focus was “on values  such as co-operation,  nurturing 
and  bonding.”  (39)  (p.  23)  They  argued  for the  importance  of context-based 
values such as the importance of personal relationships rather than abstract notions 
of rights  (39).  In  terms  of advance  care  planning,  they  argued  that  a  strong 
liberalism  did  not  embrace  the  preservation  and  protection  of  personal 
relationships due to its emphasis on the wishes of the individual. This argument is 
overstated,  in  my view,  because  people  can  readily take  into  consideration  the 
value  of  such  relationships  when  formulating  an  advance  statement  and  the 
research shows this is the context in which their implementation is most successful 
(53).
Autonomy and personal identity
In addition to the above arguments,  another set of objections  for the validity of 
advance statements is directed towards the notion of personal identity inherent in 
the principle of autonomy. A frequently quoted hypothetical example is that of a 
demented patient who prior to his illness held his cognitive powers in the highest 
regard such that he would prefer to die rather than live without them (54). He has 
stated his values both orally and in writing so that the people close to him and his 
physician are aware of them. As his disease progresses reason leaves him, initially 
frustrating him but eventually leaving him  in a  state without recollection of his 
former talents and skills and as a result without grief at having lost them. In this 
case, the patient’s personality and values have changed irreversibly. The dilemma 
in this case lies in the choice between honouring his written wishes by withholding 
care and ending his life, on the one hand, and ignoring them and paying attention
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recognise as the proper subject of this decision: his former or current self?
To decide whether an advance statement must be  followed  or not in  the case of a
patient  who  loses  his/her  personality  irreversibly  (i.e.  through  dementia),  bio-
ethicists  turn  to  the  distinction  between  “critical  and  experiential  interests” 
(55;56). Critical interests refer to our long-term values and beliefs, our hopes and 
aims that provide genuine meaning and coherence to our lives.  Our adherence to 
these interests, explain why many of us care about how the final chapter of our life 
turns out. Experiential interests, on the other hand, involve the pleasure and pain 
we  experience  through  different  life  experiences,  such  as  hobbies,  eating  well, 
socialising  or just  working  hard  on  something.  In  many  forms  of dementia  a 
patient usually goes through three phases:
1.  The patient still has critical interests.
2.  The patient has experiential interests only.
3.  The patient has permanently lost self-awareness and interests in any form.
The question that arises from the above analysis is: at what stage do we follow or 
override the advance statement given that there is an important overlap between 
critical  and  experiential  interests?  Should  physicians  respect  the  person’s 
autonomy,  represented  in  his/her  advance  statement  and  withhold  medical 
treatment, even though he/she still has experiential interests? Is it possible to make 
compatible  a patient’s  experiential  interests  with his/her critical  interests  which 
conflict  with  them  (e.g.  the  demented  patient  is  happy  when  he  gets  his  food 
although his cognitive ability is lost)?
To solve this dilemma, bio-ethicists point to the limits of autonomy and the need 
for  specific  advance  statements  for  different kinds  of illnesses  and  cases.  They 
also  underline  the  need  to  inform  patients  about  the  risk  of  vagueness  and 
interpretation  of such documents  and the necessity to  state  conditions  in which 
they themselves would want their advance statements to be overridden. Assigning 
substitute  decision  makers  will  also  help  to  handle  limitations  arising  from 
interpretation of the patients’ preferences and fill potential gaps in documentation 
(55;57).
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issues presented by advance statements for health care and its refusal. The focus 
has been on end-of-life decisions, because that is the main focus of the existing 
literature  in  this  field.  Many  similar  general  issues  arise  concerning  advance 
statements  in  mental  health  care,  such  as  the  question  of how  specific  such 
directives  should  be,  and  circumstances  in  which  they  should  be  honoured  or 
overridden.
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The  main  philosophical  debate  around  the  implementation  of medical  advance 
statements is focused on the limits of autonomy (e.g.  should the value of respect 
for  autonomy  dominate  the  value  represented  in  the  “do  no  harm”  principle?) 
inherent  in  cases  of terminal  illness.  In  contrast,  the  focus  of the  debate  about 
implementation  of  psychiatric  advance  statements  is  on  the  conflict  within 
autonomy (should we respect the former autonomous decision manifested in the 
psychiatric advance statement or the present minimally rational and autonomous 
dissent?) (21).
Liberals fear that psychiatric patients will be coerced into signing documents that 
leave  decisions  about  whether  they  will  be  hospitalised  and  treated  to  their 
doctors’  discretion.  Conservatives  on  the  other  hand  worry  that  psychiatric 
advance statements may prevent treatment of patients who would otherwise suffer 
needless pain or might inflict such pain on others (38).
How can a psychiatric  advance statement protect the individual’s  autonomy and 
the public through time?  I will try to illustrate the different sides of the debate by 
examining the following hypothetical case.
Mr X is a  40-year-old male married with  two  children.  He works as a  business  consultant for a 
large company and he is diagnosed with a bipolar affective disorder.  His manic-depressive mood 
swings  have  reached  psychotic  proportions.  During  a  period  of remission  he  realises  how 
destructive  his psychotic  episodes  are  to  all  involved  and he  has  reviewed  the  likelihood  of a 
recurrence  with  his psychiatrist.  He  has  instructed  her  to  do  whatever  she  reasonably  can  to 
prevent another relapse,  even  to  treat him  against his  will at  the  time should he  then  need but 
refuse  medications  or  hospitalisation.  A  few  months  later,  as  he  progresses from  a  normal, 
euthymic state toward a full-blown manic psychosis,  he passes through a hypomanic stage,  much 
as  they had foreseen.  He gradually becomes  more energetic and requires  less sleep.  His speech 
grows more rapid and pressured,  reflecting his  increasingly racing thoughts.  His  mood expands 
and is alternately euphoric and irritable,  and he becomes more and more grandiose and reckless 
in his actions, much to the distress of his family, friends, and co-workers. He spends large sums of 
money on  things  he does  not need and would not normally purchase,  seriously  depleting family 
resources. He makes sexual advances toward female neighbours and co-workers.  When family and 
friends attempt to intervene and to persuade him to seek psychiatric care, he resists. His mood has 
become still more expansive and irritable,  and he denies even having the illness for which he has 
been regularly taking a prophylactic medication,  lithium carbonate.  Instead,  he throws away his 
medication,  refuses  to see his psychiatrist,  and dismisses  the possibility of any treatment to  help 
him  through  the manic  episode.  Nonetheless,  he  does  not yet  present,  as  defined by  the law,  a 
danger to himself or others,  nor is he incompetent or so gravely disabled as to prevent him from 
being able to meet his biological needs for food,  clothing,  and shelter.  Thus he does not meet the 
grounds for involuntary hospital admission.
59The  above  case  is  a hypothetical  one  that most psychiatrists  and  mental  health 
professionals  would  recognise.  People  like  Mr  X  in  the  above  hypothetical 
example  suffer  from  a  recurrent  but  treatable  psychotic  disorder  that  causes  a 
change  of personality  and  behaviour.  A  person’s  personality  is  the  complex 
pattern  of values,  preferences  and  beliefs  in  which  the  person  manifests  who 
he/she  is  and wants  to  be.  We  are  mainly concerned with  our values  and  our 
personality when we plan for our own future, our happiness and security.
The  notion  of personality  and  biographical  identity  is  directly  related  to  the 
concept of autonomy (1;21;22;56).  A person’s  identity is  formed  in  stories that 
both express and create the unity of a person’s life. As stories, psychiatric advance 
statements presuppose the unity of the patient’s life and try to contribute to that 
unity,  not  by  making  the  different  phases  identical,  but  by  trying  to  create  a 
meaningful whole that covers all of them. As a consequence, if Mr X had made an 
advance statement when competent, he would have made it in order to plan for his 
future.  His psychiatric advance statement would probably indicate that he wants 
hospitalisation under special conditions even if, once in those conditions, he would 
not consent to it. He would want his wishes to be self-binding because planning 
for the future would be for him a key element for leading life as a person.  In other 
words, he recognises that crises are part of his life, in that they have occurred in 
the  past  and  are  likely  to  occur  again  in  the  future.  His  psychiatric  advance 
statement is not simply a document containing orders to his psychiatrist but is part 
of the process of communication between him and his doctor about what courses 
of action are preferable within his life history. Mr X tries to communicate that he 
is a person who needs help and support to keep a hold on life, especially during a 
period of crisis.
Disorders of mind versus changes of mind
However,  the  dilemma that  arises  in these  circumstances  is which  is  “the most 
authentic manifestation” of Mr X’s will?
•  The  acceptance  of  the  fallibility  of  his  rationality  hence  his  self-binding 
wishes? Or
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situations are also important parts of leading his life as a person?
In the case of Mr X, a change of personality is caused by a disturbance of (as yet 
unknown) brain function. The coherence of his personality (values and beliefs) is 
interrupted, and the patterns underlying his present objection to treatment are less 
stable and rational than those underlying his advance statement. The question that 
arises is:  are there any criteria by which to  determine when one is witnessing a 
patient’s genuine change of mind rather than a switch of his/her personality, which 
was foreseen by the patient who wanted to be treated in these conditions?
To  attend  to  this  argument  properly  it  is  important  to  define  truly  rational 
autonomous decisions versus irrational ones. According to philosophers, the terms 
rational,  reasonable  and  irrational  apply both  to  personality  characteristics  and 
specific choices and actions (1). Reasonable is equated with sensible which is the 
opposite end of the unreasonable continuum, while irrational is the opposite end of 
the competent continuum (see Figure 1).
Reasonable------------------------------------------   Unreasonable
Competent-------------------------------------------  Irrational
Figure 1: Reasonable-Unreasonable and Competent-Irrational continuums according to 
Feinberg
What  differentiates  the  two  continuums  is  the  existence  or  absence  of 
voluntariness and control. For example, mental illness impairs cognitive functions 
and  subjects  individuals  to  actions  based  on  delusions  and  factual  distortions 
which  are  not  fully  voluntary.  Unreasonable  choices  on  the  other  hand,  are 
voluntary and can be made by fully competent persons either in-character and as 
part of their self-image (e.g.  extreme sports) or out-of-character due to weakness 
of will (e.g. getting drunk) or perverse behaviour (1). While mental illness and its 
subsequent incompetence deprive the individual of exercising control over his/her 
actions, unreasonable choices and actions are still under the actor’s control. Using 
coercive  powers  to  restore  or  prevent  unreasonable  personality  characteristics
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western societies.  The opposite is true for persons who suffer from mental illness 
as  societies  develop  laws  (e.g.  Mental  Health  Act  1983,  Mental  Capacity  Act 
2005) to protect both the individual who suffers from mental illness and society. 
However, this clear-cut theoretical separation of irrational and unreasonable does 
not apply so clearly in every day life since definitions of health and mental health 
are socially constructed (58-61).  To  expand on the social construction of mental 
illness,  psychiatric  diagnosis  and  its  consequences  is  beyond  the  scope  of this 
thesis.  For the  current  argument  of truly autonomous  decisions  versus  unwilled 
changes of mind, which is relevant to psychiatric advance statements, the position 
of persons who accept the mentally ill role and whose competence can be restored 
is explored.
If we  accept  that  irrationality  and  its  consequent  loss  of competence  are  the 
product  of  mental  illness  and  that  certain  forms  of  treatment  can  restore 
competence  although  they  can  not  cure  mental  illness,  then  admitting  that  the 
decisions of the “former” and “later” self of the mentally ill person can be equally 
voluntary  is  the  decisive  criterion  for  the  validity  of  a  psychiatric  advance 
statement (1;22;62). Another approach, the “cool moment” theory, states that the 
moment at which the person who has conflicting preferences is neither in the grasp 
of the  one  desire,  nor in the  grasp  of the  second  is  the  decisive  criterion  (22). 
Dworkin provides  a third  approach  according to  which the best  criterion  is  the 
ability of the individual to reflect upon their critical (higher-order preferences and 
values:  e.g. importance of one’s preservation of dignity) versus their experiential 
(lower-order  desires:  e.g.  experience  of  pleasure  and  pain)  interests  (56). 
According  to  Dworkin,  the  critically  reflected  preferences  of an  individual  as 
formulated  in  the  psychiatric  advance  statement  are  of crucial  importance  and 
must receive priority above the lower-order desires expressed in cases of a crisis 
(22;56).  Along  the  same  line  is  Dresser’s  concept  of  ‘self-paternalism’  that 
“suggests that every individual has a ‘true’  identity, one that is best equipped to 
make  long-term  decisions  on the individual’s behalf.  Thus,  although  a person’s 
desires  will  vary  over  time,  decisions  of the  true  identity  should  prevail  over 
contrary expressions of choice. The Ulysses contract would furnish a mechanism 
through which the state enforced certain wishes of the true identity.” (20) (p. 15)
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cognitive  functions  in rational  decision making,  psychological  approaches  focus 
on  a  mixture  of cognitive  and  emotional  concepts  such  as  insight  as  the  most 
important  determinant  of truly  autonomous  decisions  of mentally  ill  persons  in 
relation to execution and revocation of psychiatric advance statements (61;63). A 
more  detailed  analysis  of  the  cognitive  versus  emotional  components  of 
competence will follow in chapter two.  Insight into one’s mental illness involves 
the patient’s recognition (cognitive and emotional) that he/she is suffering from an 
illness and the realisation that the illness is mental as well as the ability to re-label 
the experience of certain mental events (e.g.  the sound of a voice is an auditory 
hallucination) as pathological (63).
According  to  the  above  approaches  only  wishes  that  are  insightful,  voluntary, 
“cool”  or  reflected  should  count  as  true  expressions  of  the  patient’s  values. 
However, in practice it is difficult for the psychiatric patient to formulate his/her 
wishes  voluntarily  in  a  cool  moment  or  through  critical  reflection.  It  is  also 
difficult  for the  doctor to  decide whether the  wishes  are based  upon the  above 
criteria  because  the  criteria  themselves  are  part  of a process  of interpreting,  a 
process  that  requires  critical  examination.  The  psychiatric  advance  statement 
grows out of and is itself the source for further communication or narrative work. 
The psychiatric patient is not a self-sufficient individual directing his/her own life 
but  a  person  in  distress  and  in  need  of care.  From  this  narrative  perspective, 
autonomy  is  based  upon  biographical  work  and  the  embeddedness  in  social 
relations.  As  a  consequence  autonomy  is  not  equal  to  independence  but  is 
developed  in  relations  of dependency.  Similarly,  rational  decision-making  is 
dependent on the patient’s mental capacity, which as it will be discussed below is 
not an all or nothing thing but highly dependent on the situation.  As long as the 
patient has  enough  insight into  his  illness  and  is competent to  decide  about his 
mental  health  treatment,  his  psychiatric  advance  statement  should  have  equal 
weight as his contemporaneous decisions.
To summarise, a patient’s expressed wishes during a period of crisis should not be 
accepted  at  face  value but neither  should  they be  deemed totally  irrational  and
63irrelevant.  Rather  they  should  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of the  patient’s  life 
history, a history that is informed by the communication between the patient and 
his/her  mental  health  carers  including  formerly  discussed  psychiatric  advance 
statements.
64Effectiveness of medical and psychiatric advance statements
Lessons learnt from medical advance statements
Early studies focused on how common advance statements were in America after 
the passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act in 1990. Although there was an 
increase in the number of patients reporting discussions about end-of-life issues, 
there was no clear increase in the completion of legal advance statements.  In the 
early 1990s only between 1% and 40% of hospitalised patients reported having an 
advance statement. The patients who completed them were mainly diagnosed with 
incurable  cancer or AIDS.  Only 5%  of patients  who  were transferred  from  the 
emergency room  to  the  intensive  care  unit had  advance  statements,  while  their 
availability when patients were transferred from nursing homes to hospitals was 
generally poor.  Most physicians did not know when their patient had completed 
one (53).
To improve completion, interventions were tried such as provision of counselling 
by  hospital  patient  representatives  or  educational  material  (64;65).  Meier  et  al 
(1996)  randomised  200  consecutive  patients  admitted  to  a  teaching  geriatric 
hospital in New York City into intervention and control group within 24 hours of 
their  admission  (64).  Within  48  hours  of  their  admission  patients  in  the 
intervention  group  were  approached  and  interviewed  by  one  of  two  trained 
counsellors from the hospital’s office of patient representatives.  All intervention 
patients whom the attending physician judged had the capacity to make medical 
decisions  were  interviewed  by  the  counsellors.  These  patients  were  counselled 
about advance statements and were given the opportunity to complete a health care 
proxy,  if they had  not  already done  so.  For those  patients  who  already had  an 
advance statement, the representative reviewed the advance statement with them 
and  reported  the  recommended  changes.  Existing  and  newly  made  advance 
statements  were  reported  in  the  inpatient  hospital  chart.  Patients  in  the  control 
group  received  standard  care.  The  main  outcome  measures  included 
documentation of:
•  a copy of the advance statement form
•  documentation by the patient representative of the presence of a health care 
proxy
65•  any notation about an advance statement by a health care professional.
There  were  no  significant  baseline  differences  between  the  two  groups.  The 
intervention group performed better in all of the outcome measures. Their results 
showed that 48% of patients in the experimental group completed a new proxy or 
had  a  previously  completed  proxy  identified,  compared  with  6%  of  controls 
(p<0.001). For patients with capacity, 22% of patients in the experimental group 
had a previously appointed proxy agent identified, compared with 6% of controls 
(p<0.001).  Thirty-six  percent of patients  in the  experimental  group  appointed  a 
proxy  decision  maker  compared  with  0%  of  controls  (p<0.02).  For  patients 
without capacity, 31% in the experimental group had previously appointed proxies 
identified compared with 6% of controls (p<0.001). Meier et al (1996) concluded 
that  counselling  by  hospital  patient  representatives  is  an  effective  way  of 
improving  recognition  and  execution  of advance  statements  in  the  acute  care 
hospital.
The generalisation of the above findings is limited to urban academic institutions 
with an office of patient representatives. Larger trials involving a range of patient 
groups  with  different  diagnoses  are  necessary  to  determine  the  long-term 
usefulness of this type of intervention.
Brown  et  al  (1999)  used written materials  only versus written materials  and  an 
educational videotape to assess the use of medical advance statements (65). They 
conducted a population-based (N=T,302), randomised controlled trial with three- 
month follow-up. Their sample members were aged 75 years and older who used a 
non-profit group model health maintenance organisation. They excluded 55 people 
who  died  or  dis-enrolled  during  the  study  period  or  were  identified  by  their 
physicians  as blind  or cognitively impaired.  All  participants  were  mailed  a  10- 
page  cartoon-illustrated  educational  pamphlet  on  patient  choices,  a  selection  of 
Colorado  advance medical  directive forms,  and  a guide to  their completion.  Six 
hundred  and  nineteen  participants  were  also  mailed  a  20-minute  videotape  on 
advance  statements.  Both  groups  had  access  to  a  study nurse  for  assistance  in 
completing and placing advance medical directives. Their main outcome measure 
was the proportion of participants who placed a directive in their medical record 
for the first time.  Analysis of the results  showed no  difference between the two
66groups.  Placement  rates  increased  almost  identically,  from  21%  to  35%  in  the 
written  materials-only  group  and  from  20%  to  33%  in  the  group  receiving  the 
video  tape  (95%  confidence  interval  for  difference-0.04,  p=.95).  Brown  et  al 
(1999)  have  shown that mailing  of written materials  increased placement  of an 
advance statement in patients’ medical records substantially but the addition of a 
videotape did not (65). However, a closer analysis of the study reveals a number of 
limitations,  such  as the  lack  of baseline  questionnaire responses  from  which  to 
measure  change  and  the  lack  of  completed  questionnaires  from  41%  of 
participants at follow up. These two limitations threaten the internal validity of the 
trial. Another limitation refers to the low rate of viewing in the videotape group. 
Of the 619 participants randomised to the videotape mailing, only 429 were sent 
the videotape and a questionnaire on its use three months later. Two hundred and 
twenty  three  returned  the  questionnaire  of whom  138  answered  the  questions 
about recalling the video and remembered receiving it in the mail, and 89 reported 
viewing it.
However,  even  when  available,  studies  produce  little  evidence  that  advance 
statements change treatment or that the patients’ preferences are followed.  In one 
study, 175 nursing home patients and family members were interviewed in relation 
to their preferences for aggressive treatment at the end of life. In 25% of patients, 
care eventually received was inconsistent with their previously expressed wishes. 
In most cases patients received less aggressive care than they had requested (53).
A  number  of  prospective  and  retrospective  studies  have  examined  whether 
advance statements can reduce treatments and costs of hospitalisation (53). They 
produced  mixed  results.  In  a  randomised  controlled  trial  of  204  seriously  ill 
patients,  researchers  provided  an  advance  statement  form  to  patients  in  the 
intervention group  (n=102)  at clinic visits or through the mail while the  control 
group received standard care (66). They followed these patients for a minimum of 
23 months and measured their medical treatments and costs.  Sixty-six percent of 
enrolled  intervention  patients  (69/104)  completed  the  advance  statement.  None 
wrote  personal  instructions;  these  patients  simply  completed  the  form  and 
designated a healthcare proxy.  The study showed no  difference on any outcome 
variable  between  the  intervention  and  control  groups.  In  addition,  within  the
67intervention  group  there  was  no  difference  between  those  who  completed  the 
advance statement and those who did not (66).
In a retrospective analysis of 336 patients who died at a tertiary medical centre, the 
definition  of  an  advance  statement  was  expanded  to  include  patients  who 
addressed  end-of-life  issues  before  or  during  hospitalisation  (67).  Comparisons 
between  patients  with  and  without  an  advance  statement,  showed  a  significant 
decrease in hospital and physician costs ($31,200 vs. $49,900) among the patients 
with  advance  statements.  In  another  study,  researchers  reviewed  the  final 
hospitalisations  of  474  Medicare  patients,  looking  for  any  documentation  of 
discussion of an advance statement within the first 48 hours of that hospitalisation 
(68).  Patients  who  had  such  discussions  sustained  less  overall  inpatient  costs 
($30,478 vs. $95,305). The expanded definition of an advance statement in these 
retrospective studies creates a problem with interpretation of their results in that 
evidence may not support advance care planning but rather end-of-life issues.
One of the most important studies in the area of medical advance statements, the 
Study  to  Understand  Prognoses  and  Preferences  for  Outcomes  and  Risks  of 
Treatments  (SUPPORT),  yielded  rather  disappointing  results  (69).  This  multi- 
centred  trial  was  designed  to  improve  advance  care  planning.  The  study  was 
conducted in two phases. The observation phase aimed to identify shortcomings of 
care  and the intervention phase to  address those  shortcomings.  During the  two- 
year observation phase 4,301 terminally ill patients were seen. Forty seven percent 
of these patients died within six months of study entry.  The investigators  found 
poor  communication,  poor  decision-making  and  poor  end-of-life  care.  They 
identified five major outcomes for the intervention phase:
•  incidence and timing of do-not-resuscitate orders;
•  patient-physician agreement on preferences for cardiopulmonary resuscitation;
•  days in an intensive care unit, in a coma, or ventilated before death;
•  presence of pain;
•  hospital resource use.
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randomised to the control and treatment groups. The intervention was the presence 
of a trained nurse facilitator to provide detailed prognostic information to patients 
and medical staff, to work with patients and families to elicit and document patient 
preferences, and to facilitate communication between patients and physicians. The 
study reported no difference between treatment and control groups in any of the 
above outcome measures. Although SUPPORT has not yielded positive outcomes, 
“it has provided the raw  data to  allow investigators to understand why advance 
statements never fulfilled their early expectations” (53) (p.37).
In summary,  the above  studies have  shown that after the passage of the Patient 
Self-Determination Act in 1990 in the USA:
1.  Advance statements were recorded by medical personnel more often but were 
not more frequently completed by patients.
2.  The  process  of  recording  them  did  not  improve  patient-physician 
communication.
3.  They did not change care.
4.  They did not reduce hospital resources or save money.
What were the reasons for these negative studies? Following the SUPPORT study, 
a  number  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  studies  were  conducted  in  order  to 
investigate the reasons.
Coppola et al (2001) and Ditto et al (2001) investigated the accuracy of proxy or 
surrogate decisions made by primary care physicians,  hospital-based physicians 
and  family  surrogates  on  behalf  of  elderly  outpatients  and  examined  the 
effectiveness  of medical  advance  statements  in  improving the accuracy of these 
judgements (70;71).  The study was conducted in two phases. During phase one, 
researchers recruited participants from a network of 6 group primary care practices 
which included 24 primary care physicians. Randomly selected patients 65 years 
or older were initially contacted by letter introducing the  study.  Unless patients 
telephoned  to  decline  participation,  trained  interviewers  telephoned  patients  to 
solicit participation.  Interviews took place in the patients’  homes  and lasted  for 
about one hour. A total of 401 patients and their designated family surrogates were
69interviewed  in  phase  one.  During  the  interview,  patients  completed  the  Life- 
Support  Preferences-Predictions  Questionnaire  (LSPQ),  which  measures  patient 
preferences across a broad spectrum of realistic life-sustaining treatment decisions. 
A  subsample  (n=  82)  of family  surrogates  was  used  as  a  baseline  comparison 
group.  As  part  of  phase  one,  patients  and  family  surrogates  were  randomly 
assigned to either a control condition in which they did not complete an advance 
statement  or  one  of  four  intervention  conditions  in  which  surrogates  made 
predictions  after exposure  to  a patient-completed  advance  statement  (completed 
with or without discussion with the surrogate). The family surrogates reviewed the 
patient’s  advance  statement  (when  applicable),  made  predictions  on  the  LSPQ 
regarding  patient  preferences  and  rated  how  confident  they  were  that  they 
accurately predicted the wishes of the patient on a five-point scale.  The primary 
care  physicians  were  asked  to  complete  five  proxy  decision-making  tasks. 
Thirteen of the 24 primary care physicians completed the tasks for 5 patients. 
Seventeen  emergency  and  critical  care physicians  who  had  no  prior  experience 
with the patients and spent 50% of their time working in a hospital setting were 
contacted  by  letter  to  participate.  They  were  provided  with  basic  demographic 
information  about  each  patient  but  were  blinded  to  patients’  names.  They then 
reviewed the patient’s advance statement (when applicable) and made predictions 
on  the  LSPQ  regarding  patients’  preferences.  After  completing  the  LSPQ  with 
predictions  of the patients’  preferences,  the hospital-based physicians  also rated 
how confident they were that they accurately predicted the wishes of the patient on 
a 5-point scale and whether they found the advance statement helpful. The results 
revealed that none of the interventions produced any significant improvement in 
the accuracy of family surrogates’ judgements in any illness  scenario  or for any 
medical condition.  Discussion of the interventions improved perceived surrogate 
understanding and comfort for patient-surrogate pairs in which the patient had not 
completed an advance statement prior to study participation. Consistent with other 
research  findings,  primary care physicians  were  not  accurate  in predicting their 
patients’ treatment or non-treatment preferences. Their accuracy was not improved 
by  advance  statements.  Hospital-based  physicians  making  predictions  without 
advance  statements  had  the  lowest  accuracy.  Accuracy  and  confidence  in 
predictions  of hospital-based  physicians  was  significantly  improved  for  some
70scenarios using a scenario-based advance statement.  The limitations of the study 
could be summarised as follows:
•  The use of hypothetical situations undermines external validity in real clinical 
situations because it is unclear whether patients’ preferences and physicians’ 
predictions would be different if faced with an actual illness.
•  Patients and physicians did not discuss the patients’ preferences while 
patients completed the advance statement.
•  A relatively small sample of primary care physicians.
•  A healthy, well educated, mostly white American sample of patients and 
surrogates.
•  One, relatively brief discussion intervention.
•  Prendergast’s  review  (2001)  of qualitative  studies  in this  field reveals  that 
terminally  ill  patients  identify  five  important  domains  of end-of-life  care 
(53):
•  Avoiding inappropriate prolongation of dying.
•  Strengthening relationships with loved ones.
•  Achieving a sense of control.
•  Relieving burden (e.g. physical care, witnessing death and substitute decision 
making).
•  Managing pain and symptoms adequately.
These  studies  have  also  shown  that  patients  dislike  being  approached  with  a 
checklist of consent  for  specific  treatments  instead  of having  discussions  about 
advance  care planning based  on  their values  and  experience  of illness.  In one 
particular study, outpatient discussions of advance statements were tape-recorded 
and  analysed.  The results  showed that physicians  spoke  twice  as  much  as they 
listened and did not routinely explore patients’  values  or their attitudes  towards 
uncertainty.  A  further  study also revealed that patients  do  not believe  that their 
physicians should be at the centre of the discussion about advance care planning 
and only 9% of these patients preferred their physician to lead the discussion in the 
case of serious illness. The majority of the patients preferred to discuss treatment 
preferences with their family or surrogates rather than their physician (53).
71Successful implementation of medical advance statements
There  are  a couple of successful  reports  of implementation of medical  advance 
statements (72;73).
A retrospective  study of four healthcare providers  (in Wisconsin)  of 540 deaths 
over 11 months showed that 85% of participants had advance statements and 95% 
of these  were  available  in  the  medical  record  (72).  Most  were  completed  in 
advance  of death  (median  time  between  completion  and  death  was  1.2years). 
Nearly all indicated a willingness to limit life-sustaining therapy, and fully 98% of 
deaths  followed  some  limitation  of therapy.  A  randomised  controlled  trial  by 
Molloy  et  al  (2000)  showed  that  systematic  implementation  of an  educational 
programme  about  advance  statements  aimed  at  elderly  individuals  in  nursing 
homes,  reduced  hospitalisations  and  aggressive  care  for  nursing  home  patients 
who  did  not  want  that  level  of intervention  (73).  These  successful  reports  of 
implementation of advance care planning have tended to  embrace the  following 
principles:
•  perceived  by  service  providers  as  an  ongoing  process  and  not  as  an  event 
designed to produce a product.
•  shifts  the  focus  on  end-of-life  decision-making  away  from  completion  of 
documents toward facilitating discussion about values and preferences.
•  shifts the locus of advance care planning away from hospitals and physicians 
into the community and specifically to the family unit.
•  does  not  assume  that  the  physician  is  crucial  to  the  process  but  promotes 
extensive training of non-medical community volunteers.
•  refocuses  discussion  of preferences  away  from  autonomy  toward  personal 
relationships. Instead of asking the patient what he/she wants, they reframe the 
question as, "How can you guide your loved ones to make the best decision for 
you?"
•  works  with  hospital  and  primary  care  physicians  to  ensure  that  completed 
advance statements are available in patients’ charts.
72Unsuccessful implementation of  psychiatric advance statements
According to a recent Cochrane systematic review by Henderson and Laughame 
(2001),  there  is  no  published  trial-based  data  relating  to  the  effectiveness  of 
psychiatric  advance statements.  Their systematic review aimed to “evaluate the 
effects of personalised and accessible patient-held clinical information for people 
with diagnosis of psychotic illness.”
Their  search  strategy  included:  electronic  searches  of  AMED  (1980-1998), 
Biological  Abstracts  (1985-1998),  British  Nursing  Index  (1994-1998),  CAB 
(1973-1999),  CINAHL  (1982-1999),  The  Cochrane  Controlled  Trials  Register 
(Issue I,  1999),  EMBASE (1980-1999), PsycLIT  (1887-1998), Royal  College of 
Nursing  Database  (1985-1996),  SIGLE  (1990-1998),  Sociological  Abstracts 
(1963-1998)  and  the  Internet  (http://www.controlled-trials.coml.  The  authors 
supplemented their searches by making personal contact with the Executive Board 
of the European Network for Mental Health Service Evaluation.
Their inclusion criteria were:
1.  Studies should be randomised or quasi-randomised trials;
2.  Studies should have involved adults with a diagnosis of a psychotic illness;
3.  Studies  should  have  compared  any  personalised  and  accessible  clinical 
information held by the patient beyond standard care to standard information 
routinely  held  such  as  appointment  cards  and  generic  information  on 
diagnosis, treatment and services available.
The  authors  report  that  the  study  selection  and  data  extraction  was  reliably 
undertaken and that analysis was not possible.
Their main results showed that none of the studies met the inclusion criteria for the 
review.  The  authors  concluded  that:  “there  is  a  gap  in  the  evidence  regarding 
patient-held,  personalised,  accessible  clinical  information  for  people  with 
psychotic  illnesses.  It  cannot  be  assumed  that  patient-held  information  is 
beneficial  or cost-effective without  evidence  from  well  planned,  conducted  and 
reported randomised trials.” (74)
The advance statement project in Bradford
A relevant project in this area is the first phase of the advance statement project in 
Bradford which aimed to establish a model for advance planning in mental health
73services in central England by carrying out two  years of extensive development 
work with service users  and mental health professionals  in that area (29;75;76). 
Despite the extensive developmental work, there was very little uptake in the use 
of  advance  statements.  “Of  70  service  users  who  attended  presentations  on 
advance statements only one took up the opportunity. ”(75) (p. 123) In her report, 
Andrea Beever (Research and Development worker)  cites  the  following reasons 
for the lack of success of the project (29):
1.  Advance statements not being incorporated into existing Trust policy, meaning 
that the statements were easily overlooked. Due to the current legal status of 
advance statements, accountability for the inclusion of a statement in decisions 
made about an individual’s care and treatment would ideally come from within 
Trust policy.  This would involve the  acceptance  of advance  statements  as  a 
useful tool of communication between service users and service providers.
2.  The  need  for provision  of support  around  the  drawing  up  of an  individual 
advance  statement.  The  development  and  drawing up  of a statement  can be 
time  consuming,  with  relevant  information  to  be  gathered  and  considered 
before choices can be made. Support with this process could help to bridge the 
gap between  ‘another form to  fill in’  and a useful working document that is 
relevant to individual situations.
Based on these findings the project has been continued with the aim to link the use 
of advance statements with the Care Programme Approach (CPA) process.
Successful implementation of  psychiatric advance statements
The only example of successful implementation of a form of psychiatric advance 
statement is the recent single blind randomised controlled trial by Henderson et al 
(2004) (19).  Henderson et al (2004), investigated the effect of  joint crisis plans on 
use  of compulsory  treatment  in  psychiatry.  A joint  crisis  plan  is  a  document 
“developed by the patient together with mental health staff. Held by the patient, it 
contains his or her choice of information, which can include an advance agreement 
for treatment preferences for any future emergency, when he or she might be too 
unwell to express coherent views.” (19) (p 136) Patients were recruited from seven 
community mental health teams in south London. Eligible patients included those
74in contact with their local community mental health teams, who had been admitted 
to a psychiatric inpatient service at least once in the previous two years and had a 
diagnosis  of psychotic  illness  or  bipolar  affective  disorder  without  psychotic 
symptoms.  Excluded  from  the  study  were  patients  who  were  unable  to  give 
informed  consent due to  mental  incapacity or insufficient  command of English. 
Patients  were  randomised  to  the  intervention  and  control  group  and  the 
investigator was blind to patients’ randomisation status. Patients allocated to the 
intervention group were asked to formulate the joint crisis plan together with their 
care coordinator, psychiatrist, and project worker. The joint crisis plan contained 
contact information, details of mental and physical illnesses, treatment, indicators 
for relapse, and advance statements of preferences for care in the event of future 
relapse.  Patients  in  the  control  group  received  information  leaflets  about  local 
services,  mental  illness  and  treatments,  the  Mental  Health  Act,  local  provider 
organisations,  and  relevant  policies.  The  primary  outcomes  were  admission  to 
hospital  and  length  of  time  spent  in  hospital.  The  secondary  outcome  was 
compulsory  treatment  under  the  Mental  Health  Act  1983.  The  researchers 
collected the data from case notes, the computerised patient administration system, 
Mental Health Act office data and interviews with patients and their carers. Follow 
up was conducted  15  months after randomisation.  Of the 466 patients that were 
assessed for eligibility, 160 were randomised and analysed (eighty in each group). 
Statistical analysis showed that the use of the Mental Health Act was significantly 
reduced for the intervention group (10/80 in the intervention versus 21/80 in the 
control group). The mean number of days spent on section was also significantly 
reduced for the intervention group (14 for the intervention group versus 31  for the 
control group). Finally, the intervention group had fewer admissions (19).
This  is  the  first  study that  has  shown  reduction  of compulsory  admission  and 
treatment in adult mental health services. Although the study has some limitations 
(for example the rate of hospital admission among the control group was  lower 
than expected which reduced the power of the study to detect a difference in this 
outcome and only 36% of eligible patients agreed to participate which may reduce 
generalisability)  it  offers  important  insights  in  future  implementation  of 
psychiatric  advance  statements.  As  in the cases  of successful implementation of 
medical  advance  statements,  psychiatric  advance  statements  are  effective  when
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and patients,  they  focus  the  discussion  on patients’  values  and preferences  and 
they shift the locus of advance care planning away from hospitals into community.
76Potential uses of psychiatric advance statements
Initially,  the  use  of  psychiatric  advance  statements  was  recommended  to 
individuals with recurrent psychotic illnesses that were amenable to treatment such 
as major affective disorders  (e.g. bipolar and manic-depression,  recurrent mania 
and psychotic depression) and certain forms of schizophrenia (77). However, the 
increasingly  complex  and  stressful  society  we  live  in  resulted  in  a  higher 
percentage of people who meet the diagnostic criteria for a mental disorder. In the 
USA, more than one in four adults are diagnosed as developing a mental health 
problem every year (24). In the UK, the currently proposed revisions to the Mental 
Health Act 1983 suggest the use of a broader definition of mental disorder and the 
extension of the use of compulsory treatment in the community (28). The response 
of  the  Royal  College  of  Psychiatrists  to  these  recommendations  is  that  the 
proposals will result in an increase of compulsory detention, stigmatisation and a 
higher prevalence of mental health problems with enormous societal and financial 
implications (www.rcpsvch.ac.uk/college/parliamentV
“The prospect of losing control over the ability to make crucial hospitalisation and 
treatment  decisions  should  we  become  mentally  ill  is  a  frightening  one.  This 
prospect, coupled with the high prevalence rate for mental illness, provides a new 
incentive to think ahead about mental health treatment possibilities, to understand 
how the  law may respond to  mental  illness  and if possible to  avoid unpleasant 
treatment options and secure more desirable alternatives.” (24) (p. 58)
In view of the above uncertainties, would psychiatric advance statements provide a 
solution for the possibility of an encounter with mental illness?  In the USA,  all 
individuals have a constitutional right to make health-care decisions not only when 
they are competent, but also when they are incompetent, as long as they indicated 
in advance the manner in which they wished their right to be exercised or other 
evidence exists concerning what their wishes would have been. This constitutional 
right extends to the mental health context as well. Consequently, the creation and 
implementation  of a psychiatric  advance  statement  will  overcome  the  need  for 
formal  resolution  of  treatment  disputes  and  will  promote  the  individual’s 
autonomy and values. In addition, it may have a significant therapeutic value. For
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mental health problems in the future may lead them to take preventative measures 
to avoid such problems. Such an example is the case of A.P. presented by Ritchie, 
Sklar and Steiner (1998).
"A.P.  was a 23 year old woman  who had diagnosed herself as bipolar using the Diagnostic and 
Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders,  Third  Edition-Revised.  She  had  never  consulted  a 
psychiatrist because her family had distrusted psychiatry since her father’s experience with insulin 
treatment and ECT decades ago.  However,  she realized that both  her hypomanic and depressed 
phases were becoming more extreme.  She wanted to be able to work with a psychiatrist in such a 
way that she could exercise control over what happened to her. She did not want treatment as yet, 
although  she  recognised  that she  was  becoming  depressed,  but she  wanted  to  know  what  was 
available  if her depression  worsened.  Her fear was  that her insight was  becoming  increasingly 
tenuous  when  she  became depressed and hypomanic.  She wanted her psychiatrist to  be  alert to 
signs  that  she  was  decompensating  and  to  intervene  in  ways  that  would  have  been  agreed  to 
beforehand. ” (34) (p. 247)
People who have experienced mental illness may avoid problems they do not want 
(e.g.  excessive spending) by advance planning.  Such planning may help them to 
reflect upon their experiences in light of their most recent hospitalisation and to 
take responsibility for future decision-making.  “Staring into the abyss of mental 
illness may give people a clearer view of their present reality and an incentive to 
change it when appropriate and possible, or to find better ways of coping with it. It 
may also provoke people who suspect that their problems might escalate to obtain 
treatment early, before their condition gets out of hand. For some people, a little 
counselling may go  a long way,  helping them to  confront and resolve problems 
before they become too serious.” (24) (p. 81)
In  most  mental  health  settings  today,  patients’  strongly  held  feelings  about 
treatment issues are respected and this respect can bring  about  feelings of relief 
that  can  have  beneficial  effects.  When  the  patient’s  concerns  about  possible 
treatment and hospitalisation are not taken into account, their stress, fear, anxiety 
and helplessness may become exacerbated which may in turn affect their process 
of recovery.
Furthermore, users of mental health services frequently lose initiative and become 
more  dependent  and  less  assertive  because  of  the  treatment  they  receive  in 
psychiatric  hospitals.  It  is  generally  believed  that  assuming  responsibility  for 
decisions that significantly affect them would be empowering and have expected
78beneficial  effects.  For example,  preparing the  advance  statement  document will 
focus the patient’s  attention on  future  goals  and  how  to  attain them.  The  goal- 
setting effect could be utilized through the process of planning and preparing the 
instrument. Because the patient’s goals would be clearly expressed in writing and 
executed by the patient during a formal procedure in the presence of witnesses, the 
advance statement document might provide an effective means of achieving the 
benefits  of  goal  setting  (78).  If  we  hypothesise  that  mental  health  care 
professionals become involved in preparing the document, the process itself may 
provide  the  opportunity to  engage  the  patient  in  treatment  and  enhance  his/her 
adherence to that treatment. Therefore, patients who are able to choose a course of 
treatment  in  advance  are  likely  to  feel  better  about  it  and  be  more  willing  to 
comply with it, which could maximise the potential for therapeutic success.  This 
has already been empirically supported by Henderson et al’s (2004) study (19).
Acting and being treated as self-determining individuals with a significant amount 
of authority over their own destiny, instead of being powerless and incompetent 
victims would be therapeutically beneficial to mentally ill patients. Any sensible 
mental health  system would aim to reinstate mentally ill patients  to  the highest 
degree possible of community functioning by allowing them to put into effect their 
decision-making  abilities.  On  the  contrary,  paternalistic  treatment  and  attitudes 
encourage powerlessness  and victimisation that may lock psychiatric patients  in 
the ‘sick role’ (20;24).
Individuals who enjoy good mental health and have high self-esteem are also self- 
determined.  They  have  the  ability  to  plan  for  the  future,  envisage  future 
contingencies and produce the desired rather than the undesired ones, and set goals 
and  see  them  achieved.  However,  people  with  psychiatric  illness  may  lack 
opportunities  to  enjoy a  ‘healthy’  or  ‘normal’  life  style,  a realisation  that  often 
deepens  their  feelings  of  powerlessness,  dependence,  incompetence  and 
depression (20;24). The development and implementation of a psychiatric advance 
statement may promote their independence and competence.
Some very disturbed psychiatric  patients  pose  a particular  difficulty  for mental 
health  professionals  during  the  information-gathering  phase  of  a  hospital
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statements,  this  could  provide  mental  health  professionals  with  an  additional 
therapeutic tool, by providing them with important information about the patient, 
his or her treatment history, and his or her treatment preferences and dislikes. This 
information could be used to make an accurate diagnosis of the patient’s condition 
and  eventually  lead  to  shared  decision  making  in  relation  to  an  appropriate 
treatment plan (24).
As already mentioned above, use of psychiatric advance statements might have the 
potential to avoid formal adjudications of incompetence. Such adjudications are a 
form of deviance labelling that can cause serious social and psychological damage. 
Avoiding  unpredictable  behaviour  that  alienates  others  or  the  stigma  of  an 
involuntary admission can only be beneficial for patients.
Lastly, Backlar (1998) suggests that psychiatric advance statements could be used 
by patients with schizophrenia as tools for giving informed consent or appointing a 
surrogate  decision-maker  for  future psychiatric  research.  Given  that  regulations 
and guidelines in regard to research involving this population are  in most cases 
insufficient and unclear, a prospective research participant could draft an advance 
statement with his/her chosen safeguards (79).
To  conclude,  psychiatric  advance  statements  may  have  a  number  of potential 
benefits  to both people  who  have never  experienced  a psychiatric  problem  and 
those  with  recurrent  mental  health  problems.  The  possible  beneficial  effects 
include  prevention  of mental  health  problem  crises,  a  decrease  of involuntary 
admissions, improved patient satisfaction with services, increased compliance with 
treatment and less stigmatisation.
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One  of the  main  issues  underlying  the  implementation  of psychiatric  advance 
statements  is  the  avoidance  of coercion.  For  example,  how  do  we  ensure  that 
mental health professionals do not coerce patients to accept treatment or force the 
patients to make psychiatric advance statements by refusing them further treatment 
if they do not sign the documents?
Some research findings suggest that although no episodes of coercion were noted 
in  patients’  charts,  61%  of the  involuntary  patients  and  28%  of the  voluntary 
patients reported having been coerced (e.g. pressure to select a choice, presenting 
information  to  them  that  they did  not  wish  to  receive)  during  their psychiatric 
hospitalisation  (80;81).  This  discrepancy  between  practice  and  perception  may 
result from a poorly specified conception of what it means to be capable, informed 
and consenting in widely varying psychiatric circumstances (this will be discussed 
in the next chapter on mental capacity). It can also result from power inequalities 
in mental health professional-patient relationships. Psychiatry, in contrast to other 
medical disciplines has been the subject of criticism (from within and outside the 
profession) for its role to social control through mental health legislation and sex, 
race  and  class  biases  inherent  in  psychiatric  diagnoses  (60;82).  Chilling 
revelations about the confinement of substantial numbers of individuals in mental 
asylums  who  opposed  the  Russian  and  Chinese  communist  regimes  represent 
some extreme examples of the use of psychiatry in social control. In this country, 
voluntary  psychiatric  treatment  became  an  option  after  the  Mental  Health 
Treatment  Act  in  1930  (82).  The  use  of psychiatric  diagnosis  in  professional 
control  of  the  clinical  interaction  is  another  potential  source  of  coercion. 
“Diagnosis locates the parameters of normality and abnormality,  demarcates the 
professional  and  institutional  boundaries  of  the  mental  health  system,  and 
authorises psychiatry to label and deal with people on behalf of certain sectors of 
society. As labelling theory points out, the name (i.e., the label) is used not merely 
to  identify  and  treat  a  particular  problem,  but  to  carry  out  retrospective 
interpretation of the person’s life. This provides a master status that characterizes 
the  whole  person-everything  that  person  does  can  then  be  traced  to  some 
fundamental flaw. Assignment of a diagnostic label is sometimes used as the legal
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matters such as involuntary commitment, the insanity defense, and competence to 
stand  trial.  Labelling  may  also  cause  difficulties  in  purchasing  health  or  life 
insurance  and  may  lead  to  discrimination  in  the  workplace,  school,  and  the 
military.”  (60)  (p.  527)  This  quote  demonstrates  that  the  mental  health 
professional  has  the power to  influence the patient,  and will normally do  so  in 
order  to  ensure  the  patient’s  cooperation  and  adherence  in  the  process  of 
treatment. In addition, the subjectivity and lack of precision inherent in psychiatric 
diagnosis  may  undermine  the  ability  of  psychiatrists  to  determine  when  a 
behaviour (e.g. excessive spending) is due to relapse or to unwise choice (20). As 
a consequence, psychiatric advance statements may become instruments of power 
and control  in  the  hands  of mental  health professionals.  In  order to  promote  a 
situation of shared power and to ensure that both patients and their mental health 
professionals are involved in a process of mutual cooperation, a set of safeguards 
should  be  in  place.  Proponents  of psychiatric  advance  statements  suggest  the 
following (77;83):
1.  Psychiatric  advance statements must be legally binding.  Under current UK 
laws,  patients  and  mental  health  professionals  create  care  plans  which 
involve  the  patients’  preferences  for  treatment.  However,  patients’ 
preferences  and  refusals  for  treatment  are  not  legally  binding.  As  it  was 
discussed in the previous section under the effectiveness of Care Programme 
Approach,  this  system  may  serve  professionals’  needs  for  regular  client 
reviews and clear documentation but patients and carers still feel coerced in 
Care Programme Approach Meetings.  By legally binding patients’  advance 
agreements  and  refusals,  the  state  could  provide  the  basis  for  eliminating 
feelings of coercion. Unfortunately, the revised draft Mental Health Act 1983 
and  the  new  Mental  Capacity  Act  2005  still  deny  statutory  status  to 
psychiatric advance statements in this country.
2.  The patient must be competent when the document is made (this aspect will 
be fully discussed in the next chapter).
3.  Patients  must  be  in  remission  when  the  document  is  made.  Being  in 
remission  allows  the  patient  to  reflect  on  his/her  experience  and  make 
choices  free  of the  stress  associated  with  mental  illness.  But  what  does  it 
mean in terms of time? When is the most appropriate time for discussing and
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which in many instances coincides with discharge from hospital,  is not the 
best time. In their eagerness to leave the hospital, patients may agree to sign 
any  document.  In  addition,  lack  of  hospital  beds  may  force  treatment 
providers  to  discharge  patients  before  they  have  recovered  completely. 
However, an important advantage of discussing and drafting such documents 
just before or at discharge is the recent memory of the illness experience and 
its  impact  on  the  patient  and  his/her  family.  Provided  the  patient  has 
recovered sufficiently, is mentally competent and an independent advisor is 
involved  in  the  discussion  and  drafting  process,  this  timing  should  not 
necessarily lead  to  coercive practice.  Geller (2000)  supports  this  view  and 
states that “state hospitals often do a better job of attending to the rights of 
the chronically mentally ill population than do other settings with long-stay 
populations, such as nursing homes. The state hospital might well be the best 
that is happening  in terms  of health  care proxies  for  seriously,  chronically 
mentally ill  citizens.  Finally,  a state that has  gone to  great lengths to keep 
people  out  of  state  hospitals,  believes  that  almost  everyone  deserves 
community based  services  and  creates  those  residential  services,  the  long- 
stay  state  hospital  population  is  not  terribly  different  from  the  long-stay 
community population since this is a population ever changing between these 
loci  of care.  Examining  the  issues  of health  care  proxies  in  the  former 
population should give us insight into the issues we might face with the latter 
population  as  psychiatric  health  care  proxies  move  from  institutions  to 
communities.”  (84)  (p.8)  A  more  recent  qualitative  study  by  Amering, 
Stastny & Hopper (2005), suggests that neither being in remission in hospital 
nor receiving community mental health services is the catalyst for drafting a 
psychiatric  advance  statement.  Accumulation  of  different  factors  (e.g. 
discussions  with  mental  health  professionals  while  in  hospital  or  in  the 
community  and  the  effect  of  hospitalisations  and/or  terminal  illness  on 
mentally ill patients and their families), and the individual’s own risk-benefit 
analysis  of possessing  the  document,  seemed  to  motivate  the  process  of 
drafting (85).
4.  Patients must enter into contracts voluntarily and without coercion. To ensure 
voluntariness,  proponents  of psychiatric  advance  statements  suggest  that  a
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time of execution to assure that the patient’s best interests are served (77;86). 
Close involvement of mental health professionals and service providers in the 
process of execution of advance statements is not embraced wholeheartedly 
by either patients and their families or service providers (25;87;88).  On the 
one  hand,  involvement  of mental  health  care  providers  may  facilitate  and 
increase  communication between  all  parties  but  on  the  other  hand  it  may 
generate conflicts of interest and may increase the time and cost of care (87).
5.  Once drawn up,  psychiatric  advance  statements  should be valid only for  a 
limited  time  and  subject  to  review  by  medical-legal  boards.  The  patient 
should also retain the right to renegotiate and revoke the directive at any time 
other than during relapse (20;77;86).
6.  A  psychiatric  advance  statement  should  be  clear  and  specific  in  order  to 
avoid  misinterpretation of its contents and consequently non-adherence. For 
example, it should specify the signs and symptoms of relapse, indicate what 
treatments  would be preferable,  specify the  least restrictive  alternative  and 
identify a proxy decision maker.  In contrast to medical advance  statements 
where individuals may not be able to make specific directives due to lack of 
experience  of the  prospective  illness,  psychiatric  patients  are  in  advantage 
due to previous experience with both illness and treatment (88).
7.  Finally,  educational  interventions  and  legal  aid  should  be  provided  to  the 
patients, their families and mental health professionals as well as clear and 
concise  training  material  regarding  the  different  phases  of  drafting, 
implementing and revoking a psychiatric advance statement (88).
8.  However, as many authors have pointed out, feasible, procedural safeguards 
would  not  eliminate  all  abuses  and  mistakes  (20;22;77;86).  The  aim  is  to 
balance mistakes against the provision of desired and beneficial treatment.
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effectiveness of psychiatric advance statements
Two of the aims of the preference  for care  study were to  look at the content of 
psychiatric advance statements and the patients’  and mental health professionals’ 
views  on  the  usefulness  of such  documents.  So  far,  there  has  been  very  little 
empirical evidence on the content of psychiatric  advance statements (e.g. mainly 
pilot  studies).  As  it  was  discussed  above,  one  of the  main  criticisms  of such 
documents is that they will be used by psychiatric patients to refuse all psychiatric 
treatments leading to ‘committable but untreatable patients’ that could clog up the 
hospitals (5;41).  During the final part of this chapter,  I will cite the  studies that 
surveyed mental health patients’ and mental health professionals’ views on the use 
and effectiveness of psychiatric advance statements as well as the findings of the 
studies  on  the  content  of psychiatric  advance  statements  (18;25;85;87;89-92). 
These  studies  provide  very  useful  information  on  the  profiles  of patients  who 
express an interest in psychiatric advance statements and eventually complete such 
documents,  the  profiles  of patients  who  are  not  positively predisposed  towards 
such documents and the mental health professionals’ views and dilemmas towards 
psychiatric advance statements. These studies will also provide the context against 
which I will later compare the findings of sectioned patients’ psychiatric advance 
statements.  To  my  knowledge,  no  other  study  has  looked  at  the  content  of 
psychiatric advance statements of this population before.
In Sutherby et al’s study that took place in London, users who wanted to develop 
‘joint crisis plans’  were  significantly more likely to be white, to  suffer from an 
affective psychosis, to have a longer duration of illness, and to have made suicide 
attempts or to have been assessed as being at risk of suicide at some time during 
their  illness  (18).  The  authors  report  that  “although  there  was  no  significant 
difference  in  the  total  number  of  lifetime  admissions,  those  users  with  less 
frequent  admissions  (less  than  annual  admissions)  were  more  likely  to 
consent.”(p.58) Regarding the content of the ‘joint crisis plans’, the authors report 
that “the three most commonly included  elements of the current  care plan were 
mental  health  problem  or  diagnosis  (95%),  current  medication  (93%)  and  first 
signs of relapse (‘What happens when I start to become unwell’) (93%).” (p. 58)
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preferences  if a  full  relapse  could  not  be  prevented  and  advance  refusals  of a 
specific treatment (this involved specific drugs because of their side-effects) were 
the  other  most  common  things  the  users  chose  to  include  in  their  ‘joint  crisis 
plans’. The use of the card in a crisis was assessed at 1 month and at 6-12 months 
follow-ups.  The  cards  were  used  to  provide  useful  contact  numbers  and 
information  on  current  care  and  treatment,  to  both  formal  and  informal  carers. 
“The recognition and recording of what has helped or not helped in a crisis and 
recognition  of  triggers  for  relapse  or  first  signs  of relapse  were  reported  to 
facilitate early recognition and appropriate crisis management for both users and 
carers.  The  cards  appeared  to  avert  unnecessary  admission  or  to  facilitate  an 
appropriate  early  admission.”  (p.  59)  The  authors  also  report  that  the  cards 
provided  an  advocacy  tool  for  crisis  (18).  In  terms  of the  users’  views  of the 
process  and  psychological  value  of the  card,  they  reported  that  they  felt  more 
involved in their care,  more positive  and more in control  of their mental health 
problem as a result of developing the card. Two-thirds of users carried their cards 
with them on most days or every day at the 6-12 months follow-up and 30 of the 
37 users said they would recommend the card to other users whilst 17 key-workers 
would  recommend  the  card  to  other  services  (18).  One  potential  problem 
associated with the drafting of the cards was the stress induced by reviewing the 
patients’ past and future relapses as it was reported by the patients themselves and 
their key-workers. Another problem identified by the study was that some of the 
management guidelines and refusals of treatment on the cards of two of the study 
participants  were  not  followed  during  the  patients’  relapse  and  subsequent 
admissions.  As  the  authors  state,  not  carrying  out  the  patients’  instructions 
undermined patients’ confidence in the study and confidence in their clinical team 
(18).
Srebnik et al’s (2003)  study on interest in psychiatric advance directives  among 
high  users  of  crisis  services  and  hospitalisation,  suggests  that  variables 
significantly associated with interest in creating advance directives were support 
for  the  directives  by  a  participant’s  case  manager  and  having  no  outpatient 
commitment orders in the previous two years. Reasons for interest included using
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provision of preferred treatment (89).
Similarly,  Backlar  et  afs  (2001)  study,  provided  some  useful  insights  into  the 
reasons  patients  with  schizophrenia  opted  to  complete  or  not  to  complete  a 
psychiatric  advance directive after the passage of relevant legislation in  Oregon 
(25). Patients who declined to complete the document did so because they either 
felt it was not necessary and they could manage without it (their doctors  or the 
mental  health  treatment  system  could  be  counted  on  to  look  after  them)  or 
because they did not receive enough information about it (“It was not talked about 
enough”).  Those who  completed  a psychiatric  advance  directive  did  so because 
they originally thought they would feel empowered by the process of preparation. 
However,  when  the  latter  group  was  interviewed  at  follow-up,  they  were  less 
enthusiastic  and  more  critical  of  the  official  policy  that  was  relevant  to 
implementation of such documents. Patients’ mental health providers reported that 
the psychiatric  advance  directive  had  little  “impact”  on  their relationships  with 
their patients. Regarding the content of the directives, this study has showed that 
patients with schizophrenia did not use the directives as an opportunity to refuse 
all treatment as it is commonly believed among the critics of such documents and 
that patients were able to understand the legal concepts associated with the process 
of drafting,  implementing  and  revoking  them.  This  study  also  confirmed  the 
finding  from  the  previous  ones:  when  a  directive  is  ignored  by  outpatient  and 
inpatient  clinicians  it  produces  feelings  of  disempowerment  for  the  patient. 
Finally, Backlar et al (2001) suggest that “a legal change-although necessary- is an 
insufficient  step  to  engender  social  or  political  change”  (p.  437),  “without  a 
computerised  system  for  storing  and  retrieving  patients’  PAD  information, 
preparing a PAD may do little more than the act of scrawling ‘help’ on a scrap of 
paper, stuffing it into a bottle, and hurling it into the ocean.”(25) (p. 439)
Furthermore, Amering et al’s study (2005) looked at the processes that facilitate 
and/or impede the drafting, implementation and revocation of psychiatric advance 
directives  (85).  This  qualitative  study  showed,  that  their  small  sample  of 
individuals  with  extensive  experience  with  mental  health  services  and  crisis 
interventions  had  no  difficulty  grasping  the  legal  concepts  associated  with
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because their wishes would be more likely to be honoured in situations in which 
they had felt powerless in the past, and by designating a proxy and documenting 
their preferences  they  “would  improve  record-keeping  and  communication  in  a 
system  widely  seen  as  inadequate  in  both....Directives  held  the  promise  that 
participants would not have to  explain everything yet again, that they would be 
believed  without  having  to  persuade  strangers,  that  confrontations  could  be 
avoided  through  judicious  intervention  by  their  proxy  and  that  appropriate 
treatment  would  expedited.”  (85)  (p.  249)  None  of  the  participants  viewed 
advance  directives  as  a blanket means  to  refuse  treatment.  Reasons  against  the 
drafting of such  documents  included patients’  fears  that  the process  of drafting 
“could actually invite the situation it was designed to manage”, “more paperwork, 
more hassles”, “concerns that the directive may not stand up in court or would be 
overridden in practice” and distrust in the mental health system to implement this 
‘legalistic’  tool.  “Finding  oneself intrigued  by the  notion  and  personalising  the 
concept of an advance directive does not yet commit one to the necessary work of 
executing it. A number of catalysts can be identified in the accounts of participants 
who  took  the  step.  These  tended  to  operate  in  cumulative  fashion,  acquiring 
persuasive force over time (only a few participants initiated the process soon after 
the  training).  Further  discussions  with  mental  health  professionals  clearly 
motivated  some  to  proceed.  Others  had  been  asked  about  advance  directives 
during their last stay in hospital and now had occasion to act. Many were nudged 
by  terminal  illness  or  psychiatric  hospitalisations  affecting  their  families  or 
partners. For others, a reconfigured personal network supplied previously missing 
others who could be trusted to serve as proxies.” (p. 249) The authors report that 
their participants varied greatly in the duration of completing an advance directive. 
Some completed one immediately after training but others took years to mobilise 
the resources  and  find  the  courage  to  see  the  process  through.  In  terms  of the 
content of the completed directives, they included preferences for certain hospitals 
or specific professionals, requests to allow favoured coping strategies (e.g. being 
left alone  at times)  and boundary rules  (e.g.  not being touched by staff without 
being asked), requests for certain drugs and treatments and reasons for choosing 
them and people whose company they preferred and others whose presence they 
could  do  without.  “Much  thought  was  given  to  ensuring  that  the  advancedirectives were feasible and that preferences  fell reasonably within the range of 
options of the mental health system.” (p. 249) These findings were also supported 
by Sherman’s (1998) study on computer-assisted creation of psychiatric advance 
directives (92).
As it has already been mentioned in some of the above studies, service providers 
and  mental  health  professionals  when  asked,  they reported  similar  concerns  to 
those  of  the  patients  in  relation  to  implementation  of  psychiatric  advance 
statements.  Amering  et  al’s  study  (1998)  suggested  that  although  there  is  little 
experience with psychiatric advance statements in Europe, “there is an interest and 
predominance of positive attitudes towards this legal option among mental health 
professionals.”  (91)  (p.  30)  In  the  USA,  service  providers  and  mental  health 
professionals  are  positive  towards  the  concept  but  they  are  sceptical,  less 
enthusiastic  and  critical  towards  policies  of implementation  of such  documents 
(25;85;87).  The  only  in-depth  qualitative  study  that  examined  service  provider 
issues in relation to implementation of psychiatric  advance directives to  date,  is 
that of Srebnik & Brodoff (2003) that was carried out in Washington, USA (87). 
The main issues reported by the service providers include the following:
•  How crisis services and inpatient staff would know whether a patient had a 
psychiatric advance directive (PAD) and how the PAD would be available 24 
hours a day?
•  Whether  patients  would  have  sufficient  information  (e.g.  about  treatment 
options especially if PADs are completed outside of a clinical context) and 
mental capacity to execute PADs.
•  How to consider PADs that include treatment preferences inconsistent with 
clinical standards of care.
•  What  would  be  the  role  and  the  level  of  the  service  provider  in  PAD 
execution.
•  How would service providers be certain that the information in PADs would 
be current?
•  How would service providers make sure that the information in PADs would 
not be redundant with information gathered upon admission?
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adequately in a reasonable amount of time?
•  What was the relationship of PADs to involuntary treatment statutes?
•  What  were  the  circumstances  under  which  PADs  come  into  effect  or  are 
‘activated’?
•  Srebnik and Brodoff (2003), suggest that “administrators who seek to remove 
barriers  to  staff using  and honouring psychiatric  advance  directives  should 
also provide specific training to staff on the implementation issues presented 
above, so that questions may be answered to the extent possible before staff 
are faced with the documents in their work.” (87) (p. 266)
In  summary,  the  few  studies  that  are  cited in the  last part  of this  chapter have 
shown that psychiatric  advance statements  are not used by patients  as a blanket 
means for refusing all treatment as it is commonly believed by the critics of such 
documents.  Patients  who  complete  such  documents  do  not  compromise  mental 
health professionals with either the  content or the  style  of the  document.  When 
patients’  advance  statements  are  not  honoured,  it  results  in  patients  feeling 
disempowered and distrustful towards the mental health care system.  In terms of 
the  mental  health professionals’  views  on  such  documents,  most  of the  studies 
showed  that  the  majority  of them  are  positively  predisposed  towards  advance 
statements  but  sceptical  and  critical  about  the  clarity  of existing  guidelines  for 
implementing them.
90Chapter summary
This chapter has explored the changes in psychiatric services during the last half- 
century  that  led  to  users’  autonomy  and  self-determination  and  the  rise  of 
psychiatric  advance  statements.  An  overview  of the  different  labels  attached to 
patients’  preferences  for  future  medical  and  psychiatric  care  should  they  lose 
mental capacity, provided the rationale for using the generic term psychiatric and 
medical advance statements throughout this thesis. This part has been followed by 
a historical  overview  of the  development  of advance  statements  and  their  legal 
status in the United States of America, the European Union and Britain. The legal 
debate  on  advance  statements  was  then  followed  by  the  philosophical  debates 
underlying  both  medical  and  psychiatric  advance  statements.  The  research  on 
effectiveness of the medical and psychiatric advance statements has been reviewed 
and  the potential  uses  and  abuses  of psychiatric  advance  statements  have  been 
outlined. Finally, the few studies that looked at the content of psychiatric advance 
statements,  the  patients’  and  the  mental  health  professionals’  views  on  the 
effectiveness  of such  documents  were  described.  In  the  following  chapter  the 
concept of mental capacity and its relation to psychiatric advance statements will 
be discussed.
91CHAPTER 2 
MENTAL CAPACITY
Introduction
“Capacity  is  a  mental  construct  that  deals  with  an  individual’s  rationality  and 
comprehension  of  reality.  Without  capacity  there  is  no  choice  or  freedom. 
Capacity is the hinge on which freedom swings.” (93) (p.3) Capacity conforms to 
the rational-cognitive model usually adopted in legislation and is not determined 
by the  quality  or  effect  of individuals’  choices.  “The  Law  Commission  Report 
recommended  that  there  should  be  a  statutory  definition  of  capacity,  and 
suggested:  A person  should  be  regarded  as  unable  to  make  a decision  if at  the 
material time he or she is:
•  Unable  by reason  of mental  disability to  make  a  decision  on  the  matter  in 
question
•  Unable  to  communicate  a  decision  on  that  matter  because  he  or  she  is 
unconscious.”(45) (p. 13)
In this chapter the issues related to mental capacity in general and its relation to 
psychiatric  advance  statements  in particular will be  explored.  The  terms  mental 
capacity and competence will be used interchangeably.
92Global, domain-specific and decision-specific capacity
Historically  people  were  considered  either  capable  of making  all  decisions  or 
none, a belief that worked well for the completely competent and the completely 
incompetent  people  (e.g.  those  in  a  coma).  However,  this  global  evaluation  of 
capacity does not cater for the individuals who lie between these two extremes. As 
a consequence, the global definition of capacity needed refinement and the domain 
specific  capacity has been introduced (93).  According to  this paradigm  capacity 
can be divided into a number of domains:
• Capacity to make a will
• Capacity to make a gift
• Capacity to litigate
• Capacity to enter a contract
• Capacity to vote
• Capacity to enter personal relationships
• Capacity to consent to and refuse medical treatment
• Capacity to create advance statements
• Capacity to consent to research
Domain  specific  capacity  recognises  that  people  may  have  capacity  in  some 
domains  such  as  health  care  but  lack  capacity  in  others  (e.g.  managing  their 
finances  and/or  entering  personal  relationships).  However,  even  within  each 
domain there  is  a hierarchy of decisions  ranging  from  complex  to  simple  ones. 
Some  individuals  may  have  the  capacity  of making  simple  decisions  within  a 
specific  domain  but  not  the  difficult  ones  (93).  The  following  table  gives  an 
example of the hierarchy of decisions in general medicine.
93Difficult Carotid Endartrectomy 
Cancer treatment
Curative vs. palliative surgery, chemotherapy 
Coronary artery bypass 
Elective joint replacement
Moderate Cholecystectomy 
Anticoagulant treatment 
Pacemaker
Simple Course of antibiotics 
Influenza vaccination 
Vitamin replacement 
Blood/urine test
Table 5: Hierarchy of decisions in a single domain (adopted by Molloy, Darzins, Strang, 
1999)
In the  following  pages,  the  legal,  clinical  and  emotional  components  related  to 
capacity  will  be  explored  within  the  health  care  domain  and  in  particular  the 
capacity to draft and revoke psychiatric advance statements.
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In  this  country,  whether  an  individual  has  or  lacks  capacity to  make  treatment 
decisions is ultimately a question for a court to answer (27;94). In practice though, 
doctors, psychologists, social workers and others make capacity assessments every 
day of the year and very few cases result to courts. However, incorrect assessments 
of incapacity will provoke unnecessary court procedures, with subsequent delays 
in the patient’s treatment, expense and time lost for clinical care. Truly competent 
patients  whose  decisions  are  overridden  can  suffer  substantial  damage  to  their 
sense of self and freedom because they will be deprived from their civil liberties. 
Mistaken  findings  of competence  leave patients  who  have  inadequate  decision­
making powers without the protections afforded by substitute decision makers and 
leave health  and  mental  health  carers  open to  potential  legal  liability  (95).  The 
latter has been illustrated by the well-publicized cases of Boumewood in the UK 
and  Zinermon  v.  Burch  in  the  USA  (96;97).  In  Boumewood  case,  Mr  L  who 
suffered  from  severe  autism  and  severe  learning  difficulties  was  informally 
admitted to  hospital  simply because he  didn’t resist  the  action  although he was 
clearly  incompetent  to  give  informed  consent.  In  Zinermon  v.  Burch  case,  a 
psychotic patient Mr.  Burch was  allowed to  sign legal  documents  for voluntary 
hospitalisation  and  treatment  although  he  was  clearly  unable  to  give  informed 
consent (96;97).
The  legal  process  of  capacity  assessment  follows  certain  general  mles.  An 
individual is presumed to have mental capacity until the contrary is proved. Once 
it has been proved that someone lacks capacity, this finding continuous to remain 
valid until the contrary is proved. For people with fluctuating periods of capacity 
and incapacity the law provides the term “lucid interval” which means that if they 
sign a document during this “lucid interval” it might be valid. The burden of proof 
that someone is lacking capacity rests with the person who is making the allegation 
and the standard of proof is based on the balance of probabilities which applies in 
civil proceedings (27;94;98).
Capacity to consent to or to refuse medical treatment
In general medicine  in the UK,  health professionals  can not legally examine  or 
treat any adult without his or her valid consent unless treatment is required under
95the Mental Health Act  1983.  The law requires the doctor who is responsible for 
proposing and/or delivering treatment to provide the patient with an account of the 
benefits, risks and possible alternatives of the proposed treatment and to judge the 
patient’s capacity to give a valid consent (94;98). The following table outlines the 
criteria for inability to make decisions according to the Mental Capacity Act 2005
(27).
3 Inability to make decisions
(1) For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for himself 
if he is unable—
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(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision,
(b) to retain that information,
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision, or
30
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language
or any other means).___________________________________________________________
(2) A person is not to be regarded as unable to understand the information 
relevant to a decision if he is able to understand an explanation of it given to 
him in a way that is appropriate to his circumstances (using simple language,
35
visual aids or any other means)._________________________________________________
(3) The fact that a person is able to retain the information relevant to a decision for 
a short period only does not prevent him from being regarded as able to make
  the decision.__________________________________________________________________
(4) The information relevant to a decision includes information about the 
40
reasonably foreseeable consequences of—
(a) deciding one way or another, or
(b) failing to make the decision._________________________________________________
Table 6: Criteria for inability to make decisions. Mental Capacity Act 2005
The Act also  states that people who have no  capacity to  consent to  or refuse to 
treatment can be treated in their best interests and that force can be used to deliver 
the  care  and  treatment  as  long  as  it  does  not  exceed  the  force  needed  to  keep 
someone safe in this way (27).
The test of capacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment differs  from other 
tests of capacity not only in terms of the actual criteria of assessment but also in 
terms of the possibility of conflict of interest between the patient and the doctor 
who assesses capacity and delivers medical treatment at the same time. In order to
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proposes  a  number  of  safeguards  such  as  the  appointment  of an  independent 
consultee  or  advocate,  the  appointment  of a  lasting  power  of attorney  (allows 
people to  say who  can  decide  for them  if they cannot  decide  for themselves  at 
some later time in the future) and a court appointed deputy (if someone who lacks 
capacity has not chosen anyone to look after their affairs, the Act will let the Court 
of Protection choose someone to make decisions about money or health and social 
care  or  both).  In  addition,  the  Act  gives  adult  individuals  the  right  to  refuse 
medical treatment and to create advance refusal documents with treatments they 
wouldn’t want to receive if they become incompetent in the future.  The test for 
capacity to make an advance statement or an advance refusal is similar to that for 
capacity to make a contemporaneous decision (98).
Capacity to consent to or to refuse psychiatric treatment
According  to  the  report  of the  expert  committee  on  the  review  of the  Mental 
Health  Act  1983,  two  of the  main  aims  of the  revisions,  are  the  promotion  of 
patient autonomy and the end of discrimination in the treatment of mental illness. 
The expert committee also reported that “whatever the precise scope of a mental 
health act it must primarily be  seen  as a health measure  and must be consistent 
with  the  professional  ethics  of  the  health  services.  This  is  not  to  deny  the 
importance  of public  protection  but  to  place  it  within  the  appropriate  context 
within which it can best be promoted.”(28)  (p.  18)  With this principle in mind, 
some of those who commented on the revisions of the Act suggested that in order 
to  promote  patient  autonomy  and  non-discrimination,  patients  with  mental 
disorders  who  retain  the  capacity  to  make  treatment  choices  and  refuse  the 
treatment for their mental health problems proposed by their doctors, should not be 
treated whatever the consequences for the patient.  Only those who  lack capacity 
should be treated without consent under the mental health act. As for the patient 
with a mental disorder who refuses treatment and poses a serious risk to others, he 
or  she  should be  dealt  with through  the  criminal justice  system.  However,  that 
approach has not been accepted by the expert committee that suggests the safety of 
the public  should outweigh individual  autonomy.  In other words,  a person with 
mental disorder that can be treated should be treated under the mental health act.
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problems may occasionally have wider consequences  for the individual’s  family 
and carer, and very occasionally for unconnected members of the public affected 
by the individual’s behaviour,  acts and omissions.”(28)  (p.  19)  In contrast to  its 
acclaimed principles of patient autonomy and non-discrimination, the report of the 
expert committee on the review of the Mental Health Act 1983 embraced a broader 
definition of mental disorder and permitted detention on the basis of deterioration 
of mental disorder regardless of the patient’s capacity.  The latter has provoked a 
lot  of  criticism  towards  the  new  revised  Act  not  only  from  the  psychiatric 
establishment  but  also  from  national  user  groups  (11;99-101). 
fwww.rcpsvch.ac.uk;  www.mind.org.uk)  To justify  detention  of mental  health 
patients  who  retain  capacity  under  the  Mental  Health  Act  1983,  the  expert 
committee  suggested  “the  need  to  develop  a  very  careful  definition  of 
capacity.”(28)  (pp 88-89) (See Table 7)
7.5  Thus  we propose  a broad model of incapacity which accepts that a person may lack
capacity  where,  although  intellectually  able  to  understand  and  apply  the  information,  that 
person nonetheless reaches a judgment which s/he would not have reached in the absence of 
the disorder. Such a judgment can be said to be primarily the product of the disorder and not to 
reflect  the  person’s  true  preferences.  Paragraphs  3.16  and  3.17  of the  Law  Commission’s 
Report capture the essence  of what we  wish to recommend.  Thus  a person lacks  capacity to 
consent to care and treatment for mental disorder if at the time when the decision needs to be 
made the mental disorder is such that, either:
i. ‘he or she is unable to understand or retain the information relevant to the decision, 
including information about the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deciding one way 
or another or failing to make the decision.’ (para 3.16);
or,
ii. ‘he or she is unable to make a decision based on the information relevant to the 
decision, including information about the reasonably foreseeable consequences of 
deciding one way or another or failing to make the decision.’ (para 3.17)
Table 7: The definition of mental capacity outlined in the report of the expert committee on 
the review of the Mental Health Act 1983
However, the apparent breadth of the test has caused a lot of anxiety among those 
consulted by the Law Commission and those who responded to the committee’s 
Draft Proposals. These anxieties include:
•  the  fear  that  it  will  be  up  to  doctors  alone  to  decide  whether  the  decision 
reflects a true choice,
•  that the tendency will be to  equate  incapacity with  failure to  agree with the 
doctor,
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•  that the test is dangerously subjective and
•  that it will lead to an increased use of compulsion (28).
In order to address these concerns, the committee emphasized that there will be a 
presumption  in  favour of capacity  and that  it will  be  for the  tribunal  to  decide 
rather than the  doctor.  Furthermore,  the  committee provided  four examples that 
could help mental health professionals to apply the test in practice:
•  To what extent is the decision a ‘product’  of the disorder? In answering  this,
account should be taken of whether the decision conflicts with the individual’s
views, previously expressed or demonstrated at a time when s/he had capacity.
•  Imprudence does not on its own amount to lack of capacity.
•  It is appropriate to take into account the individual’s ability to understand the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision.
•  Capacity is a sliding scale - it may be easier to establish lack of capacity where 
the consequences of the decision to be taken are more onerous: a patient must 
have capacity ‘commensurate with the gravity of the decision he purported to 
make’  (Re T  [1992]  2  FCR  861  at  874;  Re MB  [1997]  2  FCR  541  at  549).
(28)(p. 90)
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As it was mentioned in chapter one, in this country, psychiatric advance statements 
will  not be  given  statutory approval.  Therefore,  neither the report  of the  expert 
committee on the review of the Mental Health Act  1983 nor the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 provide any guidelines for the assessment of capacity for drafting and 
implementing such documents. However, the distinction between persons with and 
without capacity to make decisions and the option to create a psychiatric advance 
statement  may  offer  a  useful  avenue  for  legislation  appropriate  to  community 
treatment since these documents could offer a means of integration of autonomy 
and the initiation of voluntary treatment  at  an early stage  of relapse  (102).  The 
feasibility of psychiatric advance statements depends on whether it is possible to 
assess capacity.  According to  Halpem and Szmukler (1997) psychiatric  advance 
statements involve three capacity-related decision points concerning:
•  their making,
•  applicability (loss of capacity triggering the psychiatric advance statement) and
•  revocation.
Assessing competence when making a psychiatric advance statement 
Comprehending and retaining treatment information
Here  the  psychiatric  patient  should  be  in  a  position  to  understand  the  facts 
associated with the nature of his/her illness as well as the ones associated with the 
purpose and likely consequences of an advance treatment decision.  However, the 
complicated nature of mental illness makes comprehending and retaining treatment 
information difficult for the psychiatric patient.  In addition, the multidisciplinary 
nature of hospital care and the way treatment information is passed to the patient 
may  confuse  matters  even  more.  “Sufficient  understanding  to  make  treatment 
decisions does not mean that a patient has to share entirely the medical view of his 
or her condition and treatment as was seen in the case of Re C.” (102) (p. 324)
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The nature of mental  illness, psychodynamic  factors,  the way the  information is 
presented to the patient, the stability of the patient’s mental status and effects of 
the setting in which the different treatment options are discussed play an important 
role  in determining whether or not the patient believes the different  alternatives 
(95). A clear-cut assessment of capacity or incapacity is not always possible and in 
non-emergency situations more than one consultation may be needed in order to 
assess whether or not the patient understands and accepts the information.
Weighing evidence and arriving at a choice: “the true choice test”
B v. Croydon Health Authority
Miss  B suffered from  borderline personality disorder and was  detained under s. 3  of the Mental 
Health Act (1983). She had been sexually abused in childhood  first by her grandfather and later by 
a lodger.  When  her grandfather died in  1990 it provoked acute guilt feelings and feelings of low 
self-esteem.  In  1991 she was involuntarily admitted to hospital.  During her hospital admission she 
started self-harming.  At first she  tried to  cut herself and later she  attempted burning.  When  all 
opportunities for  self-abuse  were  removed  by  staff  she  began  to  starve  herself.  By  the  end  of 
December  1993 her weight was down to under 5 stone and she was in danger of dying.  In March 
1994  Miss  B  wrote a  letter asking to  have therapy for her underlying wish  to  harm  herself.  Her 
letter went unanswered and the doctors suggested nasogastric tube feeding instead. Miss B refused 
the intervention and consulted solicitors. Her case reached the courts in June 1994.
In court Miss B gave coherent evidence that her refusal to  be tube fed was based on  the feelings 
that the process would rekindle.  She stated that such a process would trigger her feelings of being 
sexually abused.  The consultant psychiatrist who gave evidence on Miss B ’ s behalf stated that her 
disorder brought with  it an  inescapable distortion  of cognition.  He went on  to give the court an 
analogy:  “mental illness is like the cherrystone in the ice cream, its symptoms may be detached and 
removed.  Borderline personality disorder,  by contrast,  is like raspberry ripple; it is the person ” (A 
one  day  conference  on  Mental  Health  Law,  p.  10)(103).  He  questioned  whether  lawyers  and 
doctors have the right to  take away such person’ s coping mechanism.  The judge Mr  Thorpe  (the 
same judge who had decided Re C) held that Miss B was competent at common law to refuse to be 
tube fed. However, he also held that s.63 of the Mental Health Act overrode Miss B ’ s autonomy. He 
ruled that she could be force fed against her wishes because such treatment constituted  “medical 
treatment for mental disorder’’.  Section  63  of the Mental Health Act  1983 provides  that:  “  the
consent of a patient shall not be required for any medical treatment given  to  him for the mental 
disorder for which he is suffering,  not being treatment falling within section 57 or 58 above,  if the 
treatment  is  given  by  or  under  the  direction  of the  responsible  medical  officer. ’’  (A  one  day 
conference on Mental Health Law, p. 11) (103)
In  contrast  to  Re  C  (cited  in  introduction),  where  his  refusal  was  related  to  a 
physical condition unconnected with his delusional beliefs, Miss B’s refusal in B 
v.  Croydon  Health  Authority,  was  not  a  true  choice  but  a  choice  immediately 
related to her mental disorder (her disorder bound her to refuse food).  The legal 
procedure  in  the  case  of Miss  B  was  confusing  in  terms  of granting  a  patient 
capacity  to  refuse  treatment  but  denying  the  truthfulness  of  her  choice.  The
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consequences  of  a  finding  of  incompetence  and  the  impact  of  allowing  a 
competent patient to refuse potentially life-saving treatment argues for a cautious 
and comprehensive approach to evaluation of capacity.
The loss of capacity triggering an advance statement
Loss of capacity is usually a gradual process that poses difficulties in defining the 
point at which a psychiatric advance statement may be triggered.  Clearly drafted 
psychiatric advance statements that cover the particular situation(s) that has arisen 
sufficiently will help overcome the need for court involvement. Usually previous 
experience of a recurrent mental illness with loss of capacity should make it easier 
to  draft  applicable  psychiatric  advance  statements  (102).  An  example  might  be 
“when  I  have  spent  more  than  £2,000  my  psychiatric  advance  statement  is  to 
apply.”
Revocation of an advance statement
Halpem  and  Szmukler  wrote:  “The  test  of capacity  for  revoking  a  psychiatric 
advance  statement  has not yet been considered by the  English courts.  The  Law 
commission  comments  that  whether  people  have  the  capacity  to  alter  their 
psychiatric advance statements is inevitably a question of fact and evidence in any 
particular  case.  If the  required  capacity  of revocation  were  to  be  less  than  that 
which was necessary to  make the binding treatment decision,  then  a psychiatric 
advance  statement  might  be  revoked  by  a  relapsing patient just  at  the  point  at 
which,  when  well,  the  person  had  previously  considered  it  should  be
implemented  Previous experience of precisely the same illness and subsequent
loss  of capacity  should  make  it  easier  to  draft  criteria  highly  specific  to  the 
individual and with the individual’s endorsement.” (102) (pp. 325-326)
To avoid coercion a number of safeguards should be in place such as independent 
witnesses and advocates and the possibility to appeal in cases of dispute.
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revoke a psychiatric advance statement, to refuse hospitalisation and treatment and 
to receive legal protection.  The discussion so far, has established that assessment 
of capacity is not a black and white issue but closely related to the decision that 
needs  to  be  made.  The  tests  for  capacity  have  been  established  by  law  and 
although the assessment of capacity is ultimately a legal matter, in every day life 
doctors  and  other  health  professionals  are  the  ones  who  have  to  assess  the 
functional aspects of capacity. In the following pages the clinical issues underlying 
the assessment of capacity will be considered.
Clinical approaches to capacity
Clinicians use scientific/medical knowledge and an examination of the patient to 
form  a  medical  diagnosis  that  determines  whether  or  not  the  patient’s 
understanding  and judgement  are  in  accordance  with  people  who  do  not  suffer 
serious psychiatric  illness.  This  assessment may  support  a  further judgement  of 
competence or incompetence and decisions concerning its consequences. Although 
competence is a legal concept, it is usually the clinician’s judgement that is critical 
in determining whether a patient is regarded as competent or incompetent to carry 
out  the  activity  at  hand.  Consequently,  the  legal  and  medical  matters  are  very 
closely  linked.  Kitamura  et  al  (1999)  examined  the  question  of who  is  better 
equipped  to judge  a patient’s  competence  (the  lawyer  or  the  doctor)  (4).  They 
compared the evaluation of patients’  competence by mental health professionals, 
lawyers,  medical  and  legal  students.  They  concluded  that  persons  in  the  legal 
profession in comparison with physicians find a greater level of decision ability in 
the  same  patients.  It  was  also  shown  that  non-clinicians  do  not  perceive  the 
pathological  aspects  of certain  mental  health  disorders  such  as  paranoia.  Their 
finding is not very helpful because the confusion surrounding the question whose 
determination of competence would be used (the practitioner’s or the judge’s ?) to 
predict  the  patient’s  future  behaviour  in  cases  of  conflict  is  not  resolved. 
Furthermore, the study took place in Japan where psychiatry is very conservative 
and rather legalistic and has not been replicated in other countries which makes it 
susceptible to cultural biases.
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(internists,  surgeons  and  psychiatrists)  suggested  that  although  most  physicians 
knew  the  standards  of  competence,  they  applied  them  incorrectly  both  at  a 
theoretical  and  practical  level  (104).  As  for  the  psychiatrists  they  answered 
correctly  only  half  of  the  time  about  whether  a  demented  patient  could  be 
considered  competent.  Markson  et  al  (1994)  suggested  that  “judges  must  be 
exceedingly  careful  in  evaluating  medical  and  psychiatric  testimony  in 
competency proceedings.  In particular, judges  should not rely upon-and perhaps 
should  not  even  ask  for-  expert  witnesses’  conclusions  regarding  patient 
competence.”(104) (p. 1079)
In any case, in most countries today, the judges are the ones who ultimately decide 
whether  a  patient  is  competent  or  not  and  attempts  are  made  to  educate  both 
doctors and lawyers on the legal tests of capacity and how to use them in clinical 
practice (94).
The traditional approaches to the assessment of capacity based on the ‘outcome’ of 
the  individual’s  decision-making  (e.g.  refusal  of a  particular  treatment)  and  on 
his/her ‘status’ (or diagnosis) have been rejected on both empirical and conceptual 
grounds. Instead a functional approach is now preferred. As the study of Kitamura 
et  al  (1999)  showed,  both  clinicians  and  lawyers  agree  that  capacity  is 
multidimensional including four factors (4):
•  Understanding of the treatment
•  Insight
•  Autonomy and coercion
•  Best interest and recovery.
Although  the  functional  approach  is  used  in  current  clinical  practice,  it  is 
associated with many difficulties. It is time consuming, legal and clinical standards 
vary  and  most  importantly  there  is  no  certainty  about  the  threshold  at  which 
incompetence  should  be  judged  (105).  Adequate  assessment  should  involve
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should reflect the complexity and the risk of the decision (106).
In the literature there are a number of semi-structured interviews, recognition tests 
(e.g.  patients  are  asked  questions  about  a  short  essay  on  treatment  rights)  and 
clinical  vignettes  that  assess  both  capacity  to  sign  informed  consent  for 
admission/treatment  and  capacity  to  complete  an  advance  statement.  Review 
papers on these instruments emphasize that each of these tests investigates certain 
aspects of the problem but none is either complete or sufficient for a given patient 
(107).
One  of  the  first  instruments  developed,  was  the  Hopkins  Competence  Test 
(HCAT), by Janofsky et al (1992), which assesses the capacity of patients to make 
treatment decisions  or to  draft advance  statements  (108).  The  questionnaire was 
administered to both medical and psychiatric patients.  The instrument consists of 
short  essays  describing  informed  consent  and  the  durable  power  of  attorney 
followed  by  six  comprehension  questions  about  the  material  presented  in  the 
essay,  all formatted at  13th,  8th and 6th grade reading levels.  The questions try to 
establish  the  types  of  information  a  patient  would  need  in  order  to  make  an 
informed decision and also the appropriate time for drafting advance statements. In 
addition to the HCAT, a mini-mental state exam (MMSE) was performed as well 
as  an independent  exam by a  forensic psychiatrist.  The  study showed the  inter­
rater reliability for the HCAT to be high. The HCAT scores were distributed over a 
range of 1-10, with a score of less than four strongly correlating with the forensic 
psychiatrist’s  assessment.  The MMSE was  found to be neither a sensitive nor a 
specific  screen  for  establishing  competence  (108).  However,  another  study  by 
Molloy  et  al  (1996)  compared  the  standardised  mini  mental  status  examination 
(SMMSE) with a panel’s competence assessment (the panel consisted of a health 
worker,  a lawyer and an ethicist)  and a geriatrician’s  assessment to  evaluate the 
capacity  of 96  older patients  to  draft  an  advance  statement  and  found  that  the 
SMMSE  accurately  differentiates  people  who  can  learn  about  and  ultimately 
complete an advance  statement from those who can not (109).  To  conclude,  the 
HCAT may be a useful tool for screening large numbers of patients because it only 
takes ten minutes to  administer (while the assessment conducted by the  forensic
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to test the validity and reliability of the instrument.  The  study by Janofsky et al 
(1992)  used only a  small  number of patients  to  test the  instrument  (n=41).  The 
sample was randomly selected but selected from patients hospitalised in an urban 
teaching hospital.
The most frequently quoted and used tool to date, is the MacArthur Competence 
Assessment  Tool  for  Treatment  (MacCAT-T),  a  semi-structured  interview 
designed  to  evaluate  patient’s  competence  (106; 107; 110-113).  The  authors 
compared the responses of acutely ill psychiatric patients diagnosed with psychotic 
disorders  (n=75)  with  those  of patients  diagnosed  with  depression  (n=92)  and 
ischemic heart disease (82).  This population was in turn compared to a matched 
group of the general population not known to have any psychiatric illnesses (111- 
113).
The authors developed three instruments to assess abilities related conceptually to 
the four legal standards that are used to determine patients’ capacity to consent to 
treatment: understanding, appreciation, reasoning and the ability to express choice. 
They  operationalised  the  relationships  between  the  legal  standards  and  relevant 
psychological functions in the following ways (111-113):
1.  For  abilities  related  to  understanding,  they measured  the  patients’  ability  to 
demonstrate comprehension of information about the nature of the disorder, the 
nature of the treatment that is being recommended and the benefits and risks 
associated with it, by paraphrasing or recognising items of information (related 
to  one’s  own  disorder)  after  they  are  presented  in  an  informed  consent 
disclosure.
2.  They  operationalised  appreciation  as  acknowledgement  of  illness  and  the 
potential value of treatment or acknowledgement of these things after illogical 
premises underlying initial non-acknowledgment were challenged.
3.  Reasoning  was  operationalised  by  one’s  demonstration  of several  problem­
solving abilities when faced with a decision about treatment for a disorder.
4.  The ability to communicate a choice was operationalised as the person’s ability 
to select a treatment option in a decision-making task.
They used three instruments to measure the above abilities:
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presentation of five paragraphs (of two-to-five sentence each) of information 
corresponding to content required for informed consent for each of the three 
conditions  (schizophrenia,  depression,  ischemic  heart  disease)  which  were 
worded to meet  a 7th to  9th grade reading criterion.  The UTD provides two 
types  of disclosure:  uninterrupted  (e.g.  presentation  of all  five  paragraphs 
prior  to  assessment  of  understanding)  and  element  disclosure  (e.g. 
presentation  of  each  paragraph  separately,  with  understanding  assessed 
following  each  paragraph).  The  UTD  assesses  understanding  by  using 
paraphrased recall and recognition and takes about 25-30min to administer.
2.  Perceptions of Disorder (POD) is a standardised interview that includes nine 
stimulus  questions  and  has  two  parts:  measuring  non-acknowledgement  of 
one’s  disorder  (NOD)  and  non-acknowledgement  of the  potential  value  of 
treatment  (NOT)  even  when  successful  treatment  is  likely.  The  test  takes 
between 10 to 20min to administer.
3.  Thinking Rationally About Treatment (TRAT) includes the presentation of a 
vignette describing a hypothetical patient’s mental or medical illness and the 
description of three treatment alternatives as well as their benefits and risks, 
presented orally and on printed cards. Within this scale the patient’s ability to 
express  a  choice  (EC)  is  also  measured  by  a  single  item.  After  the 
presentation  of the  vignette  the  participants  are  asked  which  of the  three 
treatment  options  they would  recommend  to  the  hypothetical  patient.  This 
instrument requires 25-30min for administration.
4.  In  addition  to  the  above  measures,  the  researchers  also  used  the  Beck 
Depression  Inventory,  three  subtests  of  the  Wechsler  Adult  Intelligence 
Scale-Revised  (vocabulary,  similarities  and  digit  span)  and  the  Brief 
Psychiatric Rating Scale (113).
Grisso  et  al  (1995)  report  good reliability and  internal  consistency for the three 
instruments.  They  also  suggest  that  the  measures  have  reasonable  sensitivity 
because very few people who would be judged by a court to be incompetent would 
perform  well  on  all  of the  measures.  However,  they  caution  that  specificity  is 
uncertain because low scores on one or more of the measures may not be highly 
predictive of legal determinations of incapacity (112).
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patient groups (as well as non-patient groups) performed better when information 
was disclosed to them part by part than when disclosed as a whole (uninterrupted 
disclosure). They also reported that on all three capacity measures (UTD, POD and 
TRAT) mentally ill patients showed deficits in performance more often than did 
medically  ill  patients  and  their  non-ill  control  groups.  “Indeed,  when  the  most 
highly impaired subgroups were identified on each measure, they were composed 
almost entirely of patients with mental illness.” (112)(p.  169) The authors report 
that  regardless  the  overall  lower  scores  of the  mentally  ill  groups,  there  was 
considerable  heterogeneity  within  and  across  these  groups.  Impairments  in 
performance were more  significant  and more consistent  across  measures  for the 
schizophrenia  patients  than  for  depression  patients.  However,  the  majority  of 
patients with schizophrenia did not perform more poorly than other patients and 
non-patients,  it  was  a  minority  within  that  group  that  lowered  the  mean 
performance.  Although  that  minority  within  the  schizophrenia  group  was  not 
distinguishable  on  the basis  of other demographic,  mental  status  or patienthood 
variables, it did manifest greater severity of psychiatric symptoms, especially those 
of  thought  disturbance  (112).  This  finding  suggests  that  a  diagnosis  of 
schizophrenia should alert clinician’s attention to the possibility of deficiencies in 
abilities  related  to  mental  capacity,  but  the  diagnosis  itself is  only  moderately 
related  to  serious  deficits  in  those  abilities.  Further  screening  of at  risk  cases 
should be performed. The authors caution that in reality the proportion of patients 
(with  both  mental  and  medical  illnesses)  who  have  serious  deficiencies  in 
decisional abilities to consent to treatment is larger than their finding suggest. This 
is so due to the fact that some patients were not enrolled to the study because their 
doctors believed they were too acutely ill to participate (112).
In summary,  although the  instruments were  found to be  valid in many respects, 
they may not be feasible for every day use by clinicians. The standardised text may 
be difficult to adapt to every case; the tests do not give an overall rating; the length 
of  administration  exceeds  an  hour  and  the  scoring  methods  are  bulky 
(106;107;110;112).  To  overcome these problems,  Grisso  et  al  (1997)  developed 
the Mac  Arthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment Decisions (MacCAT-
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abilities related to each of the four legal standards for mental capacity, is valid and 
reliable  and requires  15-20min  administration  (114).  However,  more  studies  are 
needed in order to determine the degree to which different clinicians elicit similar 
responses from patients.
In  general,  the  different  measures  of  capacity  assessment  have  shown  that 
recognition rather than recall of information is preferable in capacity assessment 
because verbal disabilities have been found to correlate with lack of capacity in 
schizophrenia and Alzheimer’s disease (106). These tests have also suggested that 
a proportion  of psychiatric patients have deficient decision-making  skills.  These 
patients  usually  suffer  from  organic  syndromes,  psychosis  and  depression 
(106; 111-114).  In  schizophrenia,  incapacity  has  been  found  to  correlate  more 
closely with  cognitive  impairment than  symptoms but  can  be  restored  by using 
educational  intervention  and  cognitive  and  behavioural  strategies.  Delirium  is  a 
serious medical condition, which can disrupt decision-making capacity by altering 
cognition  and  motivation  and  increasing  anxiety.  In  order  to  restore  capacity, 
medical interventions are directed towards resolving the underlying causes of the 
delirium.( 106; 111 -114).
To  conclude,  the  evaluation  of  competence  to  make  treatment  decisions  is  a 
complex issue that requires the implementation of clear legal and clinical criteria. 
Although  the  existing  measures  of  competence  assessment  pose  a  number  of 
problems  including  their  inadequacy  to  address  specific  legal  thresholds  for 
capacity, they do have several advantages over the abstract application of the legal 
standards in clinical practice. The most important advantage of using a scale such 
as MacCAT-T, is when a clinician is faced with an ambiguous case rather than a 
clear-cut one.  Using the  scale will  ensure that the clinician has  covered  the  full 
range of abilities that should be considered in making competence judgements, it 
will provide documentation of the clinician’s care in informed consent disclosure 
and inquiry, it will help structure the clinician’s reasoning about mental capacity 
and finally it will equip clinicians with evidence they could use to explain to third 
parties (e.g. a surrogate or court) how the final clinical judgement was made.
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In the previous pages, the concept of mental capacity to consent to treatment and 
to draft psychiatric advance statements has been defined as the cognitive ability to 
understand the information relevant to a decision, to retain that information, to use 
or weigh that information as part of the process  of making the decision,  and to 
communicate the decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other 
means).  The Mac  Arthur Study operationalised these criteria and created the first 
valid  and  reliable  compound  measure  of mental  capacity  for  use  by  clinicians 
(111-114). However, Louis Charland in his paper on Competence to Consent and 
Emotion,  is the  first  author to  challenge  the mere  underlying  cognitive  basis  of 
measurement of mental  capacity and in particular the criteria of ‘understanding’ 
and  ‘appreciation’  of the  MacArthur  Study  (115).  Although  Charland  does  not 
reject  the  cognitive  criteria,  he  suggests  that  assessing  mental  capacity  requires 
additional  emotional  capacities.  He believes  stripping the  emotional  components 
off mental capacity assessment is due to the old fashioned idea that emotions cloud 
our rational decision-making abilities and that logic is in conflict with feeling. He 
argues, that this non-cognitive approach to emotion does not take into account the 
modem  psychological  theories  of  emotion  which  suggest  that  “emotions  are 
cognitive in virtue of their capacity to represent, that is, to ‘stand for’ or ‘be about’ 
features  in  the  world.  Indeed,  there  is  now  sufficient  evidence  to  advance  the 
hypothesis  that  emotions  may  form  a  specialized  representational  information 
processing  system  of their  own,  like  vision,  say  or  language.”  (115)  (p.  71) 
Charland borrowed his arguments from Damazio’s, de Sousa’s and Lazarus’s work 
on  the  rationality  of  emotion  (116-119).  Damazio  (1994)  a  behavioural 
neurologist,  describes  case  histories  of patients  with  injuries  to  the  inferior  and 
medial  portions  of  the  frontal  lobes  who  score  very  highly  on  intelligence, 
neuropsychological and personality testing as well as on more sophisticated tests 
of decision  making  which  require  them  to  generate  options  for  action,  display 
awareness of consequences, identify efficacious means of achieving social goals, 
predict social consequences of events and make moral judgments. However, these 
patients cannot use their emotions in every day decision making at all. “But now I 
had before my eyes the coolest, least emotional, intelligent human being one might
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wanderings  of daily  life,  succession  of mistakes,  a  perpetual  violation  of what 
would be considered socially appropriate and personally advantageous. He had had 
an entirely healthy mind until a neurological disease ravaged a specific sector of 
his brain and, from one day to the next, caused this profound defect in decision­
making.  The instruments usually considered necessary and sufficient for rational 
behavior  were  intact  in  him.  He  had  the  requisite  knowledge,  attention,  and 
memory; his language was flawless; he could perform calculations; he could tackle 
the logic of an abstract problem. There was only one significant accompaniment to 
his  decision-making  failure:  a  marked  alteration  of  the  ability  to  experience 
feelings.” (119)  (pp. xi-xii)  According to Damasio,  emotions provide us with an 
efficient mechanism  for integrating  information  that  is  crucial  to  our  every day 
decision-making.  Without  emotions  we  wouldn’t  be  able  to  integrate  a  huge 
amount of situation-specific information and life experiences simply because the 
brain cannot deal with so many pieces of data at once. ‘Gut feeling’ is the glue that 
keeps  together  all  the  pieces  of information  necessary  for  competent  decision 
making (119). This is the premise on which Charland based his argument about the 
incomplete  nature  of  the  “understanding”  component  of  mental  capacity 
assessment (115).
In  addition,  de  Sousa  (1987)  and  Lazarus  (1994)  suggest  that  emotions  are  the 
source of our most basic goals, values and preferences because they motivate us to 
action and help us to explain and predict behaviour.  Charland borrows Lazarus’s 
(1994)  theory  of  the  motivational  and  appraisal  components  of  emotion  to 
challenge the “appreciation” component of mental capacity assessment. According 
to Lazarus, (1994) emotions have a primary and a secondary appraisal component. 
Primary appraisal addresses whether and how an encounter is relevant to our well­
being (e.g. is the person in front of us angry?).  Secondary appraisal refers to our 
evaluation of the  options  and resources  for coping with the  situation  and  future 
prospects (e.g.  If the person in front of us is  angry then we have to think about 
what  action  to  take  in  order to  protect  ourselves).  Both primary and  secondary 
appraisals are very similar to the cognitive functions underlying appreciation of a 
medical treatment and the probable consequences of one’s treatment options (115).
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competent patient who  would pass  all mental  capacity tests with  flying  colours. 
However,  should we  accept him  as a mentally competent individual  in the legal 
and clinical sense of the term? In another example, Charland argues if one should 
accept the participation of a cancer patient who understands and appreciates what 
it would mean to enroll in a toxicity test trial and he does so because he hopes he 
will  get  better.  “If  the  hope  is  not  entirely  misplaced,  misinformed,  and 
inappropriate, most of us would probably grant that, in this case, it is a legitimate 
reason which we can all recognize as a sensible justification. But it is an emotive 
reason.”  (115)  (p.  76)  Charland  concludes,  that  “a  being  without  emotions  is 
incapable  of  effective  practical  reasoning  and  decision  making...Practical 
reasoning without cognition is empty, without emotion it is blind” (115) (p. 78)
In response to Charland’s paper, a few authors provided their written support for 
the incorporation of an emotional component in the evaluation of mental capacity. 
However, they all recognised that the most difficult aspect of this issue is how to 
operationalise standards for determining and assessing the contribution of emotion 
to mental capacity. For example, can we tell whether the absence of emotion is due 
to the lack of a capacity to experience emotions, or simply due to the lack of strong 
feelings  about  the  matter  at  hand?  (120-123)  In  addition,  Appelbaum  (1999) 
cautions that in order to justify the expansion of the mental capacity assessment to 
include  emotion,  one  should  be  able  to  show  that  “there  is  a  substantial  target 
population who would be identified as lacking the capacity for emotion, and who 
therefore  are  so  profoundly  impaired  as  to  be  incapable  of  meaningful 
choice.”(120) (p. 387)
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In  this  chapter  the  definitions  and  standards  of assessing  mental  capacity have 
been explored within the legal and medical contexts in the UK.  More specifically, 
the  first  part  of this  chapter  was  devoted  on  the  global,  domain  and  decision­
making definitions of capacity. This was followed by a detailed description of the 
legal  standards  of assessing mental  capacity of patients  in general medicine and 
psychiatry.  Then,  the  assessment of the capacity to  draft  and revoke psychiatric 
advance  statements  was  considered  which  was  followed  by  a  discussion  of the 
clinical aspects of mental capacity assessment.  The final part of this chapter was 
focused on the emotional components of capacity and the need for expanding the 
cognitive criteria of mental capacity assessment. In the next chapter, the concept of 
self-efficacy and its relation to this study will be explored.
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SELF-EFFICACY
“A resilient sense of efficacy enhances sociocognitive functioning in the relevant domains in many 
ways. People who have strong beliefs in their capabilities approach difficult tasks as challenges to 
be mastered rather than as threats to be avoided. Such an affirmative orientation fosters interest 
and engrossing involvement in activities.  They set themselves challenging goals and maintain 
strong commitment to them.  They invest a high level of effort in what they do and heighten their 
effort in the face offailures or setbacks.  They remain task-focused and think strategically in the 
face of difficulties.  They attribute failure to insufficient effort, which supports a success orientation. 
They quickly recover their sense of efficacy after failures or setbacks.  They approach potential 
stressors or threats with the confidence that they can exercise some control over them. Such an 
efficacious outlook enhances performance accomplishments, reduces stress, and lowers 
vulnerability to depression. ” (124)(p. 39)
According to Bandura (1997) the godfather of this psychological construct,  self- 
efficacy is not a general trait that some individuals possess and others don’t but is 
a set of differentiated  self-beliefs  linked to  different  areas  of functioning.  These 
sets of beliefs are specific for each activity domain and are not concerned with just 
the  exercise  of control  over  action  but  also  with  the  self-regulation  of thought 
processes, motivation, affective and physiological states. In other words, perceived 
self-efficacy is not concerned with the number of skills one has but with what one 
believes can do with these skills under a variety of circumstances (124). Efficacy 
beliefs  can  vary  on  several  dimensions  that  have  important  performance 
implications (e.g.  level,  generality and strength).  First, they vary in terms of the 
level  of task  demands  that  represents  different  degrees  of challenge  within  a 
particular domain of activity. For example, one can measure a person’s perceived 
self-efficacy  to  stick  to  a  health-promoting  exercise  programme  by  asking  the 
person to describe the things that make it hard for them to exercise regularly (e.g. 
when they are  under work pressure,  are tired,  when they have  other interesting 
things to do).  Second,  efficacy beliefs may differ in terms of generality.  “People 
may judge  themselves  efficacious  across  a  wide  range  of activities  or  only  in 
certain  domains  of functioning.  Generality  can  vary  on  a  number  of different 
dimensions, including the degree of similarity of activities, the modalities in which 
capabilities are expressed (behavioural, cognitive, affective), qualitative features of 
situations,  and the  characteristics  of the persons  toward whom  the behaviour is
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others. The most fundamental self-beliefs are those around which people structure 
their lives.”  (124)  (p.  43)  Third,  self-efficacy beliefs differ in terms  of strength. 
Strong  self-efficacy  beliefs  will  persist  and  produce  outcomes  under  adverse 
circumstances while weak ones will be easily cancelled (124).
Moving on from the main characteristics of self-efficacy beliefs to their role in the 
process  of human  adaptation  and  change,  Bandura  (1997)  has  identified  five 
different  ways  in  which  self-efficacy  contributes  to  this  process  (124).  First, 
different classes of activities are governed by similar sub-skills. For example, an 
executive who  runs  an  advertising  company successfully could  also  run  a fund­
raising  campaign  successfully  because  his  sense  of being  self-efficacious  that 
stems from one domain of activity can be transferred to another by using similar 
skills.  Second,  human  beings  can  acquire  competencies  in  different  domains 
simultaneously which can enhance their self-efficacy in learning new things in life. 
For example, school children are exposed simultaneously to a number of different 
skills for learning maths, languages, arts, etc.  Children who master most of these 
skills successfully, develop metastrategies which although learnt in one domain of 
activity can be used in other activity domains. Consequently, their beliefs in their 
learning capabilities affect how they approach new challenges. Third, self-efficacy 
beliefs in coping with one type of activity can be generalised in different settings. 
In a number of different experiments, Bandura was able to show that women who 
received training on how to disable men in case they attacked them physically or 
sexually,  were  able  to  transfer  these  skills  in  different  settings,  different 
individuals  and  different  activities.  Similar results  were  obtained  when  phobics 
were taught generalisable coping skills.  Their increased  self-efficacy and coping 
behaviour was  extended beyond the particular threat for which those skills were 
developed  (124).  Fourth,  by  creating  cognitive  commonalities  across  diverse 
domains of activities, people can transfer their self-efficacious beliefs in order to 
bring about change. Taylor et al (1985) showed that men with uncomplicated acute 
myocardial infarction who led impoverished lives because they believed they had a 
permanently  impaired  heart,  were  able  to  increase  their  self-efficacy  in  their 
cardiac  capabilities  by  mastering  heavy  workloads  on  a  treadmill  (125).  They 
believed that the strain their heart was able to withstand on the treadmill exceeded
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everyday activities.  Finally, human adaptation and change can be achieved when 
individuals  are  able  to  generalize  their  belief that  they  can  mobilize  whatever 
effort  to  succeed  in  different  activities.  Bandura  (1997)  outlines  a  number  of 
experiments  where  individuals  with  different  phobias  (e.g.  snake  phobia)  were 
able to show metacognitive changes in their perceptions to bring about change in 
different  areas  of functioning.  One of his patient’s reported the  following:  “The 
feeling  of accomplishment  I  was  experiencing  at  having  overcome  the  fear  of 
snakes  gave  me  the  confidence  to  overcome  my  fear  of public  speaking.  I  am 
generally somewhat less timid than I was before. The biggest benefit to me of the 
successfulness of the treatment was the feeling that if I could lick snakes, I could 
lick anything. It gave me the confidence to tackle, also successfully, some personal 
stuff.” (124) (p. 53)
So  far,  a  general  description  of the  psychological  construct  of self-efficacy has 
been attempted and how it affects human adaptation. Psychological experiments in 
the 70s and  80s  showed that changes in efficacy beliefs regulate motivation and 
action,  that  acquisition  of  self-efficacy  is  possible  through  direct  or  mastery 
experience,  indirect  or  vicarious  experience  and  verbal  persuasion  or  symbolic 
experience and finally that personal enablement is achieved by equipping people 
with  knowledge,  sub-skills  and  self-affirming  experiences  in  their  exercise  of 
personal  control  (124; 126; 127).  However,  a  lot  of work  has  been  devoted  on 
identifying the mechanisms that affect and mobilize self-efficacy to  facilitate the 
process  of adaptation  and  change.  This part  is mainly explained by the  Social 
Cognitive Theory.
Self-efficacy within Social Cognitive Theory
According  to  the  Social  Cognitive  Theory,  our  actions  are  the  result  of  a 
continuous,  dynamic  and  reciprocal  interaction  of  personal,  environmental 
(situational) and behavioural factors (124). Personal factors include our attitudes, 
perceptions, values, goals, knowledge and all previous experience. Environmental 
factors involve all those influences that may both reward or hinder actions and the
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The relative  influence  applied by each of the three  sets  of factors will  vary  for 
different  activities,  different  individuals  and  different  circumstances.  Kaufman, 
Mann & Jennett (2005) draw a picture of the interplay of these factors using the 
following illustration: “In a medical education example, when students are thrust 
into the busy environment of a clinical ward, they will do what is required to ‘get 
the job  done’  and  to  meet  expectations.  In  other  cases,  the  behaviour  and  its 
feedback will be a major influence (128). For instance, when students are learning 
and practicing  a new  skill,  the  feedback  from this will  have  a strong  influence. 
Finally,  in  those  instances  where  situational  influences  are  relatively  weak, 
personal  factors  will  exert  the  strongest  regulatory  influence.  To  complete  our 
example,  when  not  pressed  by  powerful  environmental  forces,  students  may 
choose to  learn  a new  skill,  or to  learn more  about talking with patients.  These 
choices  will  be  affected  by  the  student’s  own  values,  perceived  needs  and 
individual  goals.  There  may  also  be  interaction  within  each  factor,  as  different 
personal factors, or environmental factors, may influence each other interactively.” 
(128) (p. 9)
Within Social Cognitive Theory, Bandura identified self-efficacy as a central type 
of belief that determines individuals’  confidence in performing actions.  To study 
self-efficacy, he looked  specifically at behaviour.  According to him behaviour is 
determined by expectations (the consequences of behaviour as they are perceived 
by the  individual)  and  incentives  (subjective  evaluations  of the  importance  of a 
particular outcome or object) (124). There are three forms of expectations:
1.  Situation-specific that occur without personal action.
2.  Outcome  expectations  which  are  the  assumed  normal  consequences  of  an 
action.
3.  Self-efficacy expectations that refer to our perceived confidence in organising 
and performing a specific action.
Self-efficacy and outcome expectations
According  to  Bandura  (1997)  self-efficacy  affects  the  intention  to  change 
behaviour  (e.g.  quit  smoking),  the  effort  invested  to  reach  this  goal,  and  the
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undermine motivation. Research has shown that outcome expectations are seen as 
particularly important  in  intention  formation but  less  so  in  action  control  while 
self-efficacy has been shown to be important in both stages (124). Furthermore, it 
has been shown that self-efficacy is a good predictor of diverse forms of behaviour 
whereas outcome expectations are predictive if specified and assessed in relation 
to  the  actions  that  can  produce  them  (124; 129).  To  illustrate  the  relationship 
between  self-efficacy  and  outcome  expectations  it  is  necessary  first,  to  look  at 
three  major  forms  outcome  expectations  can  take  and  then  look  at  their 
interactions with self-efficacy beliefs. Outcome expectations can take three major 
forms:
•  The  positive  and  negative  physical  effects  that  accompany  behaviour  (e.g. 
alcohol  can  produce  physical  pleasure,  reduce  stress,  etc.  but  it  can  also 
produce serious health problems).
•  The positive  and negative  social  effects  such  as  approval,  social  recognition 
and  delivery  of  status  and  power  or  disapproval,  social  rejection  and 
deprivation of privileges.
•  The  positive  and  negative  self-evaluative  effects  such  as  self-satisfaction,  a 
sense of pride and self-worth or self-dissatisfaction, self-devaluation and self­
censure.
The  following  table  outlines  the  different  patterns  of interaction  between  self- 
efficacy beliefs and outcome expectations.
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Figure 2: Efficacy beliefs and outcome expectations
The effects of different patterns of efficacy beliefs and performance outcome expectations on 
behaviour and affective states. The pluses and minuses represent positive and negative qualities of 
efficacy beliefs and outcome expectations (From Bandura p. 20).
For  example,  highly  efficacious  individuals  do  not  give  up  trying  when  their 
personal  actions  do not produce  desirable  outcomes but keep  fighting until they 
achieve change through alterations of unfair social practices. The feminist and gay 
movements are just a couple of examples that illustrate the relationship between 
high  self-efficacy and  low  outcome  expectations.  In contrast,  people with  low 
perceived  self-efficacy  quickly  give-up  when  their  efforts  yield  no  results  (e.g. 
people with chronic mental health problems usually report powerlessness). Finally, 
when  people  have  a  low  sense  of personal  efficacy  but  see  others  like  them 
enjoying the benefits of successful effort they develop feelings of self-devaluation 
and  despondency  (124).  “In  studies  instilling  different  beliefs  about  personal 
efficacy and the  success of others, belief in one’s own inability to secure valued 
outcomes  readily  attainable  by  others  of similar  standing  is  most  conducive  to 
depressive mood and cognitive debilitation of performance”.(124) (p. 21)
The  strength  of  a  theory  lies  in  its  ability  to  operationalise  and  measure  its 
different components. To measure self-efficacy, we can use a variety of scales that 
take into account the level or magnitude of one’s estimate of one’s best possible 
performance (e.g. the various degrees of challenge to successful performance), the 
strength of one’s self-efficacy beliefs (e.g. can one perform the specified activity?) 
and the generality of efficacy beliefs.  Generality refers to whether one can judge
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of functioning.  Most  studies today focus  on the measurement  of the  strength of 
self-efficacy because this has been shown to be the most predictive aspect (129). 
Self-efficacy  has  become  a  widely  applied  theoretical  construct  in  models  of 
addiction  and  relapse,  academic  and  occupational  performance,  weight 
management,  stress  management,  pain management, phobic  behaviour,  adoption 
and  maintenance  of  various  health  behaviours  and  premature  attrition  from 
counselling (125-131).
In summary, the social  cognitive theory suggests that self-efficacious people are 
equipped  with  a  dynamic,  multifaceted  belief  system  that  operates  selectively 
across different activity areas and under different situational demands and provides 
them  with  the  commitment  to  engage  in  an  intended  behaviour  even  if failure 
builds  up.  But  how  can  one  distinguish  self-efficacy  from  other  similar 
psychological constructs? The following section will explore that area.
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Four psychological constructs are usually confused with self-efficacy:
•  Locus of control
•  Self-concept
•  Self-esteem
•  Effectance motivation.
Locus of control
Self-efficacy beliefs refer to whether one can produce certain actions while locus 
of control  beliefs  refer  to  whether  actions  affect  outcomes.  Rotter’s  locus  of 
control  construct,  is  mainly concerned  with people’s  perceptions  about  whether 
their  actions  are  determined  by  internal  (psychological)  or  external  (fate,  God) 
forces  (132).  As  Bandura  explains,  people  who  have  a  strong  internal  locus  of 
control  but  who  lack  the  required  skills  to  perform  a  particular  action,  will 
experience a low sense of self-efficacy and will view the activity at hand as futile 
(124).
Self-concept
In psychological textbooks self-concept is defined as “the sum of one’s beliefs and 
attitudes toward oneself (133).” It is measured by asking people to rate how well 
descriptive statements of different qualities apply to themselves (e.g. “I am a kind 
person” or “I am  an  active citizen”).  Consequently,  a score on self-concept will 
give a researcher an idea about people’s self-appraisal and their general outlook on 
life but it can not predict human behaviour accurately (133).  In contrast,  self- 
efficacy beliefs vary across different domains of activities, within the same activity 
domain  at  different  levels  of difficulty  and  under  different  circumstances,  thus 
giving greater power to predict human behaviour (124).
Self-esteem
Self-esteem  is  another  psychological  concept  that  refers  to  our  individual  self­
appraisal  and  self-worth  (global  measure).  It  is  different  from  self-efficacy that 
focuses on our perceived capabilities (domain specific).  Although both concepts 
are multidimensional  (one can derive  a sense of self-worth  from his/her  family, 
work, hobbies, etc), they are not simply different aspects of the same phenomenon
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clumsy footballer without the latter affecting his  self-esteem in any way  simply 
because his self-worth does not depend on that activity.
Effectance motivation
Effectance  motivation  refers  to  “our  intrinsic  need  to  deal  effectively  with  the 
environment.”  (124)  (p.  13)  We  develop  this  motive  through  accumulation  of 
knowledge  and  skills  in  managing  and  coping  with  our  environment  which  is 
similar  to  the  way  we  develop  efficacy  beliefs.  However,  the  main  difference 
between the two concepts is again the global nature of effectance motivation that is 
based on dispositional determinants (a theoretical position that poses difficulties in 
explaining the  variability of human behaviour based  on  a  single  intrinsic  drive) 
and the specificity of efficacy beliefs that are defined and measured independently 
of performance and provide a basis for predicting the occurrence,  generality and 
persistence of behaviour (124).
Self-efficacy and mental illness
The  previous  section  was  devoted  to  the  mechanism  of  self-efficacy  which 
underlies our ability to be self-determining, to plan for the future and see our plans 
achieved.
To  date  there  is  very  little  research  regarding  the  self-efficacy  beliefs  of 
psychiatric patients. The few studies that are found concentrate on the exercise of 
control  on  psychiatric  symptoms  and  the  acquisition  of coping  strategies  (e.g. 
training of social cognitive skills, conversational skills, independent living skills, 
problem  solving  skills,  vocational  rehabilitation  skills  and  recreational/leisure 
skills)  through role playing by the users  of psychiatric  services  and modelling, 
prompting, feedback and reinforcement by the therapist (134-137). Unfortunately 
these studies have not measured variations in patients’  self-efficacy.  Liberman et 
al’s (1986) review suggests that (136):
•  Users  of psychiatric  services  can  be  helped  to  acquire  behaviours  that  will 
improve their social skills in specific interpersonal situations.
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trained behaviours to untrained scenes and items for simple behaviours such as 
eye  contact  (although  generalisation  appears  to  be  problematic  for  complex 
behaviours such as behaviour change).
•  Comprehensive,  intensive  social  skills training can reduce clinical  symptoms 
and relapse  in psychiatric patients.  Bellack  et  al’s  study (1984)  showed  that 
people with schizophrenia who participated in a day hospital programme and 
received  social  skills  training  showed  symptom  reductions  that  were  more 
durable over a six month follow-up period than those who only received the 
day hospital programme (137).
•  Social  skills  training  alleviates  depression  for  unmedicated  depressed 
outpatients,  has  clinical  effects  equivalent  to  those  of  antidepressant 
medication and is associated with a lower rate of drop out from treatment.
Inspired by Liberman’s (1986)  and Bellack’s (1984) works,  Barbara McDermott 
attempted  to  develop  a  scale  to  measure  the  self-efficacy  of  patients  with 
schizophrenic  spectrum  disorders  to  cope with their symptoms  (135).  Her study 
resulted in a scale with two subscales, one that measures positive symptom self- 
efficacy and one that measures negative/social interaction self-efficacy. The author 
explains  that  validating  the  positive  symptom  self-efficacy  scale  was  difficult 
probably because patients who  were confident  in their ability to  control hearing 
voices did not feel able to get rid of their voices. They just felt their voices were 
less likely to interfere with other aspects of their functioning.  She also found that 
lack of congruence between positive symptom self-efficacy and positive symptoms 
translated  into  generalised  feelings  of  self-efficacy  rather  than  confidence  in 
management of the individual  symptoms per se.  Another difficulty in validating 
this sub-scale was the patients’ belief that if they complied with their medications 
they would be able to control their positive symptoms. This resulted in high self- 
efficacious patients who were still  experiencing a significant number of positive 
symptoms  but  not  necessarily  coping  very  efficiently  with  them.  McDermott 
suggests  that  the  positive  symptom  self-efficacy  subscale  could  be  used  as  a 
general  measure  of  self-efficacy  rather  than  symptom  specific  while  the 
negative/social interaction subscale could be used as a symptom specific measure.
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efficacy.  She  suggests  that  the  opposite  might  be  true  too  but  that  was  not 
addressed by her study. The small sample size (n=127 at baseline and n=60 at two 
weeks follow up) and the two-week gap between test-re-test reliability further limit 
the validity and reliability of the scale (135). Unfortunately, her work has not been 
taken up by other researchers.  Further work in this  area is needed in  order to 
shade more  light  in understanding the  causal relationships between  self-efficacy 
beliefs  and  management  and  coping  with  positive  and  negative  symptoms  in 
schizophrenia.
Self-efficacy and empowerment of users ofpsychiatric services 
Another attempt to study the self-efficacy of patients with psychiatric disorders is 
found in research around patients’  empowerment. Rappaport an advocate of user 
empowerment in America during the 80s, maintained that empowerment includes 
the  individual’s  psychological  sense  of personal  control  and  determination  over 
his/her  own  life  and  his/her  democratic  participation in  the  life  of  one’s
community  (138).  Following  Rappaport’s  writings  and public  campaigns  for
increasing  users’  empowerment,  researchers  such  as  Rogers  et  al  (1997)  and 
Wowra  &  McCarter  (1999)  set  out  to  develop  and  validate  the  first  scale  on 
measuring  this  construct  (139;140).  Rogers  et  al’s  study  produced  a  valid  and 
reliable instrument comprised of 28 items clustered under five major factors (139):
•  self-esteem and self-efficacy
•  power-powerlessness
•  community activism and autonomy
•  optimism and control over the future
•  righteous  anger  (e.g.  getting  angry  about  something  is  often  the  first  step
toward changing it, getting angry about something never helps).
According to  the  authors,  “the  self-esteem  -  self-efficacy factor was  one  of the 
strongest  and most  consistent produced by the  factor  analysis.”  (139)  (p.  1045) 
The authors also report a number of predictors that increase empowerment such as 
the number of community activities users engage in, the number of hours worked,
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person  is  one  who  has  a  sense  of  self-worth,  self-efficacy,  and  power.  The 
empowered person recognizes use of anger as a motivating force to instigate social 
change and is optimistic about the ability to exert control over his or her life. He or 
she recognizes the importance of the group or community to effect change, but the 
empowered  person  also  values  autonomy.”  (139)  (p.  1046)  The  validity  and 
reliability of the scale was further explored and confirmed by a big survey on  a 
sample of 2,000 outpatient mental health patients carried out by (140) (1999).
In summary, the above studies suggest that the Empowerment Scale is a valid and 
reliable measure and that empowerment can be used in research as a process and 
outcome measure. In addition, the studies suggest that services aimed at increasing 
users’  empowerment  should  focus  on  increasing  users’  self-efficacy  and  self­
esteem,  decrease  feelings  of  powerlessness  and  increasing  feelings  of  power 
especially by increasing financial resources and community activism.
Self-efficacy and its roie in advance care planning
According  to  Pearlman  et  al  (1995),  advance  care  planning  is  a  process  very 
similar  to  other  health  promotion  activities  such  as  smoking  cessation  (141). 
Pearlman et al  (1995) believe that the low uptake of advance  statement drafting 
and the unsuccessful implementation of such documents in the United States, are 
due to the underestimation of the psychological processes  that underlie  advance 
care  planning.  Focusing  on  three  psychological  models  used  in  other  health 
promotion activities, they provide a model that could be used within the advance 
care planning context (see picture 1).  The three models used in this blueprint are:
•  The stages of change model (142)
•  The health belief model (143)
•  The social cognitive theory (124; 144)
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Figure 3: Conceptual model for advance care planning adopted by Pearlman et al (1995)
The stages of change model
i
The stages of change model outlines five basic stages in the process of changing a 
behaviour:  precontemplation,  contemplation,  action,  maintenance,  and  relapse 
(142).  In each of these  stages,  individual  attitudes,  intentions  and/or behaviours 
play an important role in the process of change.  Pearlman et al (1995) suggest that 
in the precontemplation stage, individuals may be unaware of the need for advance 
care planning and unwilling or discouraged about completing advance statements 
(141).  During  the  contemplation  stage  people  become  aware  of advance  care 
planning  and  start  thinking  about  completing  an  advance  statement,  gather 
information  and  talk  about  treatment  preferences  or  completion  of  advance 
statements.  During  the  action  stage,  actual  completion  of an  advance  statement 
takes  place  and  communication  of  the  treatment  preferences  to  health  care 
providers  occurs.  Finally,  during the  maintenance  stage,  advance  care  planning 
discussions and updating of the advance statements occurs.
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Within each stage of change,  individuals  evaluate the perceived threats, benefits 
and barriers in engaging in the behaviour at hand.  This process is best known as 
the Health Belief Model, and in the case of advance care planning could take the 
following forms (141; 143):
•  The  individual’s  perception  of risk  that  if he/she  does  not have  an  advance 
statement his/her wishes will not be followed.
•  The  individual’s  perception  of  benefits  could  include  his/her  increased 
autonomy and relief that family members would not be burdened.
•  The individual’s perception of potential barriers could involve time and effort 
required in drafting and updating the advance statement.
The social cognitive theory
The concept of self-efficacy borrowed from the social cognitive theory, is the third 
psychological  construct  that  features  in  Pearlman  et  al’s  model  (141).  The 
individual’s belief in their confidence (efficacy expectation) to taking some action 
(e.g. thinking about advance care planning and completing an advance statement) 
and  the  belief  that  taking  such  action  (outcome  expectations)  will  have  any 
meaningful effect (e.g. the impact of the advance statement on future care) should 
be considered  and  incorporated in the promotion of advance  care planning  from 
the outset.
Integration and operationalisation of the three psychological models in 
advance care planning
To  operationalise the above, Pearlman et al (1995)  suggest that health providers 
should prepare a structured interview with questions which will incorporate all of 
the three models and a patient-centred workbook which will provide people with 
another opportunity to understand the purpose and relevant issues of advance care 
planning (141). Examples of structured interview questions could include:
•  Exploring the stage of change: “If you became seriously ill today with a life- 
threatening problem, what should be the goals of your medical treatment? To 
get better or to make you comfortable?”
•  Exploring  attitudes  to  perceived  benefits/risks:  “What  are  the  factors  that 
influence your choice? Hope for improvement, fighting for life?”
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advance  statement about a life-threatening problem?  If you were in the  final 
stages of an incurable disease and dying, would you still want these treatments, 
and if so, why?”
A patient-centred workbook could incorporate personal values into the formation 
of informed  and  well-considered  preferences,  knowledge  about  treatments  and 
health  states  and  questions  about  areas  of uncertainty  for  discussions  with  the 
health providers.
So far there is no available data on the use of Pearlman et al’s model in promoting 
advance care planning.
Self-efficacy and the preference for care study
Self-efficacy is defined as confidence in our abilities to execute certain actions. If 
users of psychiatric services can benefit from social cognitive skills training, then 
systematic implementation of an educational programme about advance statements 
that incorporates Pearlman et al’s model could possibly make them more effective 
in  their  abilities  to  design,  execute  and  revoke  psychiatric  advance  statements 
(141).
I joined  the  preference  for  care  study  a  year  and  a  half after  the  study  began 
because  the  previous  researcher  had  difficulties  recruiting  sectioned  patients. 
Because  recruitment  was  well  under  way  it  was  not  possible  to  introduce  a 
baseline measure that could look at the self-efficacy beliefs of sectioned patients in 
relation  to  drafting  and  implementing  psychiatric  advance  statements.  My 
academic  interest  in  the  psychological  construct  of  self-efficacy  led  me  to 
investigate  existing  research  on  self-efficacy  that  could  be  introduced  at  the 
follow-up phase of the study. My investigation was successful and identified two 
longitudinal studies on smoking cessation in the Netherlands which showed that an 
increase  in post-treatment  level  of self-efficacy  and  an  increase  of self-efficacy 
during treatment, were predictors for success and failure after 1   year (130). In the 
first  study  (which  was  part  of a  research  programme  about  the  prevention  of 
smoking in youth), the attitude, social norm and self-efficacy scores of the control 
group at the first measurement (Tl) were used to predict intention and behaviour at
128a following measurement one year later (T2). Analysis of the results showed that 
self-efficacy at T1  was the best predictor of smoking intention at T2  explaining 
24%  of the  variance.  Self-efficacy  at  T1  also  had  a  unique  contribution  in  the 
prediction  of behaviour  at  T2  when  added  after  the  intention  T1  (130).  In  the 
second study, researchers used two self-efficacy questionnaires to evaluate success 
of a  three-week  ‘stop  smoking’  programme  (130).  At  the  pre-treatment  self- 
efficacy measure, respondents were told to imagine that they were quitting without 
professional  assistance,  to  minimise  the  effect  of  programme-efficacy 
expectations. Success rates of the programme were 54% after treatment, 44% after 
6-weeks follow-up and 27% after 1-year follow-up and were comparable to rates 
of other  studies.  There  were  no  differences  between  the  groups  of quitters  and 
smokers  after one  year with respect to  any measure on the pre-test.  Researchers 
divided  the  participants  that  were  successful  after  the  treatment  in  three 
success/failure groups:
•  A:  post-treatment success, post-6-weeks success, post-1-year success.
•  B:  post-treatment success, post-6-weeks success, post-1-year failure.
•  C:  post-treatment success, post-6-weeks failure, post-1-year failure.
The  researchers  predicted  the  membership  of the  three  groups  from  the  self- 
efficacy  scores  at  the  post-treatment  measure  and  the  increase  in  self-efficacy 
during treatment (130).  Post-treatment self-efficacy predicted success and failure 
after one year (129; 130; 145).
Garcia et al (1990) further explored the hypothesis whether self-efficacy predicts 
future behaviour better than does past behaviour (146). They studied smokers who 
were trying  to  quit  on their own.  They also  tried to  answer whether  success  or 
failure in coping with particular high-risk situations affect efficacy evaluations and 
whether different coping mechanisms were associated with different levels of self- 
efficacy. Their findings showed that baseline efficacy ratings were weak predictors 
of success. Their explanation for this result suggested that people learn from their 
initial experience and develop more realistic efficacy evaluations as they go. Their 
results also suggested that previous smoking rate predicted future smoking rate as 
well  as  self-efficacy  ratings.  Moreover,  their  findings  showed  that  successful 
coping led to an increase of personal efficacy while failure led to a decrease. The
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ratings.  For  example,  in  situations  where  participants  smoked,  efficacy  ratings 
were lower when no coping action was taken than when behavioural or cognitive 
coping techniques were used (146).
It  is  worthwhile  noting that  all  of the  above  studies  used  specific  (e.g.  the pre­
abstinence efficacy scale or ratings of participants’  confidence in abstaining in a 
particular risky situation on a ten point scale) self-efficacy questionnaires.
Following  the  above  mentioned  research,  a  self-efficacy  questionnaire  was 
introduced at the follow-up phase of the study. The questionnaire aimed to look at 
self-reported  generalised  (e.g.  “I  am  confident  that  I  could  deal  efficiently with 
unexpected events”) and specific (e.g.  “I can manage my own mental health”, “I 
can  make  decisions  about  my  future  care”)  self-efficacy  beliefs  of  sectioned 
patients (147) (see appendix 11).
Chapter summary
To  summarise,  in  this  chapter  I  defined  the  concept  of self-efficacy within  the 
context of social cognitive theory, I gave a brief explanation of its relation to other 
related  concepts  such  as  self-esteem,  I  summarised  the  few  studies  of  the 
evaluation of self-efficacy in people with mental health problems and I explained 
the rationale  for the use  of the  self-efficacy scale  at the  follow-up  stage  in this 
study.  In the  next  chapter  the  literature  on  randomised  controlled  trials  will  be 
explored.
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RANDOMISED CONTROLLED TRIALS
Introduction
Scientific research methods involve the systematic observation of the phenomenon 
of interest.  Systematic  study  of phenomena  requires  the  existence  of rules  and 
processes that investigators follow thoroughly and against which the research can 
be  evaluated  (148).  Randomised  controlled  trials  are  regarded  as  the  “gold 
standard”  of outcome  research  because  randomisation  ensures  that  all  forms  of 
bias  are  controlled  for  in  an  experiment  to  test  the  effects  of an  intervention. 
Outcomes  (also  known  as  dependent  variables)  are  events  that  are  present  or 
absent after the participants receive the interventions.  In clinical practice the main 
characteristics  of randomised  controlled  trials  involve  two  or  more  groups  of 
individuals (called the participants) who are randomly allocated into experimental 
and control groups. The participants of the two groups should be drawn from the 
same population and ideally should be identical in all respects except that those in 
the experimental group will receive one or more clinical interventions (also called 
the  independent  variable(s)).  The  two  groups  are  studied  systematically  under 
similar,  known,  tightly  defined  and  controlled  conditions  in  order  to  avoid 
variation between them.  The strength of the outcome of a randomised controlled 
trial  is mainly due to  the  accurate  assessment of the  effects  of the  intervention. 
This is mainly achieved by the random allocation of participants that balances the 
effects  of  any  extraneous,  confounding  variables  (e.g.  selection  biases)  and 
increases  scientific  confidence  in  the  effect  of  the  intervention.  Randomised 
controlled trials are considered the only scientific designs that can determine cause 
and effect relationships.  Another characteristic of randomised controlled trials is 
the pre-and post-testing condition. The experimental and control groups receive a 
number  of measurements  (e.g.  questionnaires,  interviews,  clinical  assessments) 
before  and  after  the  intervention.  Apart  from  strengthening  confidence  in  any 
observed differences (or lack of them) between the two groups, the pre-and-post
131testing condition offers explanations for the direction of any associations between 
the independent and dependent variables.
In  the  following  paragraphs  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  randomised 
controlled trials will be explored and reasons discussed for the use of this type of 
experimental design in the present study.
132Randomised controlled trials in health care evaluation
Randomised  experiments  may  be  the  preferred  method  for  studying  cause  and 
effect relationships but in health care  settings the design and implementation of 
randomised controlled trials may be  inappropriate,  unnecessary or impossible to 
carry out. Bowling (1997), Jadad (1998) and Britton et al (1998) outline some of 
the  reasons  for  the  inappropriateness  of randomised  controlled  trials  in  some 
settings (148-150):
•  Financial,  legal  and  ethical  constraints  may  prevent  the  execution  of 
randomised controlled trials for the study of infrequent and adverse effects of 
medical treatment.
•  Questions related to the aetiology and natural history of diseases should not be 
influenced by investigators.
•  Randomised  controlled  trials  are not the best method  of evaluation  of long­
term  outcomes  of  medical  treatments  (e.g.  10-20  years  ahead)  because 
researchers cannot keep people in controlled arms for so long.
•  Random allocation of participants may not always produce the best effect of an 
intervention (e.g. when participants have very strong preferences for or against 
the intervention).
•  Randomised  controlled  trials  may  not  always  produce  generalisable  results 
because of the involvement of highly selected centres (e.g. teaching hospitals), 
participants and investigators.
To  overcome  these  barriers  and  a  number  of  biases  inherent  in  randomised 
controlled  trials  (experimenter  biases,  demand  characteristics,  sample  attrition) 
investigators  have  come  up  with  different types  of randomised  controlled  trials 
suitable for a variety of populations, settings and interventions. Jadad (1998) has 
summarised the different types of RCTs in the following table (150):
133RCTs according to the aspects of the interventions they evaluate:
•  Explanatory and pragmatic trials
•  Efficacy and effectiveness trials
•  Phase I, II and III trials
RCTs according to how the participants are exposed to the interventions:
•  Parallel trials
•  Crossover trials
•  Trials with factorial design
RCTs according to the number of participants:
•  From n-of-1 to mega-trials
•  Fixed size
•  Sequential trials
RCTs  according  to  whether the  investigators  and participants  know  which 
intervention is being assessed:
•  Open trials
•  Single blind trials
•  Double blind trials
•  Triple and quadruple-blind trials
RCTs according to whether the preference of non-randomised individuals and 
participants are taken into account:
•  Zelen’s design
•  Comprehensive cohort design
•  Wennberg’s design
Table 8: Different types of RCTs.  Adopted by Jadad p.  11
134Internal Validity
Effects of attrition
The randomisation process eliminates the possibility of systematic allocation bias 
or risk of confounding which is the major criticism of non-randomised controlled 
trials.  However,  one  of the  common  threats  to  internal  validity  of randomised 
controlled  trials,  “is  the  introduction  of  bias  through  non-random  losses  of 
participants at different stages of the study.. ..If subjects who are likely to drop out 
at  different  stages  of the  study  can  be  excluded  from  randomisation,  internal 
validity  will  be  improved  but  this  has  to  be  weighed  against  potential  loss  of 
generalisibility (149) (p.23).” One of the common strategies employed to deal with 
attrition of participants during the different phases of the study is the intention to 
treat  analysis  where  the  lost  randomised  participants  are  treated  as  if they  had 
completed the study.
Patient preference
Possible  interaction  effects  can  threaten  the  internal  validity  of  a  randomised 
controlled trial.  Interaction effects are the result of the association of extraneous 
factors with the dependent variable that cause variation in it when the independent 
variable  is  under  investigation.  So  individual  preferences  for  or  against  an 
intervention can increase or decrease its effect. Interaction effects are particularly 
difficult  to  identify  because  of  the  large  number  of  patients  required  to  be 
recruited.  For example in order to detect a 10% increase in survival, 1,000 patients 
would  be  needed  at  90%  power  and  the  5%  level  of significance.  In  order  to 
identify an interaction effect of 10% between preferences and treatments we would 
need several thousand for the same power (148). However, it is very important to 
be  able  to  separate  the  treatment  effects  from  individual  preferences.  Lack  of 
empirical evidence about how individual preferences work (some studies suggest 
they  may  work  similarly  to  placebos)  restrict  conclusions  to  observations  that 
preferences do exist and that special study designs such as those described above 
are necessary (149; 151).
135Reactive effects
Ann Bowling (1997) uses the term reactive effects to describe any changes in the 
participants’  attitudes, behaviours and feelings by simply taking place in a study 
(148).  The  Hawthorne  effect  (participants  change  because  they  are  treated 
differently),  evaluation  apprehension  (participants  exhibit  increased  levels  of 
anxiety because they are being tested), demand characteristics (participants guess 
the  hypothesis  and  behave  in  a  way  that  will  please  the  experimenter)  and 
experimenter bias  (unconscious  communication  of the  experimenter’s  desires  to 
the participants)  may all  undermine the  study’s  validity.  The best way to  avoid 
these types of biases is to apply multiple levels of blinding.
136External validity
As mentioned above, the aim of conducting randomised controlled trials in health 
care settings is to measure the effect of an intervention and to provide an informed 
basis  for  future  clinical  decision-making.  When  it  is  possible  to  generalise  the 
results of a randomised controlled trial to a wider health care setting and patient 
population  then  the  study  has  external  validity.  To  safeguard  external  validity 
researchers have to define clearly the patients involved in the study, the clinicians 
and the treatment providers.
Participation or selection biases
Participation  biases  may pose  a threat  to  the  external  validity  of a  randomised 
controlled trial if the centres recruited in the study are specialised units of health 
care or teaching hospitals. Although there is no direct evidence for this suggestion 
(149; 152),  it is believed that non-randomised controlled trials are more likely to 
include a broader range of health care facilities and more typical clinical practice.
Clinician  preferences  may  further  reduce  the  generalisibility  of results  by  not 
inviting eligible patients to participate in the study (149; 150).
Participation  bias  can  also  be  introduced  whenever  there  are  great  differences 
between the characteristics of participants and non-participants.  Eligible patients 
may refuse  to  participate  in  a trial  because  they have  a different  preference  or 
because  they  don’t  like  getting  involved  in  any  research.  Britton  et  al  (1998) 
performed a systematic analysis of 16 randomised controlled trials and identified 
different  types  of  participation  bias  in  treatment  and  prevention  studies.  In 
treatment studies the participants were usually male,  younger than average, non­
white,  less  educated,  of lower  socio-economic  status,  smokers,  had  inadequate 
social  support  and  had  no  private  insurance.  In  terms  of  their  clinical 
characteristics,  they  had  more  severe  or  advanced  disease,  more  comorbidity, 
poorer health status or quality of life.  In prevention trials the picture was quite 
different. Participants were more likely to be younger, of higher socio-economic 
status in terms of income, housing, education or car ownership and they believed 
in  or  adopted  a healthy  lifestyle  (e.g.  non-smokers  and  those  who  take  regular 
exercise).  Such  differences  between  participants  and  non-participants  in
137randomised  controlled  studies,  apart  from  undermining  the  effect  of  the 
intervention and the  generalisibility of results,  could also have important ethical 
implications.  For  example,  were  the  less  educated  and  more  severely  ill  in 
treatment trials able to give full informed consent?
138The CONSORT statement
Reporting the characteristics of service providers, participants and non-participants 
in randomised controlled trials has become a standard followed by most journals 
today.  This  initiative  took  place  in  1996  when  two  groups  (the  Standards  of 
Reporting  Trials  group  -SORT  and  the  Asilomar  Working  group  on 
Recommendations for Reporting of Clinical Trials in the Biomedical Literature) of 
clinical epidemiologists, bio-statisticians and journal editors produced the Consort 
statement  (Consolidation  of Standards  for  Reporting  Trials)(153).  The  consort 
statement  contains  a  checklist  of 21  items  and  a  flow  diagram,  which  aim  to 
improve the documentation of randomised controlled trials and make interpretation 
of their results clearer (150; 154). The consort statement is a guide to the various 
stages  of a study including the numbers  of eligible participants,  the numbers of 
participants  not  randomised  and  reasons  for  exclusions,  the  numbers  of 
randomised ones, the drop out and the  follow up rates  (see Figure  1   reproduced 
from Begg et al,  1996).  The two groups decided on these items because there is 
empirical evidence that if they are not reported, biases will result in the estimates 
of the  effects  of interventions  (153).  “Like  other  studies,  randomised  trials  are 
open to bias if done badly.  It is thus essential that randomised trials are done well 
and  reported  adequately.  Readers  should  not  have  to  infer  what  was  probably 
done, they should be told explicitly.... It seems reasonable to hope that, in addition 
to  improved  reporting,  the  wide  adoption  of this  new  publication  standard  will 
improve  the  conduct  of  future  research  by  increasing  awareness  of  the 
requirements for a good trial.” (154) (pp. 570-1)
139Randomisation
Completed trial (n=...) Completed trial (n=...)
Not randomised (n=...) 
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Followed up (n=...) 
Timing of primary and 
secondary outcomes
Followed up (n=...) 
Timing of primary and 
secondary outcomes
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as allocated (n=...) or 
Did not receive standard 
intervention ds allocated (n=...)
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Intervention ineffective (n=...) 
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Withdrawn (n=...)
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Other (n=...)
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(n=...)
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allocated (n=...)
Figure 4: The CONSORT diagram
Flow chart describing progress of patients through randomised trial (Reproduced from Begg et al. 
1996)
But has the CONSORT statement fulfilled its aim? Moher et al (2001) investigated 
whether use of the  CONSORT  statement is  associated with  improvement  in the 
quality  of  reports  of randomised  controlled  trials  (155).  They  carried  out  a 
comparative before-and-afiter evaluation in which reports of randomised controlled 
trials  published  in  1994  (pre-CONSORT)  were  compared  with  randomised
140controlled  trials’  reports  from  the  same  journals  published  in  1998  (post- 
CONSORT).  They  included  211  reports  from  BMJ,  JAMA,  and  The  Lancet 
(journals  that  adopted  CONSORT)  as  well  as  The  New  England  Journal  of 
Medicine (a journal that did not adopt CONSORT and was used as a comparator). 
Their  main  outcome  measures  included  the  number  of  CONSORT  items 
incorporated in a report, frequency of unclear reporting of allocation concealment, 
and  overall  trial  quality  score  based  on  the  Jadad  scale,  a  5-point  quality 
assessment  instrument.  Their  results  showed  that  compared  with  1994,  the 
number of CONSORT  checklist items  in reports  of randomised  controlled trials 
increased in all 4 journals in 1998, and this increase was statistically significant for 
the 3  adopter journals (pre-CONSORT,  23.4; mean change,  3.7;  95% confidence 
interval  [Cl],  2.1-5.3).  The  frequency  of  unclear  reporting  of  allocation 
concealment decreased for each of the 4 journals, and this change was statistically 
significant for adopters (pre-CONSORT, 61%; mean change, -22%; 95% Cl, -38% 
to -6%). Three of the 4 journals also showed an improvement in the quality score 
for  reports  of  randomised  controlled  trials,  and  this  increase  was  statistically 
significant for  adopter journals  overall  (pre-CONSORT,  2.7;  mean  change,  0.4; 
95% Cl, 0.1-0.8).  The authors concluded that the use of the CONSORT statement 
was  associated  with  improvements  in  the  quality  of  reports  of  randomised 
controlled trials.  Egger et al (2001) reported similar findings in their analogous 
study (156). However, they also suggested that the original CONSORT statement 
“lacked  clarity  and  that  the  information  presented  in  the  flow  diagram  was 
incomplete.  Our results  indicate that there were problems with both the original 
design of the flow diagram and its implementation by authors. For example, most 
flow diagrams provided the number of individuals randomized, although this count 
was  not  explicitly  requested.  Conversely,  only  about  half  of  flow  diagrams 
included the number of participants who actually received treatments as allocated, 
an item included in the original template. The number of participants included in 
the  main  analysis  was  not  an  item  in  the recommended  flow diagram,  and  this 
number was included in only a few diagrams (23.0%). This finding is of concern 
because  the  latter  count  is  essential  for  appraising  whether  a  trial  has  been 
analyzed by intention to treat.” (156) (p. 1999)
141Exclusions
To  improve  the  internal  validity  of  a  randomised  controlled  trial  researchers 
exclude  patients  on  medical  (e.g.  high  risk  of  adverse  effect,  benefit  already 
established,  expected benefit is reduced), ethical (e.g.  involving pregnant women 
in treatments with high risk complications), administrative (e.g. children, elderly, 
drug users)  and  scientific  grounds  (e.g.  cancer patients may be  excluded  from a 
study for heart disease because they may confuse the picture or decrease the power 
of the  study).  The most commonly excluded groups  from RCTs  are the elderly, 
people  from  ethnic minorities and women  (149).  However, when the  eligibility 
criteria of a randomised controlled trial are defined very narrowly the study may 
fail to produce any evidence regarding the characteristics of excluded patients and 
its  external  validity  may  be  compromised.  In  addition,  clinicians  may 
inappropriately generalise  the  results  to  excluded  groups  or may  fail  to  provide 
effective treatment to those who need it because their decision making is based on 
the available evidence (148-150).
142Are randomised controlled studies superior to non-randomised 
ones?
Recent systematic reviews of randomised and non-randomised studies  show that 
although there are large differences in how the research is conducted using the two 
approaches such as the population included, the setting, the practitioners and how 
the  outcomes  are  assessed,  there is no  evidence “to  support the  argument that a 
systematic bias arises from the use of one method rather than the other...” (149) 
(p.  59).  Britton,  et  al  (1998)  suggest  that  the  results  obtained  from  the  two 
approaches are frequently similar, that any differences they found were usually of 
similar magnitude  of the estimated treatment effect and that very rarely the two 
approaches  favoured  different  interventions  (149).  They  also  showed  that 
differences in results between randomised controlled studies and non-randomised 
ones were frequently smaller than those between randomised controlled studies or 
between non-randomised studies.
Ioannidis et al (2001) also  agree that there is a high correlation in the estimated 
efficacy of medical interventions between randomised and non-randomised studies 
(157). However, their systematic analysis of 45 medical topics also suggested that 
non-randomised controlled trials show “larger treatment effects” and that between- 
study heterogeneity was “frequent among randomised trials alone (23%) and very 
frequent among non-randomised studies alone (41%)”.  Finally, they suggest that 
publication bias and a time lag to publication occur for negative studies regardless 
of study design.
The most persuasive argument for the superiority of randomised controlled studies 
over non-randomised ones is that randomisation leads to comparable groups and 
most  importantly,  that  it  determines  causal  relationships.  However,  as  Abel  & 
Koch (1999) explain “randomisation only implies the equality of the distributions 
of  variables  measurable  at  the  time  of  randomisation  (158).  It  leads  to  the 
statistical  control  of imbalance  in the baseline variables  and permits probability 
statements on differences between the groups regarding these variables. It has no 
influence on everything that happens between randomisation and the assessment of 
the  outcome.  Therefore,  randomisation  itself  does  not  lead  to  balance  in
143differences  in  the  quality  of treatment  and  doctors’  commitment,  differences  in 
patients’  motivation,  differences  in  general  patient  care  (e.g.  accompanying 
treatment  and  ancillary  care),  differences  in  the  experimental  environment  and 
differences  in observation  (e.g.  definition of outcome, measurement of outcome, 
quality of data collection and follow-up)” (158) (pp.488-9).  They also argue that 
randomisation  is  neither  a  necessary  nor  a  sufficient  condition  for  inferring 
causality.  They  explain  that  statistical  analysis  itself (accepting  or rejecting  the 
null hypothesis) does not demonstrate causality and that a number of medical facts 
from  clinical  experience  can  satisfy  the  condition  of  causality  without  the 
involvement  of  randomisation.  To  support  their  argument  they  cite  medical 
breakthroughs,  like penicillin,  aspirin and  corticosteroids which were  introduced 
on  the basis  of historical  controls.  Finally,  they cite  a  list  of procedures  that  if 
followed  they  could  lead  to  very  well  designed  and  accurate  non-randomised 
studies. These include the following:
1.  Specify  a  zero  time  that  will  be  used  in  determining patient  eligibility  and 
adjust for baseline differences in prognostic risk.
2.  Determine eligibility according to the same criteria of inclusion and exclusion 
that would be used in a randomised trial.
3.  Classify the patients according to suitable clinical criteria to enable adjustment 
for any inequalities in susceptibility to the outcome.
4.  For the main analysis, use the same statistical strategies (e.g. intention to treat 
procedures) as those employed in a randomised trial. (158) (p. 492)
144Recruiting patients with mental health problems into randomised 
controlled trials
Recruiting patients with mental health problems into randomised controlled trials 
is  particularly  difficult  because  of  the  combination  of  medical,  ethical  and 
administrative  constraints.  The  symptoms  of mentally  ill  patients  may  make  it 
particularly  difficult  for  them  to  focus  on  tasks  such  as  long  questionnaire 
completion or to concentrate on extended interviews with researchers. The nature 
of their condition  and  the  vulnerability  associated with  it  makes  the  process  of 
obtaining full informed consent time consuming and subject to a number of ethical 
considerations.  Finally,  substantial  variations  in  working  policy  and  practice 
among the different hospitals and community psychiatric teams create obstacles to 
identifying,  approaching  and  recruiting  suitable  candidates  in  different  research 
projects (159).
Chapter Summary
In  this  chapter,  the  different  types  of randomised  controlled  trials  (RCTs)  have 
been briefly outlined and the concepts of internal and external validity in relation 
to  different  types  of  RCTs  have  been  discussed.  In  addition,  the  literature 
associated with the CONSORT statement has been explored as has been the debate 
about whether RCTs are superior to non-randomised ones. Finally, the difficulties 
recruiting patients with mental health problems into RCTs were outlined.  In the 
next  chapter  the  aims  and  hypotheses  of the  preference  for  care  study will  be 
explored.
145CHAPTER 5
Rationale, aims, hypotheses
Chapter overview
In this chapter, I will introduce the rationale for this study, the research questions 
the study set out to answer and the hypotheses that were bom out of the research 
questions which were tested.
Rationale for choice of hypotheses
The  choice  of sectioned  patients  as  the  focus  for  the  trial  was  based  on  two 
premises. The first one was the increase of formal admissions under the Act from
16,000  in  1989  to  27,000  in  1999  (160).  The  second  one  was  the  serious 
psychosocial  implications  of  sectioned  admissions  such  as  infringement  of 
personal liberty and stigma.  In addition, the preparation and implementation of a 
psychiatric  advance  statement  could  lead to  different pathways  of care  such  as 
voluntary  re-admissions  or  no  admission  at  all  and  while  preserving  users’ 
liberties  and  self-determination.  The  Mental  Health  Act  1983  aims  to  protect 
individuals  who  are  at  risk  of becoming  dangerous  to  themselves  or  others. 
Psychiatric  advance  statements  aim  to  protect  patient  self-determination  and 
autonomy.  These  two  approaches  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  A  state  centred 
approach and a person centred approach can complement each other. For example, 
when a sectioned patient  is  asked to  specify his/her own treatment preferences, 
he/she  may  feel  less  coerced  and  disempowered  under  the  Mental  Health  Act. 
When his/her section expires the psychiatric advance statement may stay in effect 
and prompt compliance with treatment when there is no legal obligation to do so. 
In  addition,  Mental  Health Act provisions  may mobilise  emergency psychiatric 
evaluation  and  hospital  admissions  while  an  existing  psychiatric  advance 
statement  may  cover  prior  consent  for  admission  and  treatment  (42; 161). 
Currently, this approach is strongly recommended by the expert committee on the 
review  of the  Mental  Health Act  1983  and the new Mental  Capacity Act  2005 
(27;28).
146In  terms  of choosing  patient  satisfaction  as  an  outcome  measure,  we  did  so 
because  recent  studies  suggested  a  significant  association  between  patient 
satisfaction and treatment outcome and patient satisfaction and global reports of 
outcome (162; 163).
This is the first study that measured the self-efficacy beliefs and expectations of 
sectioned patients. Self-efficacy is an important psychological construct that refers 
to  the  individual’s  confidence  in  his/her  ability  to  carry  out  a  certain  action. 
Studies on smoking cessation in the Netherlands showed that an increase in post­
treatment level of self-efficacy and an increase of self-efficacy during treatment, 
were predictors  for success  and  failure  after  1   year (130).  This  study looked  at 
whether patients in the intervention group would score higher on generalised self- 
efficacy beliefs in comparison to the control group.
Aims of the study
The  preference  for  care  study  is  a  pragmatic,  randomised  controlled  trial  that
aimed to evaluate:
•  Whether  the  use  of advance  statements  by  sectioned  patients  who  are  near 
discharge  from  section,  leads  to  lower  rates  of compulsory  readmission  to 
hospital.
•  Whether patients who have completed psychiatric  advance  statements report 
higher self-efficacy.
•  Whether patients who have completed psychiatric  advance  statements report 
higher satisfaction with psychiatric services.
Hypotheses
1.  Sectioned  patients’  advance  statements  for  psychiatric  treatment,  when 
disseminated in written form to  key-workers  and general practitioners  and
147included in patients’  case records will reduce the frequency of compulsory 
re-admissions to hospital.
2.  Sectioned patients who have completed advance  statements  for psychiatric 
treatment will report higher generalised self-efficacy than patients who have 
not.
3.  Sectioned  patients  who  have  completed  advance  statements  for  treatment 
will  report  higher  satisfaction  with psychiatric  services  than  patients  who 
have not.
In the next chapter,  the  setting of the  study will be described,  the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria for participation, the materials used, the procedures carried out 
and the statistical analysis performed.
148PART II
CHAPTER 6 
METHOD
149Chapter overview
In  this  chapter,  the  setting  of the  study  will  be  described,  the  inclusion  and 
exclusion criteria for participation, the materials used, the procedures carried out 
and the statistical analysis performed.
Setting
Two inner city psychiatric hospitals were used for the recruitment of patients. The 
Royal  Free  Hospital  in North  West  of London  and  St  Ann’s  Hospital  in North 
London.  The  two  hospitals  were  chosen  because  of  the  ethnically  diverse 
populations  they  serve,  the broad  spectrum  of socio-economic  strata they  cover 
and  their  increased  rate  of  sectioned  admissions  which  is  a  characteristic  of 
London  hospitals  (The  Statistical  Bulletin,  Department  of Health).  During  the 
conception of the study, Royal Free data showed that 200 patients were admitted 
annually on sections 2,  3  and 4 to the Royal Free and 280 to  St Ann’s hospital. 
Fifty percent  were  readmitted  within  twelve  months,  50%  of whom  were  on  a 
further section of the Mental Health Act.
St  Ann’s  hospital  serves  a  catchment  area  of almost  250,000  people  and  has 
approximately 200 acute adult mental health beds. The Royal Free hospital serves 
a  catchment  area  of  110,000  people  and  at  the  time  of  recruitment  had 
approximately 60 beds.  The patients were recruited from three acute psychiatric 
wards  at  the  Royal  Free  Hospital  and  five  acute  psychiatric  wards  at  St  Ann’s 
hospital.
The study was conceived in 1996 when the formation of community mental health 
teams  and  the  emphasis  on  patient  empowerment  were  the  main  focus  of 
psychiatric  services  in the UK.  In  1991  the Care Programme Approach  and the 
Health of the Nation policies came into effect in order to maximise user and carer 
involvement (164). However, as was mentioned in chapter one, research suggested 
that  the  Care  Programme  Approach  system  may  be  meeting  the  needs  of 
professionals by ensuring regular client review and clear documentation of the care 
plan but that patients and carers can feel subject to a degree of coercion in Care
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promote patients’ empowerment, autonomy and self-determination. Therefore, the 
opportunity  to  complete  psychiatric  advance  statements  outside  the  Care 
Programme Approach meetings would closely involve patients in their care  and 
consequently improve their autonomy. Given the limited time and expertise of the 
patients’  clinicians, it was decided that the psychiatric advance statements would 
be prepared by the patients with my help and would be placed at the front of their 
hospital records so that can be easily accessible at any time. We also believed that 
researchers  outside  the  patient’s  team  would  be  unbiased  and  more  likely  to 
advocate the patient’s rights  and preferences.  The decision to place the advance 
statements at the front of the patients’ hospital records and to disseminate them to 
patients’  GPs  and  key-workers  was  in  accordance  with  the  report  of the  expert 
committee on the review of the Mental Health Act 1983 and NICE guidelines (28).
1.1.8.2 When advance directives have been agreed, copies should be placed in 
primary-care and secondary-care case notes/care plans, and copies given to the 
service  user  and  his  or  her  care  coordinator.  If appropriate,  and  subject  to 
agreement with the service user, a copy should be given to his or her carer._____
Table 9: NICE guidelines for schizophrenia : http://www.nice.orq.uk/pdf/CG
Placing  the psychiatric  advance  statements  at the  front  of the patients’  hospital 
records and sending one copy to the patients’  general practitioner and one to their 
Care  Programme  Approach  key-worker  was  thought  to  be  a  comprehensive 
approach  to  the  implementation  and  evaluation  of such  instruments  which  was 
explicitly explained by NICE guidelines at the time.
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In-patients under sections 2, 3 or 4 of the Mental Health Act 1983 for England and 
Wales who were due for discharge in the 12 months October 1997 to October 1998 
were recruited.  Section 2 allows a patient to be compulsorily admitted to hospital 
for assessment, section 3 for treatment and section 4 for assessment in emergency. 
The  three  section  categories  were  considered  together because  the  majority  of 
patients on section 4 are usually transferred to section 2 or 3. Between 1995-1996 
when  the  study  was  designed,  828  patients  were  transferred  from  section  4  to 
section 2, 303 to section 3 and 432 to informal, in England (160).  The choice of 
sectioned patients as the  focus for the trial was based on two premises.  The first 
one was the increase of formal admissions under the Act from  16,000 in  1989 to
27,000  in  1999  (160; 165).  The  second  one  was  the  serious  psychosocial 
implications of sectioned admissions such as infringement of personal liberty and 
stigma.  Patients near discharge from hospital were recruited because their ability 
to manage their mental illness was likely to be improved, their insight was more 
likely  to  have  been  restored  and  their  cognitive  abilities  related  to  competence 
evaluation would be restored, while their experience of their sectioned admission 
to hospital was  still  fresh in their minds.  It was considered that all these  factors 
would help in the completion of psychiatric advance statements.
Inclusion  criteria  were  age  18  years  and  over  and  the  ability to  read  and  write 
English.  It  was  also  decided  that  only  patients  who  were  competent  would  be 
recruited in the study.  The decision to recruit competent adults in the  study was 
based on both  legal  and pragmatic purposes.  Competent individuals  of 18  years 
and over can  give  informed consent  and according to  common law can provide 
oral  and  written  psychiatric  advance  statements.  Sectioned  admissions  are  less 
common among children and adolescents. The ability to read, write and understand 
English was essential for many reasons:
•  Patients had to give informed consent in order to participate in the study which 
involved reading and understanding the written summary of the study and the 
informed consent form (see appendix 2).
•  Patients  had  to  read  and  complete  a  number  of  self-report  measures  (see 
description of the instruments in the following sections).
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legal concepts associated with it.
•  The funding obtained for the study did not allow for the hiring of translators 
for those patients who did not read and write English.
Exclusion  criteria  were  kept  to  a  minimum  in  order  to  maximise  the  external 
validity of the trial (see Table 10). Patients under other specialised sections, those 
about  to  be  transferred  to  other  sections  of the  Mental  Health  Act  or  to  other 
hospitals  and those with  organic  and psychoactive  substance use disorders were 
excluded for two main reasons:
•  to avoid losses to follow-up
•  to  avoid  ethical  problems  associated  with  mental  incapacity  and  informed 
consent  characteristics  of  people  with  organic  and  psychoactive  substance 
disorders.
Inclusion Exclusion
Competent adults 
Age: 18 years and over
Patients  on  other  sections  of  the 
Mental Health Act
Patients on section 2, 3 or 4 of the 
Mental Health Act
Patients  about  to  be  transferred  to 
other  sections  of the  Mental  Health 
Act or to other hospitals
Ability to read and write English Patients  with  organic  and 
psychoactive substance use disorders
Table 10: Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Individuals  who  refused,  or  were  unable  to  give  informed  consent  were  not 
included in the study. For ethical reasons, only data on sex, ethnic origin and type 
of section were collected on non-participants.
153Sampling Technique
Patients  were  allocated  randomly  using  a  block  design,  stratified  according  to 
whether this was the patient’s first ever or subsequent section.  Blocks of 12 (six 
experimental,  six  control)  random  combinations  were  prepared  and  sealed  in 
opaque  envelopes.  When  a  patient  agreed  to  participate  in  the  study,  an 
independent colleague in the trial centre was called who chose the next envelope in 
each case.  To be blind to the patient’s allocation was impossible as I was required 
to assist patients to make a directive in those allocated to the intervention group.
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There  are  many  advantages  to  outcome  assessment  in  mental  health  services. 
Outcome  assessment  may  improve  quality  of care,  provide  an  aid  to  decision 
making  in  clinical  practice,  evaluate  the  clinical  and  cost-effectiveness  of 
interventions  in clinical trials  and inform government policy formulations  (166). 
However, sceptics are weary of un-interpretable and unwieldy outcome measures 
that may become a bureaucratic hindrance to successful patient care (167).
Evaluating outcome in mental health care involves complex research processes at 
both the service level and the patient level  (168).  As Trauer said “despite major 
advances in therapies, the links between interventions and changes in health status 
are  often  tenuous.  The  term  ‘treatment-resistant’  acknowledges  the  fact  that 
intensive  intervention  is  sometimes  followed  by  minimal  change.  Conversely 
epidemiological studies remind us that not insignificant numbers of persons appear 
to  recover  spontaneously  (i.e.  without  intervention)  from  seemingly  serious 
disorders. Also, what constitutes an intervention? A patient might be in receipt of 
several medications, supportive therapy and case management. Since we generally 
can  not  disentangle  the  active  ingredients  of therapy,  we  can not  unequivocally 
specify  the  intervention.”  (169)  (p.  338)  However,  I  believe  that  use  of  the 
experimental method can measure change in psychiatric status and other outcome 
measures.
The different domains of outcome in psychiatry involve well being (e.g. quality of 
life),  cognition/emotion  (e.g.  psychopathology,  personal  constructs),  behaviour 
(e.g. functional status, activities of daily living), physical health (e.g. physical well 
being),  interpersonal  (e.g.  vocational,  educational,  residential  status  and 
interpersonal  relationships),  society  (e.g.  economic,  public  safety,  burden  to 
relatives)  and  services  (e.g.  satisfaction  with  services  and  treatment, 
empowerment)  (166; 168).  To  obtain  data  and  assess  the  above  domains, 
researchers resort to either administration based data sources such as public health 
and medical records or to clinical based sources such as standardised patient self- 
report and  clinical  assessment instruments  (163; 166-168).  Administrative based 
outcome  assessments  may  include  mortality,  service  utilisation  (e.g.  rate  of
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assessments may involve symptom level, social or role functioning, quality of life 
and satisfaction with services. Neither of the two sources is superior to the other. 
For  example,  service  utilisation  data  such  as  admission  and  discharge  rates  is 
relatively  easy  to  collect  from  hospital  databases  on  all  users  of  psychiatric 
services  but  it  is  difficult  to  interpret.  According  to  recent  systematic  reviews, 
illness severity is not linearly correlated with service use (163).  Service use may 
depend  on  many variables  other than  mortality  and  morbidity  such  as  patients’ 
socio-demographic  characteristics,  relationship  with  professionals  and  the 
resources  available,  national  policies  and  intrinsic  characteristics  of the  service 
(163). In addition, the existing gaps in clinical based measurements (e.g. the need 
for  further  psychometric  testing  of existing  tools  with  minority  groups)  leave 
researchers with no gold standard of outcome measurement.
To  assess all  outcome domains  in psychiatry is  impractical.  For that reason five 
main domains were chosen: service utilisation, psychiatric status, satisfaction with 
services, user and professional views.
156Main outcome
The need to obtain a robust, primary outcome measure for all users, the difficult 
group of participants (e.g.  sectioned patients), the costs of collecting meaningful 
data over a two year period in two busy inner city psychiatric hospitals, and finally 
the  ethical  and  legal  concerns  surrounding  the  implementation  of psychiatric 
advance statements, led to the choice of the rate of compulsory re-admissions as 
the main outcome measure.
As  it was discussed  above,  the rate of compulsory readmission in the year after 
discharge from section was high. Furthermore, a sectioned admission has a direct 
impact on personal  liberty and choice.  The preparation and implementation of a 
psychiatric  advance  statement  could  lead  to  different  pathways  of care  such  as 
voluntary re-admissions or no admission at all and while preserving users’ liberties 
and self-determination.
Secondary outcomes
In  evaluating  the  effectiveness  of  psychiatric  advance  statements  it  is  also 
important to see if they can improve users’ clinical status and satisfaction with the 
services they received. For that purpose data was gathered on:
•  Time spent in hospital compulsorily or voluntarily.
•  Reported symptoms of mental illness.
•  Patients’ satisfaction with service delivery.
•  Patients’ perceived self-efficacy.
•  Use of anti-psychotic medication.
Although it is difficult to be certain which variable has caused which change in 
psychiatric research, we hoped that psychiatric advance statements would lead to 
greater  sense  of  autonomy,  better  engagement  with  services,  less  coercive 
admissions, and better mental health.
157Materials
In order to evaluate the impact of advance statements on the primary outcome and 
maximise the response rate, I searched the hospital records for data on voluntary 
and  involuntary  admissions  for  the  five  years  before  baseline  and  over  the  12 
months of follow-up. In order to examine their effect on other secondary measures 
that  are  an  integral  part  of the  objectives  of community  psychiatric  care,  two 
questionnaires  were  designed  one  for  baseline  and  one  for  follow-up  (see 
appendices 6 and  14).  In addition, a number of other standardised measures were 
used at baseline and follow-up.
Baseline materials 
Demographics
In  1989, the Department of Health for England, in conjunction with the Office of 
Population  Censuses  and  Surveys  (OPCS)  planned  and  carried  out  a  series  of 
surveys, which aimed to  estimate the prevalence of psychiatric morbidity among 
adults  aged  16-64  living  in  Great  Britain  (162; 170).  The  survey results  showed 
that:
•  psychiatric disorders were commoner in women,
•  the peak prevalence of disorders was between 25 and 54 years,
•  high risk groups correlated with social disadvantage (e.g. people  from ethnic 
minorities,  lone  parents  and  those  in  single  person  households  such  as 
divorced, separated and widowed)
•  prevalence  of psychiatric  disorder  was  commoner  in  lower  socio-economic 
groups,
•  high prevalence was strongly associated with unemployment,
•  living in urban areas was strongly correlated with psychiatric morbidity.
In terms of the demographics of sectioned patients, the Statistical Bulletin in 1998 
showed that out of 10,518  adult sectioned patients in NHS  facilities,  6,535  were 
male and 3,983 female (160).  Of those male sectioned patients, 124 suffered from 
psychopathic  disorders,  441  from  mental  impairment,  116  from  severe  mental 
impairment  and  514  from  non-specified mental  illness.  Of the  female  sectioned 
patients 61  suffered psychopathic disorders,  121  from mental impairment, 26 from
158severe  mental  impairment  and  433  from  non-specified  mental  illness.  No  data 
were provided on ethnicity and marital status of sectioned patients.
In  this  study,  data  were  collected  from  case  notes  on  patients’  demographic 
characteristics. The data were double-checked with the patients and hospital staff 
in order to identify whether the recruited sample was representative of the general 
sectioned inpatient population. The data gathered included (see appendix 6):
•  Age
•  Gender
•  Ethnicity according to OPCS (1990)
•  Marital status
•  Household composition (whether the patient lived alone, with a partner, etc.)
•  Employment status
•  Diagnosis
Psychiatric status
Two  validated  and  standardised  questionnaires,  BASIS-32  (171)  and  HoNOS 
(172)  were  used  to  assess  the  patients’  psychiatric  status.  BASIS-32  was 
completed by patients at baseline and 12 month follow-up. HoNOS was completed 
by the researchers only at baseline in order to assess baseline differences between 
the  experimental  and  control  groups  and  to  evaluate  psychiatric  status  and 
psychosocial functioning from the mental health carers’ point of view.
1.  Basis-32
One  of  the  main  principles  in  choosing  an  appropriate  outcome  measure  in 
psychiatric research is the involvement of users of psychiatric services.  It was 
not possible to blind researchers to the intervention in this study because we had to 
assist patients  in drafting the psychiatric  advance  statements.  For this reason,  in 
order to avoid bias, it was desirable that the main measure of mental health status 
was a self-report questionnaire. This does not remove the possibility of bias from 
the patient. Several patient-completed instruments exist but few had been designed
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psychosis. Given the need to balance the utility of an outcome measure with a high 
response  rate  it  was  decided  to  use  a  brief self-report  questionnaire  that  had 
recently  been  standardised.  This  was  the  32-item  Behaviour  and  Symptom 
Identification  Scale  (BASIS-32)  (171).  The  scale  was  developed  for  research 
purposes on a psychiatric inpatient hospital population (n=387). Basis-32 asks for 
the  degree  of difficulty  (on  a  5-  point  scale:  0=  no  difficulty  and  4=extreme 
difficulty) the patient has been experiencing with each item during the past week. 
The  32  items  assess  five  major  areas  of difficulty  and/or  distress:  relation  to 
self/others,  daily  living/role  functioning  skills,  depression/anxiety, 
impulsive/addictive  behaviour  (including  substance  abuse)  and  psychosis  (see 
appendix 3).
The scale has good overall internal consistency (a=.89). The internal consistency 
for the five subscales is as follows:
•  Relation to self and others a= 0.76
•  Daily living and role of functioning a= 0.80
•  Depression and anxiety a= 0.74
•  Impulsive and addictive behaviour a= 0.71
•  Psychosis a= 0.63
The  authors  (171)  reported  an  average  test-retest  reliability  across  all  items  of 
0.85.  They  tested  the  concurrent  validity  of the  scale  by  correlating  continued 
hospitalisation  or  rehospitalisation  during  the  six  months  after  admission  and 
employment  status  at  follow-up with Basis-32  scores  at follow-up.  Their results 
were  statistically  significant  for the  average  Basis-32  score  and  for  each  of the 
subscales with the  exception  of impulsive  and  addictive  behaviour.  The authors
reported  good  discriminant  validity  since  the  scores  successfully  discriminated
between  different  diagnostic  groups.  Finally,  they  suggested  that  Basis-32  is 
sensitive to change in patients’ symptoms and problem distress after treatment.
However, further research examining the reliability and validity of the  scale has 
not always shown that the impulsive/addictive behaviour and psychosis subscales 
are  adequate  measures  of these  constructs  for  non-inpatient  groups  (173-176). 
Klinkenberg  et  al  (1998)  investigated  the  impact  of  changing  the  method  of
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scale.  Their  sample  consisted  of  120  adults  from  3  psychosocial  rehabilitation 
programmes.  They  found  good  internal  consistency and  test-retest  reliability on 
most subscales but the coefficients were higher in the self-report condition. Their 
results showed unacceptable internal consistency for the psychosis subscale of the 
interview  version.  Although  validity  correlations  were  good  for  the  symptom 
subscales,  they  were  poor  for  the  functional  domains  (the  subscales  did  not 
discriminate between diagnostic groups). They also found a trend for participants 
who  completed  the  self-report  version,  to  report  somewhat  greater  distress  on 
BASIS-32  subscales  than  participants  who  were  administered  the  interview 
version (176).
Eisen et al (1999) examined the reliability, validity and sensitivity to change of the 
scale  on  outpatients’  recipients  (n=407).  Psychiatric  outpatients  completed  the 
BASIS-32 and SF-36  (a self-report survey designed to measure functional health 
status) at the beginning of an outpatient episode of care and 30 to 90 days later. 
They found that the full-scale internal consistency reliability was 0.95. They also 
found reliability coefficients above 0.60 for all subscales. However, two items on 
the  psychosis  subscale  (hearing  voices/seeing  things  and  sexual 
activity/preoccupation)  did not meet the 0.40 item-scale correlation criterion.  As 
far  as  discriminant  validity  is  concerned,  the  BASIS-32  scores  differentiated 
between  inpatient  and  outpatient  samples.  The  specific  subscale  scores  showed 
that outpatients with  depression or anxiety reported  significantly more difficulty 
on  the  depression/anxiety  subscale.  In  contrast,  the  subscales  of 
impulsive/addictive  behaviours  and  psychosis  failed  to  discriminate  outpatients 
with substance abuse disorders and psychosis from those without such diagnoses. 
Finally, the construct validity and sensitivity to change were good (174).
In  another  study,  Chun-Chung  Chow  et  al  (2000)  assessed  the  cross-racial  and 
cross-ethnic  validity  of the  BASIS-32.  The  scale  was  administered  at  intake  to 
1,207  users  of the  City and  County of San Francisco  community mental  health 
services.  Fifty-two  percent  of their  sample  was  white,  24%  African  American, 
16% Asian American and 7% Latino American. In general, the results of the study 
showed  moderate  to  high  indicators  of reliability  and  validity  for  the  different
161subscales.  In  accordance  with  the  previously  mentioned  studies,  the 
impulsive/addictive  behaviour  and  psychosis  subscales  had  somewhat  lower 
reliabilities  than  the  rest  of  subscales.  The  two  subscales  also  were  found  to 
provide  less  discrimination  than  other  subscales,  often  with  more  than  20%  of 
respondents reporting none of the problems  addressed  in the items.  The  authors 
suggest  that  although  their  study  provides  strong  evidence  to  support  the 
usefulness  of BASIS-32  with  ethnic  populations,  their  “evidence  is  limited  by 
circumstances  of  administration,  which  include  translation  and  provision  of 
assistance by culturally and linguistically proficient clinicians.  It says little about 
standardised translation of the instrument (173) (p.410).”
To  summarise,  the  limitations  that  apply to  other self-report questionnaires  also 
apply to Basis-32. Interviewer and respondent biases are two of them. In addition, 
the scale was standardised on inpatients who were well enough to go through the 
interview.  According to  the  authors they excluded 9% of patients who were too 
psychotic, confused or too unwell. Other types of measures or clinical assessment 
would  be  required  for  this  type  of  population.  Another  limitation  that  I 
encountered was the length of time it takes to complete the scale (between  10-90 
minutes).  A  lot  of  our  participants  found  the  instrument  too  long  and  tiring. 
Finally, although the scale is a useful outcome measure for a variety of populations 
(e.g. outpatients, ethnic populations), the scale needs further refinement especially 
in relation to the reliability and validity of the impulsive/addictive behaviour and 
psychosis subscales.
2.  HoNOS-4
In  order  to  assess  baseline  differences  between  the  experimental  and  control 
groups  and to  evaluate psychiatric  status  and psychosocial  functioning  from the 
mental health carers’ point of view, the Health of the Nation Outcome Scales were 
chosen.
The Health of the Nation  Outcome  Scales  is  a set of 12  scales,  each measuring 
types of patients’ functional disabilities in health care practice, which is completed 
by professionals  (172)  (See  appendix  4).  The  scale  was  developed  to  measure
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significantly the health and social functioning of mentally ill people” (172). Each 
item of the scale measures a type of problem commonly presented by patients in 
mental health care settings and each is scored on a five-point scale ranging from 0 
(no problem) to 4 (severe/very severe problem). The 12 items are intended to cover 
four areas of mental health: behaviour (1-3), impairment (4 and 5), symptoms (6- 
8),  and  social  functioning/context  (9-12).  During the  development  of the  scale 
patients were rated at the start of an episode of care and at discharge. The sample 
of patients  comprised  adults  with  severe  mental  illness  attending  in-patient  and 
community psychiatric  services.  Ratings were carried out either by a nurse  or a 
psychiatrist.  Outcome was  measured by comparing  a patient's  scores  at  the  two 
points in time,  using individual  item  scores,  the dimensional  sub-scores, and the 
total  score.  The  authors  claim  that  HoNOS  is  a  unidimensional  scale  (172). 
However, Trauer’s study (1999) indicated that low inter-item correlations suggest 
that the scale is not unidimensional and that the internal consistencies of the four 
subscales  are poor (177).  Trauer’s  study suggested a different subscale  structure 
that  fits  the  data  better,  differentiates  diagnostic  groups  more  accurately  and 
accounts  for  more  precise  movements  between  in-patient  and  out-patient  status 
(177). His model had five subscales, two of which were the same (social problems 
and impairment) as in the original HoNOS scale:
•  Social problems
•  Impairment
•  Depression (items 2,7,8,9)
•  Behaviour (items 1,3)
•  Hallucinations/delusions (item 6).
According to Wing et al (1998), the information provided by the scales is of good 
quality  and  can be  used  to  record  clinical  progress,  for  clinical  audit  and  CPA 
reviews and clinical research. The authors also stated that HoNOS is reliable and 
sensitive to change.  McClelland et al’s study supported the authors’  findings and 
added  further  evidence  for  a  sufficient  degree  of both  construct  and  criterion 
validity of the  scale (178). However, other studies have questioned its reliability 
(179),  sub-scale  structure  (177; 179),  sensitivity to  change (180),  appropriateness
163for routine  clinical  use  in busy psychiatric  services  (181; 182)  and usefulness in 
care-planning  in  day-to-day  clinical  practice,  psychotherapy  and  psychological 
treatment services (182; 183).
164Hospital Service Satisfaction Scale
Patients’  satisfaction  is  an  important  variable  in  the  process  of  care  and  its 
expected  outcomes  and  has  been  studied  widely  since  1960.  Recent  studies 
suggested  a  significant  association  between  patient  satisfaction  and  treatment 
outcome and patient satisfaction and global reports of outcome (162; 163).  Patient 
satisfaction  is  a  multidimensional  concept  that  involves  aspects  such  as  overall 
satisfaction with health care,  access to health care facilities, cost, overall quality, 
humaneness and competence of health carers (e.g. doctors, nurses, etc), provision 
of  accurate  and  adequate  information,  food  and  physical  facilities,  visiting 
arrangements,  bureaucratic  procedures,  handling  of psychosocial  problems,  and 
patients’  expectations  regarding  the  services  and  amount,  length  or  quantity  of 
service (184; 185).  The study of patients’  satisfaction was initially burdened with 
problems not only of an academic nature but also of political and socio-economic 
ones.  In  their  review,  Batchelor  et  al  (1994)  suggested  that  patient  satisfaction 
research has been biased and in many cases counterproductive since patients have 
provided  feedback  on  a  service  over  which  they  “have  little  influence  or  any 
realistic  choice  but  to  remain  even  if dissatisfied”  (p.23).  However,  with  the 
introduction of the Patients’  Charter and the National  Service Framework in the 
mid  1990s,  patient  satisfaction  studies  have  been  taking  into  account  patients’ 
agendas as well as those of professionals who monitor the service provision.
The Hospital Service Satisfaction Scale I used was an adapted brief version of the 
Verona Satisfaction Scale (186)  (See appendix  5).  The reliability and validity of 
the version had been tested by Leavey et al in 1997 in patients at St Ann’s Hospital 
(187).  The scale consists of 9 questions (negative and positive) that aim to elicit 
spontaneous  answers  about the  patients’  experience  in the  previous  year.  These 
questions cover four main domains of care:
•  Helpfulness of psychiatric care;
•  Information and advice;
•  Humane qualities of staff;
•  Hotel aspects of hospital.
165The alpha coefficient for these factors ranged from 0.72 to 0.86. The participants 
rated their satisfaction with the  services  on a five-point Likert  scale  (l=terrible, 
2=mostly dissatisfied, 3= mixed, 4=mostly satisfied and 5=excellent).
166Preference for care booklet
The  advance  statement  was  provided  in  the  form  of a  "Preferences  for  Care" 
booklet  (see  also  chapter  one,  section  on  preparing  the  booklet  for  further 
explanation and justification).  As mentioned in chapter one, psychiatric  advance 
statements  appear  under  different  names  (e.g.  advance  agreement  for  future 
psychiatric  treatment,  anticipatory  consent  for  treatment,  Mill’s  will,  Winick’s 
proposals  and  Ulysses  contracts).  The  choice  of “Preferences  for Care” booklet 
was  made  in  order  to  avoid  legal  consequences  due  to  the  lack  of  statutory 
legislation covering psychiatric advance statements in this country. The front page 
of the booklet contained the name of the patient and his or her general practitioner, 
community  psychiatric  nurse,  key-worker,  consulting  psychiatrist  and  social 
worker  (see  appendix  15).  We  included  the  trial  centre’s  address  in  case  the 
booklet became lost. The booklet contained seven statements on future preferences 
for treatment:
I notice I am becoming ill again when I.......
Things that happened just before I was placed on a section and/or started to 
become ill were................
If I do seem to be becoming ill again I would like..............
I would like you to contact.................
I wouldn’t want.............
If I have to be admitted to hospital again I would like................
In hospital I would also like..................
Table 11: Preference for care booklet
The  content of the  directive was  not  intended to  address  compulsory admission 
directly.  Rather it  aimed to  give patients  an  opportunity to  consider their future 
treatment  on  a  wider  basis,  thereby  increasing  their  trust  and  compliance  and 
ultimately reducing the need for compulsory treatment.  One might argue that the 
preference for care booklet was not really an advance statement because it did not 
direct,  guide  and  impel  toward  a  specific  action  or  goal  which  in  this  case  is 
compulsory  re-admission.  However,  the  questions  in  the  preference  for  care
167booklet  and  the  answers  provided  by  the  patients  (see  results  section)  were 
intended to provide a clear guide for the professionals about what a patient would 
like  to  be  done  if he  or  she  becomes  ill  again  and  needs  hospitalisation  and 
treatment. This is especially true for questions 1  and 2 that can be used as means of 
opening discussions with the patient into  early warning signs.  The choice of the 
statements  in  the  preference  for  care  booklet  are  also  in  accordance  with  the 
guidelines  of the  report  of the  expert  committee  on  the  review  of the  Mental 
Health Act 1983 which states (28):
12.13......  It  (an advance statement about care ) would address the patient’s treatment preference (if
any) in relation to any possible future care and treatment for mental disorder, and it would have to 
be taken into account as a capable expression of the patient’s preferences should treatment become 
necessary at a future point when the patient has lost capacity.
In order to avoid overestimation of the legal effects of the booklet, a rider placed at 
the  end  of the  booklet  indicated  that  professionals  were  not  legally  bound  to 
comply with the preferences for care, if, for instance, the patient was subsequently 
recommitted  (See  appendix  15).  Again  some  may  argue  that  the  disclaimer 
undermined the importance of the directive.  However, expert legal advice taken at 
the outset of the trial meant that there was little option but to include it, given the 
uncertain  legal  status  of advance  statements  in England  and Wales  at  that time.
168Follow-up materials
Twelve months after discharge we completed the following measures again:
1.  The Basis-32.
2.  The Hospital Service Satisfaction Scale for measurement of satisfaction 
with treatment over the 12 months follow-up.
3.  The Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer 1993).
4.  Semi-structured interview for patients on use of the advance statements
5.  Semi-structured interview for consultant psychiatrists and key-workers 
on their awareness of the statement, its use, and whether it could be 
improved
169The Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer 1993)
The Self-efficacy scale assesses people’s “general beliefs in their ability to respond 
to  and  control  environmental  demands  and  challenges”  (147).  This  is  the  first 
study that measured the self-efficacy beliefs and expectations of sectioned patients. 
Although  I  did  not  obtain  any data on patients’  self-efficacy at baseline  due to 
practical difficulties, evidence from smoking cessation programmes suggests that 
pre-treatment self-efficacy does not predict relapse but post-treatment self-efficacy 
does (see also chapter 3 on self-efficacy) (129).
The  scale  contains  ten  general  self-efficacy  items  (items  1-10  developed  by 
Schwarzer in  1992), two specific self-efficacy beliefs (items  11. I can manage my 
own mental health  and  12.  I can make decisions about my future care)  and two 
outcome expectations (items 13. If I need hospitalisation in future I can voluntarily 
admit my self and  14.  I can contact my GP/KW/outpatient clinic, the next time I 
begin to relapse) (developed by me) (See appendix  11). It is a self-report measure 
that  normally  takes  five  to  ten  minutes  to  complete.  Patients  were  required  to 
indicate the extent to which each statement applied to them. For each item there is 
a four choice response from ‘Not at all true’ which scores 1 to ‘Exactly true’ which 
scores 4. The score for each of the fourteen items are summed to give a total score. 
The higher the score the higher the individual’s sense of self-efficacy. The internal 
consistency of the original scale was high (a=0.82 to 0.93).  Cronbachs alpha co­
efficient is high for both the short (ten item) and longer (fourteen item) version of 
the  self-efficacy questionnaire,  being 0.91  and  0.91  respectively.  This  indicates 
that  both  versions  have  satisfactory  internal  consistency,  and  conclude  that  the 
shorter version is satisfactory to use. Test-retest reliability (0.47 for men and 0.63 
for  women)  was  moderate  (147).  The  concurrent  validity  of  the  scale  was 
established by using correlations with other tests (147). Positive correlations were 
found  with  measures  of  self-esteem  (0.52),  internal  control  beliefs  (0.4)  and 
optimism  (0.49)(147).  Negative  correlations  were  found with  general  anxiety (-
0.54),  performance  anxiety  (-0.42),  shyness  (-0.58)  and pessimism  (-0.28)(147). 
Schwarzer (1993) assessed the predictive validity of the scale in a one-year follow- 
up of East German migrants (147).  He found that the scale correlated positively
170with measures of self-esteem (0.40) and optimism (0.56) in women. However, the 
correlations in men were weaker: self-esteem (0.20) and optimism (0.34) (147).
171Semi-structured interview for patients and mental health professionals on use 
of the advance statements
In addition to  the three psychometric  scales  (Basis-32,  Hospital  Satisfaction and 
Self-efficacy), we also designed two semi-structured interview forms, one to elicit 
and  record  patients’  views  on  the  usefulness  of  the  advance  statements  (see 
Appendix  12)  and  the  other  to  elicit  consultant  psychiatrists’  and  CPA  key­
workers’  views  (see Appendix  13).  Professionals received one questionnaire per 
patient.
172Procedures
The study was funded by the Responsive Funding Division of the NHS Research 
and Development Executive (former North Thames Regional Health Authority).
Ethical considerations
The study received approval of the ethical practices sub-committees of the Royal 
Free Hampstead NHS trust and Enfield and Haringey NHS  trust.  The study was 
conducted according to the Helsinki declaration on research into human subjects 
(including  amendments)  that  requires  obtaining  and  documenting  informed 
consent and ensuring archiving of patient identity codes for at least 15  years.  All 
study records  (except the preference for care booklet) were kept confidential.  In 
accordance  with  the  Data  Protection  Act,  participants’  names  were  not  entered 
onto the computer database.
An  ethical  issue  that  became  apparent  during  the  study  was  that  of  implicit 
withdrawal  of consent.  Participants  were  free  to  withdraw  at  any  time  and  a 
statement of wish to withdraw resulted in cessation of contact. However, a number 
of patients who initially consented to participate in the study, avoided my efforts to 
follow them up without explicitly withdrawing consent. After a meeting with the 
research team, it was decided not to contact participants who failed to keep three 
follow up appointments.
173Preparing the setting and the hospital staff
Once  ethical  approval  for  the  study  was  obtained,  the  ward  managers  of both 
psychiatric  hospitals  were  approached  to  discuss  the  study.  Following  their 
approval, we attended their staff meetings and explained the study to the rest of the 
ward  staff.  In  addition,  a number  of handover  meetings  and  Care  Programme 
Approach meetings were attended.
Extensive discussions took place with managers, consultant psychiatrists and nurse 
managers about the study to ensure they were fully informed and prepared for the 
trial during the first six months of the trial.  Although it would have been useful to 
incorporate the directives into the formal CPA process, clinicians did not think that 
this was warranted at the stage the trial was designed.
174Preparing the patients 
Feasibility study
During the first six months of the trial (September 1996 to February 1997) a small 
feasibility study was carried out in order to pilot the materials and the procedures 
used in this  study.  The researcher who carried out the  feasibility study recruited 
competent  sectioned patients  from the  Royal  Free  and  St Ann’s hospitals.  She 
recruited  26  patients  of whom  11  completed  the  interviews  (6  controls  and  5 
preference for care) and 15 aborted the interviews (either refused half way or were 
too  ill).  Between  February  and  April  1997  the  materials  and  procedures  were 
revised and the final version of the preference for care booklet was printed.
Main trial
When  recruitment  started,  participants  were  seen  individually  by  myself  and 
another researcher who  informed them  about the purpose  of the  study and what 
would be involved for them. A standard written form with a summary of the study 
was  given  to  all  potential  participants  (see  appendix  1).  Participants  were  also 
informed about accessibility of their local service users’ groups for further advice 
on any related issues.  Local service users groups were informed about the study 
and  I  and my supervisor talked to the  groups regularly throughout and  after the 
trial. Competence to enter into an agreement was an important prerequisite for the 
study.  Members  of the  clinical  team  responsible  for  each  patient’s  care  were 
consulted in relation to their competence prior to the interview.  Only competent 
patients were  approached.  In addition, because there was no  single established 
test  of competence  to  consent  to  treatment  in  British  Law  at  that  time,  it  was 
decided that each patient would be assessed on the following:
•  Their capacity to  understand information necessary to  complete  a preference 
for care  statement,  which  included  understanding the  necessity  for care  and 
what the preference for care document is.
•  Their awareness of their situation and that they are receiving treatment.
•  Their understanding  that  failure  to  complete  a preference  for care  statement 
would not affect their care in any way.
Evaluation of the above points were incorporated in the interview process in the 
form  of questions  and patients were  asked to  re-state their understanding of the
175issues involved in the study in their own words when there were doubts about their 
understanding.
176Baseline data collection
During  baseline  assessments,  data  were  collected  from  patients  in  the  form  of 
questionnaires and from their hospital notes. I and the other researcher visited the 
psychiatric  wards  weekly  and  made  lists  of sectioned  patients  who  were  near 
discharge from section. After discussions with nursing and medical staff, eligible 
patients  were  approached  and  asked to  give  consent to  participate  in the  study. 
Each  patient  who  initially  accepted  to  participate  was  briefed  further  about  the 
study and asked for written informed consent (see appendix 2). Brief demographic 
data were obtained  for those patients who refused to participate.  After informed 
consent was obtained,  each participant was asked to complete the BASIS-32 and 
the Hospital Service Satisfaction Scales.
After randomisation, participants in the preference for care group were encouraged 
to complete and  sign  four copies of the preference for care booklet.  Participants 
who did not wish to write in the booklet themselves, dictated their preferences to 
me and the other researcher. Only patients who were able to read and write English 
were  included  in  the  study.  In  the  cases  where  myself and the  other researcher 
wrote the statement, the patient read the statement and then signed the document. 
The same process was followed for the rest of the copies that had to be read and 
signed by the patient before they were disseminated. This process is in agreement 
with both the report of the expert committee on the review of the Mental Health 
Act 1983 and the BMA code of practice (28; 188).  Each patient was asked to keep 
a copy of the booklet in a safe place.  We gave one copy to the key worker and 
general practitioner as well as placing one in the front of the hospital records.
After the participant left the session (which could last up to two hours), I and the 
other researcher with the help of a member of the ward staff who worked closely 
with  the  participant,  completed  the  HoNOS  scale.  Finally,  information  (see 
appendix 6) was gathered from the case notes.
All patients continued to receive standard community psychiatric care.
177Follow-up data collection
One year from baseline I went through the following procedure:
1.  I  gathered information  from the participants’  notes  in order to  complete the 
follow-up form (appendix  14). The case notes gave me an idea where I would 
find most of the participants.
2.  The participants were contacted by telephone and/or letter and reminded about 
the last phase of the study. An appointment was made for an interview either 
in their homes, rehabilitation centre or hospital.
3.  The participants  in both groups were  given the BASIS-32,  Hospital  Service 
Satisfaction  and  Self-efficacy  scales  to  complete.  Those  in the  intervention 
group  were  shown  their  preference  for  care  booklet  and  were  given  to 
complete the structured questionnaire about the usefulness of the booklet (see 
appendix 12).
4.  The Care Programme Approach key-worker and consultant of the participants 
in the intervention group were sent a letter reminding them about the follow- 
up phase of the study and a semi-structured questionnaire per patient about the 
usefulness of the directives (see appendices 10 and 13).
178Statistical analysis
Pre-trial sample size and power calculation
Hospital  data  for  sectioned  admissions  were  used  to  calculate  the  sample  size. 
Hospital  data  for  the  year  before  the  study  indicated  that  50%  of  patients 
discharged from a compulsory admission were re-admitted within 12 months, 60% 
of whom  were  re-admitted  compulsorily.  That  means  30%  of all  patients  were 
readmitted compulsorily within one year. We estimated that detecting a reduction 
in the rate of compulsory readmission to  10%  or less in the  advance  statements 
group (compared to 30% in the control group) at 90% power and the 5% level of 
significance would require 80 patients in each group.
Rationale for power calculations
Sample  size  calculations  were  based  on  the  admissions  data  in  the  year  1996, 
collected  at  the  hospital  where  the  trial  was  based.  The  admissions  data  (same 
setting, similar time period) from that year should therefore have been a reasonable 
predictor of the future rate at which trial participants would have been readmitted. 
Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility (with the benefit of hindsight) of 
1996  being  an  unusual  year,  or  that  there  may  be  unpredictable  year-to-year 
fluctuations  in  readmission  rates,  depending  on  the  case  mix  for that  particular 
period.  Sample size calculations have to be based on historical data, and it is not 
possible to take into account variations that can later affect readmission. Moreover, 
readmission  rates  of 50%  are  not  uncommon  in psychiatry,  Kisely  et  al  (2004) 
found  that  up  to  72%  of their  patients  with  compulsory  treatment  orders  were 
readmitted within a year (189).
The  decision to  look  for  an  absolute reduction of 20%  in the readmissions rate 
(from  30%  to  10%)  is  based  on  the  view  that  this  would  represent  a palpable, 
clinically meaningful benefit which would be  appreciated both by clinicians  and 
patients.  This  level  of reduction would  also  be  regarded  as  sufficient to  have  a 
significant  impact  on  health  service  resources,  whereas  a lower level  of benefit 
may probably go unnoticed.
179Data handling
Data entry and data checking were undertaken using the data entry module of Epi- 
Info (v6.01). The results of each questionnaire for baseline and follow-up and the 
administrative and demographic data were entered onto individual Epi-Info  files. 
Each file was associated with a check file to identify out-of-range data values and 
essential  missing  data.  Each  Epi-Info  file  was  checked  for  accuracy by  double 
entry by myself and the other researcher. These files were then exported to SPSS 
(1998)  data  files  and  were  combined  to  provide  a  comprehensive  database  of 
variables (190). At this point, I carried out a second comprehensive check of data 
by  checking  each  data  record  against  the  original  data  record  to  ensure  the 
database was as error-free as possible.
180Quantitative data analysis
I first ran an exploratory data analysis in order to check the distribution and detect 
outliers. All patients were analysed in the group to which they were allocated in an 
intention  to  treat  analysis.  As  already described,  the primary outcome  was  the 
number  of people  compulsorily readmitted  under the  Mental  Health  Act  during 
follow-up.  In  the  analysis  of other outcomes  I  made  group  comparisons  using 
standard  t-tests  for  approximately normal  data,  Mann-Whitney tests  for  ordinal 
non-parametric  distributions  and  the  Chi-squared  statistic  for categorical  data.  I 
reported grouped medians for ordinal non-parametric data. The grouped median is 
the  median weighted by the  frequency of data in  the  adjacent categories  and is 
particularly useful for extreme scores such as days spent in hospital or on section. I 
used  Cronbach’s  alpha  to  test  the  internal  consistency  of the  adapted  Hospital 
Service Satisfaction  Scale (a =0.9)  and self-efficacy scale (a=0.9).  Analyses of 
covariance  (controlling  for  baseline  values)  of  Basis-32  and  Hospital  Service 
Satisfaction  scores were performed on  log-transformed data.  Univariate  logistic 
regression  was  used,  firstly  to  analyse  each  potential  explanatory  variable 
independently to give some indication as to factors that may be important for re­
admission.  A multivariate  approach also  using  logistic regression was  taken in 
order to build  a model that accounted  for any interaction terms and included all 
relevant explanatory variables/potential confounders. The multivariate model was 
used  to  estimate  and  test  the  influences  of multiple  variables  on  the  risk  of 
readmission.  This  multivariate  analysis  involves  the  simultaneous  statistical 
evaluation of the relationships among the multiple measured properties (e.g.  age, 
lives  alone)  of  the  trial  participants,  and  the  rate  of  readmission.  The  most 
parsimonious  model,  which  included  adjustment  for  the  variable  ‘group’,  was 
chosen,  based  on  likelihood  ratio  tests.  Where  data  were  missing  listwise  or 
casewise approach was used.
181The content of  psychiatric advance directives
As mentioned in chapter 1, only a handful of studies have looked at the content of 
psychiatric  advance directives (18;25;85;90;92).  The preference for care study is 
the  first  one  to  look  at  the  content  of sectioned  patients’  psychiatric  advance 
statements. As Brown and Lloyd (2001) suggest, during the exploratory stages of a 
research  project/area,  qualitative  methodology  is  an  appropriate  means  for 
examining policy implementation and collating user views.  Since we know very 
little about the preferences for care of psychiatric patients in general and sectioned 
patients  in particular,  we  decided  to  explore the  content  of psychiatric  advance 
statements  using  content  analysis.  Content  analysis  was  considered  the  most 
appropriate method for the type of responses we obtained from the patients (191- 
193).
Content  analysis
“Content  analysis  is  the  most  deductive  of  all  forms  of  data  analysis....The 
categories  of  analysis  are  developed  through  logical  deduction  from  the  pre­
existing theory.. ..Content analysis as with any other form of data analysis, begins 
with the identification of the population from which units are sampled.... Content 
analysis next defines the units of analysis and the categories into which these will 
be placed. Data analysis involves reviewing each unit of analysis and categorising 
it  according  to  the predefined categories.  The  occurrences  are then  counted  and 
comparisons  are  made,  often using  statistical  or quantitative methods.  The  final 
stages of content analysis is the interpretation of results.” (193) (pp 82-83) In other 
textbooks, the process of counting the instances of each unit under a category and 
producing percentages is also known as tabulation (192).
Content  analysis of the preference for care booklets
The  data  obtained  from  the  patients’  booklets  (see  appendix  15)  composed  our 
sample that was read and content analysed independently by myself and another 
researcher  (191-194).  Patients’  responses  comprised  the  units  of analysis  which 
were entered under the seven preference for care booklet’s headings into a word 
processing  package.  After  several  readings,  each  researcher  created  her  own
182codes/themes that emerged from the data which we then compared (see chapter 8 
for more details on the  development of codes/themes).  Any discrepancies which 
were  found  were  discussed  and  data were  recoded where  appropriate.  We  then 
counted  the  number  of  responses  under  each  category  independently  and 
transferred  the  data  to  SPSS  (version  9)  in  order  to  obtain  the  distribution  of 
responses in each category. Seventy-nine advance statements were analysed.
183Chapter summary
Overall  the  study  was  carried  out  smoothly  without  major  difficulties  and 
unexpected events.  Most of the patients who participated in the  study expressed 
very positive views about the idea of completing the preference for care booklet. 
Some of them found the process of completing all the scales plus the preference 
for care booklet tiring but educative nonetheless (some interviews took up to two 
hours).  Overall,  the  psychiatric  staff was  helpful  and  supportive.  In  the  next 
section the results in relation the main and secondary outcomes will be presented 
as well  as  the  findings  from  the preference  for care booklets  and patients’  and 
mental health professionals’ views on the usefulness of the booklets.
184PART III
RESULTS
Introduction
Part  III  will  be  divided  into  two  chapters.  In  chapter  7  I  shall  present  the 
quantitative  results  of  the  study  that  provide  answers  to  the  hypotheses  the 
preference for care study set out to test, while in chapter 8 the findings from the 
preference for care booklets and patients’  and mental health professionals’ views 
in relation to the usefulness of the booklets will be presented.
185Chapter 7 
Quantitative results
This  section  begins  with  the  CONSORT  statement  which  is  followed  by  the 
description  of the  population  from  which the  sample  of the preference  for  care 
study was drawn and the results of the randomisation process. This is followed by 
the  results  of the  analysis  in  relation  to  the  main  hypothesis  of the  study,  the 
profile  of patients  who  did  not  complete  the  study  and  the  main  predictors  of 
outcome  for the  whole trial  sample.  Finally,  the results  in relation to  secondary 
outcome measures  are presented which are followed by the results in relation to 
the last two hypotheses of the preference for care study.
186Recruitment
The results  of the  study  are  reported  according  to  the  CONSORT  statement  on 
reporting  randomised  controlled  trials  (154).  The  flow  diagram  below  gives  an
outline of the attrition during the trial (Figure 5).
Not discharged from hospital (n=4)
Not discharged from hospital (n=l)
Assessed for eligibility (n=605)
Allocated to standard care group (n=81)
Patients evaluated for main outcome (n=79)
Patients evaluated for other outcome measures (n=59)
Patients evaluated for main outcome (n=77)
Patients evaluated for other outcome measures (n=55)
Randomised (n=161)
Allocated to make advance statement in addition to standard care (n=80)
Lost to follow-up (n=22)
-Refused follow-up (n=7), Moved away, no 
response to postal FU (n=5)
-Lost contact with services (n=8)
-Died (suicide) (n=2)
Excluded (n=444)
-Not meeting inclusion criteria (n=372) 
-Refused to participate (n=27)
-Discharged too early or without notice (n=45)
Lost to follow-up (n=20)
-Refused follow-up (n=7), Moved away, no response to postal FU (n=4) 
-Lost contact with services (n=7)
-Died (1  suicide,  1   cancer) (n=2)
Figure 5: Flow diagram of recruitment and attrition
187Exclusions
Six hundred and  five patients were  admitted under section of the Mental Health 
Act during the period of recruitment of whom 161  entered the trial (Figure 1).  All 
except six (who were not competent) of the 372 not meeting inclusion criteria were 
transferred onto  a further commitment order or to  another hospital,  their section 
was renewed  and were not discharged from hospital, they suffered from organic 
and psychoactive substance use disorders, could not read and write English.  There 
were no significant differences in sex and age between those considered and those 
eventually taking part or between the participants who entered the trial and those 
who refused.
Effectiveness of randomisation
Table  12  summarises the demographics of the sample according to experimental 
and  control  groups.  There  were  no  major  baseline  differences  in  age,  sex, 
ethnicity, marital  status,  household composition or employment between the two 
arms  of  the  trial,  confirming  that  the  randomisation  appeared  to  have  been 
conducted satisfactorily.
188Advance 
statements 
group (n=79)
Control group 
(n=77)
Mean age in years 35.5 (SD 11.3) 36.3 (SD 12.6)
Gender
Male 42 (53%) 51 (66%)
Ethnic group*
White 43 (54%) 48 (62%)
Black 22 (28%) 24 (31%)
Other 14(18%) 5 (6%)
Marital status
Single 50 (63%) 54 (70%)
Married 10(13%) 4 (5%)
Divorced/separated 16 (20%) 16(21%)
Widowed/other 3 (4%) 3 (4%)
Household
composition 11 (14%) 7 (9%)
Lives alone 16 (20%) 12(16%)
Lives with partner 32 (40%) 41 (53%)
Lives with parent 20 (25%) 17 (22%)
Other
Employment status #
Unemployed 31 (39%) 29 (38%)
Sickness benefit 34 (43%) 39 (51%)
Employed (f/t & p/t) 4 (5%) 5 (6%)
Other 10(13%) 4 (5%)
Table 12: Demographic characteristics at baseline
* Black = African Caribbean, Black African, other Black. 
Other = Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, other Asian.
# Other = home-manager, retired, student and other
189Baseline mental health
There were no differences in previous hospitalisation, diagnosis, symptoms (Basis- 
32)  or  satisfaction  with  services  (see  Table  13),  between  the  two  trial  arms. 
Further  analysis  of  the  Basis-32  and  HoNOS  subscales  did  not  show  any 
significant differences between the experimental and control groups. The average 
Basis-32 and HoNOS scores as well as the scores obtained from their subscales are 
typical of the average scores reported for acute care patients in other studies that 
used the same instruments (166).
190Advance 
statements group 
(n=79)
Control group 
(n=77)
Diagnosis
Psychosis 50 (63%) 49 (64%)
Depression/bipolar 22 (28%) 22 (29%)
disorder 7 (9%) 6 (8%)
Other
Basis-32 0.63 0.68
(grouped median) min=0, max=2.84 min=0, max=2.63
Mean Hospital satisfaction 30.34 (SD 7.4) 28.5 (SD 7.5)
Score
Mean HoNOS score 44.30 (SD14.4) 45.30 (SD 14.2)
*Pre-admission social &
role performance
Above average 10(13%) 9 (12%)
Average 28 (35%) 23 (30%)
Below average 36 (46%) 37 (48%)
Markedly below average 5 (  6%) 8 (10%)
Mental Health Act
status
Section 2 25 (32%) 17 (22%)
Section 3 52 (66%) 59 (77%)
Section 4 2 (2%) 1  (1%)
Number of antipsychotic
medications prescribed at
discharge
0 9(11%) 4 ( 5%)
1 53 (67%) 62 (80%)
2 16 (20%) 11 (14%)
3 1 (1%) 0
Table 13: Clinical characteristics at recruitment.
*Pre-admission social & role performance is measured by the Health of the Nation Outcome Scales
191Patients in the advance statement group, however, had spent less time in hospital 
during the index admission than those in the control group (Table 14).
Advance
statements group, 
n=79,
Grouped median 
(min, max)
Control group, 
n=77,
Grouped median 
(min, max)
1)  Number of days in
hospital index admission* 94(13, 545) 123 (13, 1,546)
2)  Number of admissions in 
previous 5 years 1.3 (0, 17) 1.4 (0, 10)
3)  Days in hospital in 12 
months prior to index 
admission
4.5 (0, 365) 13 (0,350)
4)  Number of admissions in 
year before index 
admission
0.6 (0, 3) 0.7 (0, 4)
Table 14:  Baseline characteristics concerning hospital care
* Mann Whitney U = 2427, p = 0.03
192Follow-up rates 
Main Outcome
In order to test the main hypothesis  of the preference  for care  study,  I  obtained 
data  on  the  principal  outcome  for  all  randomised  patients.  Five  patients 
(experimental 2, control^ 3) were not discharged from hospital during the follow- 
up  period  and  were  removed  from  the  analysis.  I  conducted  face-to-face 
assessments of 59  (75%) patients in the advance statements and 55  (71%) in the 
usual care arms  12 months after recruitment (figure 5). There were no statistically 
significant differences  in  sex,  age,  ethnicity or primary diagnosis between those 
interviewed  at  follow-up  and those not contacted (see Table  15).  Nor was there 
any  difference  in  the  primary  outcome  between  those  contacted  and  those  not 
contacted at follow-up.
Fifteen participants (19%) in the experimental and  16 (21%) in the control group 
were  readmitted  to  hospital  under  section  within  one  year  of discharge  (Chi- 
squared=0.08,  df=l, p=0.8).  Survival  analysis supports this conclusion across all 
time points (see Graphs 1  & 2).
193Graph 1: The X axis (dates of survival between admissions) shows the time from first 
discharge (point 0), the Y axis (cum survival) shows the percentage of patients who were out 
of hospital after first discharge.
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194Graph 2: The X axis (dates of survival between sections) shows the time from first discharge 
from section (point 0), the Y axis (cum survival) shows the percentage of patients who were 
not on section after first discharge.
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195Demographic characteristic of participants lost to follow-up
Interviewed
Participants
(n= 114)
Not interviewed 
Participants
(n=42)
Mean age in years (s.d.) 35.5 (12.5) 37(10.48)
Gender
Male (n (%)) 69 (60.52) 24 (57.14)
Ethnic group*(n (%))
White 61 (53.50) 30 (71.42)
Black 37 (32.45) 9(21.42)
Other 16(14.03) 3 (7.14)
Marital status (n (%))
Single 80 (70.17) 24 (57.14)
Married 8 (7.01) 6 (14.28)
Divorced/separated 21 (18.42) 11 (26.19)
Widowed/other 5 (4.38) 1   (2.38)
Household composition (n
(%))
Lives alone 56(49.12) 8 (19.04)
Lives with partner 10(8.77) 6 (14.28)
Lives with parent 22 (19.29) 17 (40.47)
Other 26 (22.80) 11 (26.19)
Employment status #
Unemployed 42 (36.84) 18 (42.85)
Sickness benefit 56(49.12) 17 (40.47)
Employed (f/t & p/t) 6 (5.26) 3 (7.14)
Other 10(8.77) 4 (9.52)
Mental Health Act Status at 
baseline (n (%))
52
53
54
26 (22.80) 
85 (74.56) 
3 (2.6)
16(38.09) 
26 (61.90)
Table 15: Demographic characteristic of participants lost to follow-up
* Black = African Caribbean, Black African, other Black.
Other = Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, other Asian.
# Other = home-manager, retired, student and other
196Predictors of outcome for the whole trial sample
Table  16  shows  the  individual  odds  ratios  from  univariate  analyses  of potential 
predictor variables, with their associated 95% confidence intervals and p-values. It 
appears from this table that having two or more previous admissions increases the 
odds of re-admission to almost two and a half times that of someone who has had 
one  or no  previous  admissions,  (95%  confidence  interval  1.09  to  5.62).  Also, 
someone  who  lives  alone  is  approximately twice  as  likely to  be  re-admitted  as 
someone who has a different household composition is.  No other variables were 
significant.
Odds
Ratio
95%
Confidence
Interval
P~
value
Randomised arm (Experimental vs. 0.89 0.41 to 1.96 0.78
Control)
Gender (Male vs. Female) 1.30 0.57 to 2.93 0.54
Ethnicity (Non-white vs. White) 1.01 0.46 to 2.25 0.97
Primary Diagnosis (Dep/ Mania/ 1.12 0.50 to 2.52 0.78
Bipolar/Other vs. Psychosis)
Household (Lives Alone vs. Other) 2.08 0.93 to 4.65 0.07
Living (With Help vs. 0.66 0.30 to 1.48 0.31
Independent)
Relation to Carer (Relative/partner 1.99 0.66 to 6.02 0.22
vs. Other)1
Employment (Not-Employed vs. 2.05 0.25 to 17.04 0.51
Employed)
No. Previous Admissions ( 2 or 2.54 1.13 to 5.70 0.02
more vs. none or 1)
Age Group (25-54 vs. under 25) 0.63 0.25 to 1.63 0.34
Age Group (over-54 vs. under 25) 0.31 0.06 to 1.65 0.17
Marital Status (Married vs. 1.70 0.50 to 5.85 0.4
Single/divorced/separated)
’n=56 missing data from this group
Table 16: Univariate analysis of predictors of re-admission
197Secondary Outcomes
Subsequent admissions
Table  17 presents the results of the statistical analyses that were performed to test 
secondary  outcome  measures  such  as  the  number  of  subsequent  compulsory 
admissions, days spent on a section, number of patients’ readmitted voluntarily or 
days spent voluntarily in hospital. There were no  significant differences between
the two groups in either of the above.
Advance 
statements group 
(n=79)
Control group 
(n=77)
Number of subsequent 
Sections of the MHA
0
1
2
>2
64 (81%) 
9(11%) 
4 (  5%) 
2 (  2%)
61 (79%) 
11 (14%) 
5 (  6%) 
0
Grouped median 0.2 (range 0, 4) 0.22 (range 0, 2)
Days on subsequent 
sections 64 (81%) 61 (79%)
0
10(13%) 14(18%)
1-100 5 (6%) 2 (2%)
101-365
Days as an inpatient on 
a subsequent voluntary 
admission
0 52 (66%) 49 (64%)
1-100 20 (25%) 22 (29%)
101-200
6 (7%) 
1  (1%)
5 (6%)
1 (  1%)
201-365
Number of patients
Re-admitted
voluntarily
13 (16%) 12 (16%)
Table 17: Secondary outcome measures
198Self-efficacy
Statistical  analyses  to  test the  second main hypothesis  of the  study showed that 
there  was  no  difference  in  the  total  self-efficacy  score  at  follow-up  (advance 
statements  grouped  median  42.66;  control  arm  grouped  median  42.25)  and  the 
self-efficacy subscales between the two groups.
Mental health at follow-up and patients’ satisfaction with the mental health 
services they received
Table  18 presents the results of the statistical analyses that were performed to test 
patients’mental  health  status  at  follow-up  and  the  third  main  hypothesis  of the 
study  regarding  the  patients’  satisfaction  with  the  mental  health  services  they 
received.
Patients reported less symptoms of mental illness at baseline and more symptoms 
at follow-up  as the analysis of their scores on the BASIS-32  showed.  However, 
there  was  no  indication  on  other  parameters  that  patients’  clinical  state  had 
deteriorated by the time of follow-up.
There were no  significant differences between the two groups in relation to their 
satisfaction with the mental health services they received (see Table 18).
199Baseline score Follow-up score
Grouped median Grouped median
BASIS-32 (min, max) (min, max)
Advance 0.63 0.81
statements (0, 2.84) (0, 3.34)
group  (n=59)
Control group 0.68 0.62
(n=55) (0, 2.63) (0, 3.25)
Hospital Grouped median Grouped median
Satisfaction (min, max) (min, max)
Advance 31 29
statements (15,45) (9, 45)
group (n=59)
Control group 29 31
(n=55) (10, 45) (9, 44)
Table 18: Mental health at follow-up
200Basis-32 and hospital satisfaction for non-completers
Mann-Whitney  tests  for  non-completers  showed  no  difference  between  the  two 
groups  regarding  their  Basis-32  scores  but  a  significant  difference  (p<0.04) 
between  their  hospital  satisfaction  scores  with  the  preference  for  care  group 
expressing greater and the control lower satisfaction with services.
Chapter summary
In  this  chapter  I  have  presented results  relating to  the  demographic  and  clinical 
characteristics of the study sample and the effectiveness of randomisation. I have 
also presented results concerning the primary and secondary outcome measures. In 
the next chapter I will present the findings from the psychiatric advance statements 
and  the  patients’  and  mental  health  professionals’  views  in  relation  to  the 
effectiveness of the statements.
201CHAPTER 8
Findings from the Preference for Care booklet and the patients’ 
and mental health professionals’ views on the usefulness of the 
booklet
So far, there has been very little empirical research in this country relating to the 
content of sectioned patients’ psychiatric advance statements. Two of the aims of 
the  preference  for  care  study  were;  first,  to  explore  the  content  of psychiatric 
advance statements of sectioned patients and second, to explore the patients’  and 
mental health professionals’ views in relation to the usefulness of such documents.
202The content of the Preference for Care booklet and the 
development of codes/themes
There were seven statements in the preference for care booklet (see Table 19).
Statement 1: “I notice I am becoming ill again when I  ”_________________
Statement 2: “Things that happened just before I was placed on a section and/or
started to become ill were.. ___________________________________________
Statement 3: “If I do seem to be becoming ill again I would like...”___________
Statement 4: “I would like you to contact...”______________________________
Statement 5: “I wouldn’t want...”_______________________________________
Statement 6: “If I have to be admitted to hospital again I would like...”_______
Statement 7: “In hospital I would also like...”_____________________________
Table 19: Content of the Preference for Care Booklet
Each patient could  give up to three open responses under every statement of the 
preference  for  care  booklet  (see  appendix  15  for  an  example  of  a  completed 
booklet). For example, one patient (who will be called PI5) wrote under statement 
1: “I notice I am becoming ill again when I...”
•  “hear voices saying bad things ”
•  “get a headache and my brain goes round”
•  “cannot eat or sleep ”
Another patient (who will be called PI9) wrote under statement  1: “I notice I am 
becoming ill again when I...”
•  “can not keep my place tidy ”
•  ‘'negl  ect my self’ ’
•  “hear voices ”
The first open response from PI5  (“hear voices saying bad things”) was coded as 
Positive psychotic symptoms; the second open response from PI5 (“get a headache 
and  my  brain  goes  round”)  was  coded  Physical/somatic  problems;  the  third 
response  from  PI5  (“can not  eat or sleep”) was  coded Mood/anxiety,  emotional 
disturbance;  and  so  on.  The process  of creating  codes/themes  for  each patient’s 
response continued until no new codes  emerged and  ‘saturation’  was reached, at 
which  point  new  patients’  responses  could  be  accommodated  by  existing 
categories (192-194). To avoid having too many codes under each statement of the 
preference  for  care  booklet  we  decided  to  merge  codes  such  as  positive  and 
negative  psychotic  symptoms  into  one  code  which  appears  under  the  name:
203Positive or negative psychotic symptoms (see Table 20). The number of responses 
under each code/theme  was then counted  and the percentages  of total responses 
were calculated.
The findings from the Preference for Care booklet 
Statement 1: “I notice I am becomine ill again when I...”
Five major categories of response were identified for the first statement, "I notice I 
am becoming ill again when..."  (Table 20).  Other categories included becoming 
ill again due to alcohol or drugs (n=7); due to confusion, relationship problems or 
financial problems  (n=5);  due to missing appointments or not taking medication 
(n=4); and due to committing self-harm or expressing suicidal ideas or behaviour 
(n=3).
Positive or negative psychotic 
symptoms
32
(41%)
Physical/somatic problems 28
(35%)
Mood/ anxiety, emotional disturbance 27
(34%)
Aggression / irritability/ anger 22
(28%)
Altered behaviour 17
(22%)
Table 20: Responses to preference for care statement 1:  "I notice I am becoming ill again 
when ...”
204Statement 2: “Things that happened just before I was placed on a section
and/or started to become ill again were ...”
Statement  two  produced  responses  that  were  coded  and  analysed  thematically 
under the headings  in  Table  21.  These  responses  focused  on  symptoms  such  as 
chronic  illness  and its  triggering  factors  such  as missing treatment or not taking 
prescribed medication, and also relationship problems.
Medication/appointments problems 18 (23%)
Positive or negative psychotic 
symptoms
15 (19%)
Relationship problems 15(19%)
Aggression / irritability/ anger 13(16%)
Social/ financial/ work/health 
problems
13 (20%)
Altered behaviour/routines 11 (14%)
Mood/ anxiety disturbance 10(16%)
Self harm/ suicidal ideas/behaviour 6 (8%)
Use of alcohol or drugs 6 (8%)
Trouble with police/others 6 (8%)
Confusion/isolation/withdrawal 4 (6%)
Physical/ somatic problems 4 (6%)
Table 21: Responses to preference for care statement 2:  "Things that happened just before I 
was placed on a section and/or started to become ill again were ..."
For example, patient 20 wrote:
•  ‘'I stopped my medication
•  “I had an argument with my girlfriend ”
Patient 102 wrote:
•  “talk too much about religion
•  “don ’t sleep
205•  “show  inappropriate  behaviour  such  as  lying  down  on  the floor  and  give
money aw ay”.
Statement 3: "If I do seem to be becoming ill again I would like ...”
Statement  three  produced  responses  that  were  coded  and  analysed  thematically 
under the headings in Table 22.
More talking therapies 23 (29%)
More service input 23(29%)
Support to take medication 20 (25%)
Family and/ or social support 19 (24%)
Informal hospitalisation 18 (23%)
See my GP 17(22%)
More and better communication with 
professionals
14(18%)
Treatment in the community 10(13%)
Better housing/ financial conditions 5 (6%)
See a lawyer 3 (4%)
Other 3 (4%)
Table 22: Responses to preference for care statement 3: "If I do seem to be becoming ill again 
I would like:"
One patient (PI02) gave the following answer to statement three "If I do  seem to 
be becoming ill again I would like  “more support from the social worker and 
tenancy worker”.Another one (PI56) stated:
•  “proper communication with mental health professionals ”
•  “talking therapy”
A third one (P53)wrote:
•  “to come into hospital informally ”
•  “an early outpatient appointm ent”
•  “to discuss medication with the doctor”
206Statement 4: "I would like you to contact...”
In response to statement four "I would like you to contact ..." just over half of the 
sample  chose  a member of their  family while 48% chose  a non-family member 
(Table  23).  This  may  have  service  implications  as  almost  50%  of the  sample 
would chose non-family member which will be discussed in chapter 9.
A family member 41(52%)
A non-family member
Other services (rehabilitation hostels, social 
worker, CPN)
10(13%)
Friends 9(11%)
GP 5 (6%)
Consultant psychiatrist 4 (5%)
Lawyer 2 (3%)
No-one i (i%)
Table 23: Responses to preference for care statement 4:M I would like you to contact...”
For  example,  one  patient  (P79)  wrote:  “my  mother”  and  “my  GP”.  Another 
(P107) wrote:  “my  fa th er”. A third one (P 15) wrote:  “my husband”.
207Statement 5: "If I have to be admitted to hospital again I would not want...”
Six  categories  were  identified  under  statement  five  "If I  have  to  be  admitted to 
hospital again I would not want ..." (Table 24).  The majority of patients opposed 
the use of force (e.g. being handcuffed), coercion and intrusion during admissions 
and wished for their rights to be respected.  They also stated that they would prefer 
to  be  admitted  to  hospital  by psychiatric  professionals  who  already  knew  them 
rather than the police or mental health staff that did not know them. Some patients 
also  expressed  their wish not to  be treated with  certain medication  or injections 
(e.g. haloperidol, depot injections).
Force/ coercion/ intrusion 34 (43%)
Admission +/by unknown staff 13 (16%)
Particular treatments 12(15%)
Human rights not respected 6 (8%)
Others informed 5 (6%)
Unwanted contact from family 3 (4%)
Table 24: Responses to preference for care statement 5:’Tf I have to be admitted to hospital 
again I would not w ant...”
For example, one patient (PI) wrote:
•  “I would not want the police to be involved unless absolutely necessary ”
•  “I would not want my employer contacted without my consent ”
Another patient (PI 1) stated:
•  “I would not want Haloperidol as 1 get bad side effects ”
A third one (PI31) wrote:
•  ‘7 would not want injections against my will ”
•  “Being placed on a locked w ard”
•  “Heavy-handed treatm ent”
208Statements 6 and 7:  "If I have to be admitted to hospital again I would want
  " and 7 “In hospital I would also like....”.
Statements  6  and  7  triggered  responses  such  as  better quality  hospital  facilities 
(e.g.,  'my  own  room'),  different  types  of treatment  such  as  psychotherapy  and 
counselling and respect of human rights (Table 25).
Better quality hospital facilities 34 (43%)
Treatments/therapies (e.g. alternative therapies, 
counselling, psychotherapy)
26 (33%)
Improved human rights 25 (32%)
More say/ explanations in treatment 11  (14%)
Avoidance of coercion 7 (9%)
Table 25: Responses to preference for care statement 6 and 7:M If I have to be admitted to 
hospital again I would w ant..."
One patient (PI50) wrote:
•  “In the ward round things to be discussed rather than me being interrogated’’
•  “My own room ’’
•  “To receive regular counselling ”
•  “To have an independent advocate ”
•  “To  know  more  about  the  decisions  regarding  my  care  and  have  a  saying 
about these decisions ”
Another one (PI45) stated:
•  “A room without traces o f violence,  without smoke fumes ’’
•  “Provision o f  soap, shampoo and herbal teas ”
•  “To be sure my privacy as a woman is safeguarded’’
•  “Structural issues such as new light bulbs etc to be dealt with ’’
In summary, patients’ responses to the seven statements of the preference for care 
booklet fell into two  categories.  One category that mainly includes factors which 
lead  to  recurrent  psychiatric  episodes  and  hospitalisations  and  another  category 
that  includes  factors  patients  identify as  important to  their treatment before  and 
after hospitalisation. These findings and their implications will be discussed in the 
following chapter.
209Patients’ follow-up questionnaire
Fifty-nine patients in the preference for care group were successfully followed-up 
a year after their discharge from hospital and provided views on the advance
statement.
Do you remember 
drawing up a 
preference for care 
booklet?
Yes 44 (75% )  No 15 (25%)
Do you still have it? Yes 27 (46%)  No 32 (54%)
Could you show it 
to me?
Yes 14 (24%)  No 32 (54%)
If No what 
happened?
Don’t know 11(19%)
Lost it 10(17%)
Not on me /somewhere else 6 (10%) 
Other 7 (12%)*
Was it ever used in 
your care the last 
year?
Yes 2 (3%);  No 35 (59%);  Don’t know 22 (37%)
If yes whose idea 
was to use it?
Key-worker 1  (1.7%);  Consultant 1  (1.7%)
Was it helpful? Yes 9 (15%)  No 24 (41%)
If Yes how? Helped other people to understand that the patient is ill 3 (5%) 
Helped patient know when ill and needing admission 2 (3%) 
Reminded patient of things they can do to improve life 2 (3%) 
Helped with reality testing 1  (2%)
Helped patient evaluate their illness 2 (3%)
If No why not? Staff not aware of it /staff didn’t produce it /refer to it 10 (17%) 
Didn’t need it 7 (12%)
Instruction was not acted upon 2 (3%)
Other** 5 (8%)
Would you want to 
use it again?
Yes 24 (41%)  No 5 (8%)
Would you 
recommend it to 
other patients?
Yes 26 (44%)  No 2 (3%)
In what way do you 
think it could be 
improved?
9 (15%) recommended the following:
Change design e.g. more like a bus pass to be carried around 
Staff should be more aware of it and use it 
Should be prominent in the medical notes 
Should have more clout
Involve consultants /professionals more in it’s its preparation 
Give more time to fill it in
Table 26: Patients follow-up questionnaire
Numbers are the actual number of consultants that gave each response.  Where percentages add to 
less than 100% data were missing. *Other: Left it in hospital; gave it to carer; not given to me; got 
destroyed; don’t remember doing one **Other: Was written when patient was not thinking clearly; 
forgot about it; design too bulky; lost it became out of date
210The majority of patients (75%) remembered drawing up the booklet but more than 
half (54%)  did not have  it in their possession (see Table 26).  The main reasons 
they gave for the latter included responses such as:  “Idon’t know”,  “Ilost it”,  “I 
don’t have it with me ”.  Most of the patients reported that the preference for care 
booklet  was  not  used  in  their  care  because  they  did  not  need  it,  because 
professionals were not aware of it or if they were, they did not produce it or refer 
to  it  during  consultations  with  patients.  Only  two  patients  mentioned  that  the 
booklet was not useful because their instructions were not acted upon.
Only  nine  patients  (15%)  found  the  booklet  useful  because  it  helped  them  and 
other people around them to understand that they were ill and needed admission. 
Also, it reminded them of the things they could do to improve their ‘reality testing’ 
and their lives. Twenty four (41%) patients said they would like to use the booklet 
again and 26 (44%) would recommend it to other patients.
Finally,  when we  asked patients how could the  advance statement be improved, 
they said that involving professionals in its preparation, changing the design (e.g. 
to  look  like  bus  pass),  spending  more  time  on  filling  it  in  and  making  it  more 
influential, would be more useful.
211Mental health professionals’ views
As mentioned in chapter  1,  the preference  for care study,  also  aimed to  explore 
mental  health  professionals’  views  on  the  usefulness  of  psychiatric  advance 
statements. The last part of this chapter will be focused on consultant psychiatrists’ 
and  patients’  Care  Programme  Approach  (CPA)  key-workers  views  on  the 
effectiveness of such documents.
Consultant psychiatrists9  responses to the follow-up questionnaire
Consultants  returned  questionnaires  on  31  (39%)  of  the  79  patients  in  the 
intervention arm (Table 27). Their responses to closed questions (such as “Do you 
remember if this patient had a preference for care booklet?”) were counted and the 
actual number of responses is presented in Table 27. When open ended questions 
were  asked  (e.g.  If Yes  why?),  their responses  are presented  either verbatim  or 
coded into categories (see Table 27).
212Do you remember if 
this patient had a 
preference for care 
booklet?
Yes 9 (29%)  No 22 (71%)
Did you ever see it? Yes 8 (26%)  No 23 (74%)
Did you ever use it in 
the management of 
this patient?
Yes 3 (10%)  No 28 (90%)
Did you find it useful 
in the management of 
this patient?
Yes 5 (16%)  No 19 (61%)
If Yes why? 
5 responses
"Her capacity to agree to treatment was relevant"
"Interesting to discover what patients value most"
"Allowed consultant to understand patient’s experiences"
"Basis of CPA"
"Consultant routinely asks people about their early warning signs 
of stress"
If No why not? 
26 responses
Patient did not want to use it” (2)
Consultant prefers to talk face to face with the patient (3) 
“Consultant knew about what patient wrote anyway” (1) 
Unrealistic preferences given  (5)
Not integrated into the CPA (5)
Not discussed with the patient  (4)
Consultant / team were not aware of it (14)
Not applicable as patient was not in area (2)
How useful do you 
think this instrument
is?
8  not useful at all 
6 moderately useful 
4 very useful
How do you think it 
would be improved?
“Redesigning of card (signs of stress not of illness)” 1  
Integrate into system (CPA) 9 
“Give indication that card has been done” 1  
“Regular review of contents of booklet” 1  
“Draw it up with the consultant” 1  
“Have it in electronic format” 1
Would you want to 
use it again?
Yes 6 
No 1
Table 27: Consultant psychiatrists’ responses to the follow-up questionnaire
Numbers are the actual number of consultants that gave each response.  Where percentages add to 
less than 100% data were missing.
213Very few of them  (n=9) remembered that the patient had  an advance  statement, 
saw  it,  used  it  or  found  it  useful  in  the  management  of  that  patient.  Five 
consultants who found it useful said that the booklet helped them to understand the 
patient’s  values  and  experiences  and  it  was  used  as  the  basis  for  the  Care 
Programme Approach meeting.  Those who  did not  find it useful  (n=19),  gave a 
variety  of  reasons  that  ranged  from:  “the  patient  did  not  want  to  use  it”, 
“unrealistic  preferences  given ”,  “not  integrated  into  the  CPA ”,  and 
“consultant/team were not aware o f it” (see Table 27).
The implications of the above findings will be discussed in the following chapter.
214Care Programme Approach key-workers ’ responses to follow-up questionnaire
Care  Programme  Approach  (CPA)  key-workers  returned  the  semi-structured 
questionnaire about the usefulness of the advance statement on only twelve of the 
79 patients in the intervention arm (Table 28). Their responses to closed questions 
such as “Do you remember if this patient had a preference for care booklet?” were 
counted and the actual number of responses is presented in Table  10. When open 
ended questions were asked (e.g. If Yes why?), their responses are presented either 
verbatim or coded into categories (see Table 28).
215Do you remember if 
this patient had a 
preference for care 
booklet?
Yes 4 (33%)  No 8 (67%)
Have you got it? Yes 2 (17%)  No 10 (83%)
Can you access it 
easily?
Yes 3 (25%)  No 8 (67%)
If Yes how did you 
use it?
1  response
"As a basis talk about his hospital admissions to try and develop 
some insight into these and his illness. Unfortunately his 
preferences were quite unrealistic due to his lack of insight into how 
he gets ill.”
If No why not? 
9 responses
“Because some of the patient’s requests are beyond my capacity and 
are colluding with his illness. The patient’s perception is distorted 
by his mental disability so he is asking to be respected when he is 
meaning to have done exactly what he wants.” (1)
“I can’t remember if I gave it to the patient or not.” (1)
Don’t remember seeing it or I am afraid I am not aware of this 
booklet. (6)
“He was transferred to another sector on his discharge.  I did not 
have the opportunity to deal with this matter.” (1)
How useful do you 
think this instrument
is?
4 (33%) not useful at all 
1  (8)%) moderately useful 
7 (58%) don’t know
How do you think it 
would be improved?
“It is very difficult with psychiatric patients due to the distortions of 
perception.”!
“Key workers to be involved in this initiation at the very 
beginning.” 1
“If it could be updated after every admission and used ongoingly.”
1
“The booklet is fragile.  It needs to be more durable.” 1
Would you want to 
use it again?
Yes 3 
No 8
Table 28: CPA key-workers responses to the follow-up questionnaire
Numbers are the actual number of consultants that gave each response.  Where percentages add to 
less than 100% data were missing.
216Similarly to consultant psychiatrists, very few CPA key-workers remembered that 
the patient had  an advance  statement or found  it useful.  They also  reported that 
they did not have a copy of it that could be accessed easily. An example of how 
one CPA key-worker used the advance statement was:  “as a basis to talk about the 
patient’ s  hospital admissions and helped him  develop some insight into these and 
his  illness.  Unfortunately,  his preferences were quite unrealistic due to his lack of 
insight into how he gets ill” (see Table 28).
Most CPA key-workers reported they did not use the booklet mainly because they 
were  not  aware  of it,  the  patient’s  preferences  colluded  with  his  illness  or  the 
patient was transferred to another sector.
When  CPA key-workers  were  asked  about how  the  advance  statement could be 
improved, they said it should be made more durable, that they should be involved 
in its design and  drafting,  it  should be reviewed regularly and probably be used 
with a different psychiatric population.
The implications of the above findings will be discussed in the following chapter.
217Chapter summary
This chapter focused on the  findings of the preference  for care booklets  and the 
participants’  and  professionals’  views  on  the  usefulness  of  the  booklet.  In 
summary, patients presented their views in relation to signs of lapses and relapses, 
and their preferences and refusals on certain aspects of their treatment and needs 
whilst  hospitalised.  A  proportion  of them  also  stated  they  valued  the  booklet. 
There  was  a  consensus  of  views  among  consultant  psychiatrists’  and  Care 
Programme  Approach  key-workers  to  the  follow-up  questionnaire.  Despite  the 
fact  that  copies  of the  advance  statements  were  placed  at  the  front  of patients’ 
hospital notes and sent to consultant psychiatrists and Care Programme Approach 
key-workers, very few of them remembered or saw or found the booklets useful. 
Contrary to patients’ views and expectations, some of the professionals thought the 
patients’ preferences for care were unrealistic. In the next chapter, the implications 
of the findings of the preference for care study will be discussed.
218PART IV
DISCUSSION 
CHAPTER 9
Aims of the study
The  preference  for  care  study  is  a  pragmatic,  randomised  controlled  trial  that 
aimed to evaluate:
•  Whether  the  use  of advance  statements  by  sectioned  patients  who  are  near 
discharge  from  section,  leads  to  lower  rates  of compulsory  readmission  to 
hospital.
•  Whether patients  who  have  completed psychiatric  advance  statements  report 
higher self-efficacy.
•  Whether patients  who  have  completed psychiatric  advance  statements  report 
higher satisfaction with psychiatric services.
In this chapter,  I will discuss the results of the study against the hypotheses I set 
out to test, the methodological limitations of the preference for care study within 
the context of similar theoretical and empirical evidence, the impact of psychiatric 
advance  statements  for sectioned patients within the current legal  guidelines  and 
future evaluations of such documents.
219Summary of results in relation to main hypotheses
Hypothesis  1:  sectioned  patients’  advance  statements  for psychiatric  treatment, 
when disseminated in written form to key-workers and general practitioners and 
included  in  patients’  case  records  will  reduce  the  frequency  of compulsory  re­
admissions to hospital.
The first hypothesis is rejected because users’  advance instruction directives had 
no  impact  on  the  rates  of compulsory  re-admission  during  the  12  months  of 
follow-up.  The  same  finding  applied  for  number  of days  spent  on  subsequent 
sections, days as an in-patient on a subsequent voluntary admission or number of 
patients re-admitted voluntarily.
Hypothesis  2:  Sectioned  patients  who  have  completed  advance  statements  for 
psychiatric treatment will report higher self-efficacy than patients who have not. 
No  significant  difference  was  found  in  self-efficacy  scores  between  the 
experimental and control group at follow-up which led to rejection of the second 
hypothesis
Hypothesis  3:  sectioned  patients  who  have  completed  advance  statements  for 
treatment  will  report  higher  satisfaction  with  psychiatric  services  than  patients 
who  have  not.  The  third  hypothesis  was  also  rejected  because  there  were  no 
significant differences in satisfaction with services at follow-up.
Summary of results in relation to predictors of outcomes
Two variables were important in predicting subsequent sectioned admissions: the 
number of previous admissions and household composition. It appeared that two 
or more previous admissions increased the odds of re-admission to almost two and 
a  half times  that  of  someone  who  had  one  or  no  previous  admissions.  Also, 
someone who lived alone was approximately twice as likely to be re-admitted as 
someone who lived with a partner, parent or other.
220Summary of results in relation to other outcomes
There were no significant differences between the intervention and control groups 
in terms of baseline characteristics concerning hospital care (time spent in hospital 
the year before the index admission and the number of admissions in the previous 
five years).  However, patients in the advance statement group  spent less time in 
hospital during the index admission than those in the control group.
Mental health status at baseline, as assessed by the BASIS-32 and HoNOS, did not 
differ  significantly  between  the  two  groups.  However,  patients  in  both  groups 
reported  fewer  symptoms  of mental  illness  at  baseline  and  more  symptoms  of 
mental illness at follow-up. There was no indication on other parameters that the 
patients’ clinical state had deteriorated by the time of follow-up.
Summary of findings from the Preference for Care booklet and 
the patients’ and professionals’ views on the usefulness of the 
booklet
The  content  of the  preference  for  care  booklet  revealed  that  sectioned  patients 
were able to draw up advance statements similar to those of other populations with 
mental health problems (18;25;85;92). The psychiatric advance statements of this 
study, contained statements on first signs of relapse, statements about what should 
be done at the first sign of relapse, who to contact at the time of relapse, advance 
refusals  of specific  treatments  and treatment preferences.  Sectioned patients  did 
not  use  the  directives  as  an  opportunity  to  refuse  all  treatment.  Instead,  they 
refused  certain prescribed medication  due  to  side  effects  (e.g.  haloperidol),  and 
expressed  their  wishes  against  use  of force,  coercion  and  intrusion before  they 
became hospitalised and during hospitalisation.
Three-quarters of patients at follow-up remembered having drawn up an advance 
statement  but  only  a  small  percentage  of those  found  it  useful.  The  ones  who 
found it useful reported that it was used as a ‘reality-check’ to help them evaluate 
their condition, or as a way of seeking care and engaging themselves in activities 
that might improve their condition and quality of life.
221In only five instances did the psychiatric consultants who returned questionnaires 
find the directives useful in increasing their understanding of their patients’ values 
and  subjective  experiences  and  serving  as  a  tool  for  patients’  empowerment. 
Overall,  Care  Programme  Approach  key-workers,  did  not  find  the  advance 
statement  useful.  Consultant psychiatrists  and  Care  Programme Approach key­
workers who were aware of the booklet still did not find it useful. They claimed 
that it was not integrated into the patient’s care plan or they were not involved in 
the  process  of drawing  up  the  booklet.  Some  consultants  and  care  programme 
approach key-workers believed that patients would have impractical preferences. 
The  data  from  patients  suggested  desire  for  reasonable  and  relatively  small 
changes such  as better quality hospital  facilities  (e.g.  “A  room  without traces of 
violence”,  ‘‘My own room ”). However, within the limited resources of the service 
these requests might still be impossible to meet.
222Methodological limitations
Recruitment
Six hundred and five in-patients were assessed for eligibility during baseline. Of 
those,  372  did not meet inclusion criteria,  27 refused to participate and 45  were 
discharged  too  early  or  without  notice.  Although  this  is  a  large  number  of 
excluded participants, it is not unusual in this type of research. Psychiatric patients 
are considered one of the most difficult groups of the population to do research 
with (29;75;149;159). Although the exclusion criteria were kept to a minimum, a 
large  number  of psychiatric  patients,  mainly  at  St  Ann’s  hospital,  were  people 
from ethnic minorities who were unable to read and write English.
Other reasons for excluding some of the 372 patients were lack of mental capacity, 
presence of organic and psychoactive substance use disorders and those on other 
specialised sections of the Mental Health Act 1983.  Significantly more male than 
female patients participated in this study which is a characteristic of the sectioned 
population in this country (160).
Only 27 (6%) eligible participants refused to participate in the study. This is a low 
figure and indicates that either the majority of patients were genuinely interested 
in the study or were eager to comply with any professional who approached them 
before  they  were  discharged.  My  impression  was  that  they  were  genuinely 
interested in the  study and is  supported by the fact that more than 70% of them 
accepted to be interviewed at follow-up.
Some may argue  that  considering  sections  2,  3  and 4  of the Mental Health Act 
(1983)  together  meant  that  this  study  recruited  a  heterogeneous  population. 
Although there are no official statistics that give detailed profiles of the different 
individuals on these three sections, I believe that the three sections target similar 
individuals.  Sections  2,  3  and 4  come  under Part  II  of the  Mental  Health  Act 
(1983) and aim to protect the health and safety of individuals who suffer from a 
mental health problem and those of the society in which they live. According to 
government  statistics  for  the  period  of the  study,  the  majority  of patients  on 
section 4 were transferred to either section 2 or 3, and the majority of people in
223sections 2 and 3 were changed to informal (160). This suggests that individuals in 
the three groups were not different in terms of the course of their mental health 
illness.  In  addition,  statistical  analyses  showed  that  patients  were  evenly 
distributed by type of section at the baseline of the study suggesting that basis for 
admission had no biasing influence on the representatives of the sample.
The  recruitment  of  sectioned  patients  in  this  study  could  possibly  limit  the 
generalisability and usefulness of the results to the general psychiatric population 
which includes voluntary psychiatric patients and those cared for by community 
based  psychiatric  teams.  The  study  aimed  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of 
psychiatric  advance  statements  for sectioned patients because the autonomy and 
self-determination  of this  particular  group  of psychiatric  patients  are  especially 
limited.  The  design  of a  pragmatic  randomised  controlled  study  such  as  the 
present one could only target one group of the psychiatric population. Of course a 
different  study design  could have  included  several  groups but would have been 
more expensive to run.
224Randomisation
The present study was a pragmatic, between groups, randomised controlled trial. 
These  trials  aim  to  evaluate  an  intervention  (in  this  case  the  effectiveness  of 
psychiatric advance statements) in everyday clinical practice. The strength of this 
randomised study lies in its design and consequently the elimination of allocation 
bias or risk of confounding. No obvious differences in characteristics between the 
two  groups  at baseline  assessment were  detected,  suggesting that randomisation 
had minimised bias.
However,  some may argue that the  study was still subject to biases.  These may 
have  involved  patients’  preferences,  lack  of  blinding  of  investigator  being 
recruited for the study and non-random losses of participants at follow-up. Patients 
did  not  express  strong  preferences  in  this  study  and  seemed  to  understand  my 
explanation that the effectiveness of psychiatric advance statements had not been 
tested so that two groups needed to be compared to find out if psychiatric advance 
statements would make any difference to readmission rates.  Another explanation 
for the participants’ compliance may be the time at which I recruited the patients. 
Patients near discharge  from section, and in most cases from hospital, were very 
eager  to  leave  the  hospital  and  may  have  been  more  likely  to  comply  with 
professionals’ requirements. Although I was not part of the clinical teams and the 
participants  were  aware  of  that,  they  may  have  felt  compelled  to  comply. 
However, I attempted to remove this potential bias by use of an information sheet 
and by verbal explanation making it clear that their refusal to participate would not 
affect their care in any way. Yet another explanation may be the participants’ lack 
of deeper understanding of the issues involved in the process of giving informed 
consent or of the purpose of the trial. Although the informed consent letter and the 
summary of the study explained very clearly and simply the randomisation process 
this  particular  sample  may lack the  cognitive  abilities  necessary to  process  this 
type  of information.  One  solution would have been to  add  a test to  check their 
understanding.  This was not done as would have been very time consuming and 
impractical in an already long interview process.  The feasibility study suggested 
that increase in the length of interview would be difficult for patients. However, a 
full  pilot  study  (limited  by time  and  financial  constraints)  was  not  carried  out.
225Furthermore, the possibility that the patients did not completely understand what 
they  were  being  asked  to  do  may  have  contributed  to  the  lack  of detectable 
differences between groups at final analysis.
As I previously mentioned in the methods section, blinding of the participants was 
impossible  in  this  study  as  they  had  to  write  down  their preferences  for  care. 
Blinding  of the  researchers  was  also  impossible  as  I was  required to  assist the 
participants  to  complete  the  preference  for  care  booklet.  Outcome  assessments 
however,  could have been done by someone  else blind to the  experimental  and 
control groups.  A different type of design would have been required in order to 
blind  the  researchers.  For  example,  a  researcher  could  have  approached 
participants and obtained informed consent, then an independent interviewer such 
as a patients’ advocate could have randomised and helped patients to complete the 
booklets while yet another researcher could have collected, recorded and analysed 
the data.  However,  since the primary outcome was  an objective measure which 
could not be  influenced by the researcher, blinding did not seem  essential.  This 
would in any case have been beyond the resources available for the study.
A final argument against the validity of this study might be the non-random losses 
of participants  at  follow-up.  However, the primary outcome  (re-admission rates) 
of this trial was not subject to the constraints of missing data.  It is unlikely that 
such biases  applied  to  the  secondary outcome measures  such  as  BASIS-32  and 
hospital  satisfaction  because  firstly the  follow-up  rate  was  particularly high  for 
this population (75% of the experimental and 71% for the control) and secondly 
statistical  analyses  between  completers  and  non-completers  did  not  show  any 
significant  differences  in baseline  characteristics  between the  two  groups.  The 
only  statistically  significant  difference  between  non-completers  was  found  in 
satisfaction with services. Non-completers in the preference  for care group were 
more  satisfied  with  services  at  baseline.  Purely  by  chance  the  randomisation 
process  could  lead to  this  imbalance.  Another interpretation could be that those 
who were satisfied with the services that they received in hospital decided that it 
was not worth continuing with the study. Other interpretations could be that they 
could be a more passive group with less interest in being involved or they were 
just happy to leave it to professionals.
226Power of the study
Although, hospital data of sectioned admissions in the previous year were used to 
calculate the  sample  size,  fewer patients than expected (about  10%  fewer) were 
compulsorily  readmitted  in  both  arms  of the  trial.  This  led  to  lower  statistical 
power than predicted.  However, the difference between trial arms in proportions 
of  patients  readmitted  under  section  was  so  small  that  inadequate  power  is 
unlikely to  be  an  explanation.  Although  this  drop  may  simply reflect  a  secular 
trend  in  the  trial  area,  it  runs  counter  to  the  increased  number  of involuntary 
admissions in England from 23,725 in  1996-1997, to 25,415 in  1997-1998 (160). 
This could be a classic Hawthorne effect.  Professionals in both arms of the trial 
may have modified their behaviour in response to being observed in a trial that 
concerned  patients’  preferences  and  subsequent  rehospitalisation.  Professionals 
would have had to be unaware of the trial which was not feasible as I had to obtain 
their  opinion  about  patients’  competence  and  their  permission  to  approach 
patients.  Finally,  there  is  a possibility that  figures  for readmissions  during the 
period were unusually high.
227Choice of outcome measures
One of the limitations of this study is the concentration on distal outcome such as 
compulsory  re-admission  instead  of proximal  outcomes  in  the  process  of care. 
Psychiatric  advance  statements  as  a  form  of  anticipatory  planning  for  future 
treatment may exert some beneficial effect on therapeutic alliance, communication 
and continuity in community-based treatment before they affect distal outcomes. 
The benefit of choosing services data for evaluation of primary outcomes lies in 
two premises:
•  It is readily available for all participants.
•  It is not affected by drop out rates from research follow-ups.
However, as this study has shown, the interpretation of such data may be difficult. 
Was the rate of compulsory re-admission lower because professionals already took 
account of their patients’ preferences or because patients were clinically improved 
for  other  reasons  (e.g.  intense  community-based  treatment)?  If  patients  were 
clinically improved why did they report more symptoms on Basis-32 at follow-up 
in comparison to the baseline?  One might argue that near discharge patients had 
less insight into their problems (or were concerned to present themselves as being 
well) than one year later, when they reported their difficulties more frankly. The 
absence  of other  signs  of clinical  deterioration  would  add  extra  support  to  that 
argument.  To resolve the problem of interpreting distal outcomes the addition of 
proximal  measures  of  outcome  would  have  been  helpful.  These  could  have 
involved observational methods and/or videotaping of clinical consultations (e.g. 
to  evaluate  therapeutic  alliance  and  communication),  interviews  and 
questionnaires.
Another limitation of this study is the use of the generalised self-efficacy scale at 
follow-up.  Although  research  has  shown  that  post-treatment  rather  than  pre­
treatment  self-efficacy  is  a better predictor  of reporting  higher  self-efficacy  (in 
other words reporting increased confidence in  achieving aims  such  as managing 
one’s own mental health and voluntarily admitting oneself to hospital), it would be 
more informative for the  study of this population to have a baseline comparison 
(130;146).  In addition,  future studies  should incorporate Pearlman et al’s (1995) 
model  that takes  into  account the multiple psychological processes that underlie
228psychiatric  advance  planning  (141).  As  mentioned  in  chapter  3,  complex 
interventions such as the implementation of psychiatric advance statements require 
detailed planning and assessment of the participants’ psychological motivators and 
coping  mechanisms.  Similar  measures  are  needed  in  other  health  promotion 
activities  (e.g.  smoking  cessation  and  weight  loss)  to  study  factors  that  will 
facilitate  or  hinder  the  uptake,  design,  implementation  and  revocation  of such 
documents. Unfortunately, the time scale and funding for the preference for care 
study did not allow for such interventions.
Choice of the listwise or casewise approach for missing cases
For  missing  cases  the  listwise  or  casewise  approach  was  used  which  means 
excluding the whole case from the analysis. The remaining samples may be not a 
fair reflection  of the  population  from  which  they were presumably drawn.  The 
limitations of this approach are that the low sample sizes lead to lower power and 
the  possibility  of  type  II  error.  However,  as  mentioned  above,  the  primary 
outcome measure of the study was not affected by this approach because we were 
able to obtain information on 100% of the participants from their case notes.
229Predictors of outcome and detention under the Mental Health Act 1983
Although the number of psychiatric beds decreased during the  1990s in England 
and Wales, the number of sectioned admissions under Part II of the Mental Health 
Act  1983 almost doubled (160).  What are the causes of this paradox? A number 
of different hypotheses appear in the literature that include the following (195):
•  Pressure  to  release psychiatric  beds  may  lead  to  premature  discharges  from 
hospital consequently increasing the likelihood of re-admission under a section 
of the Mental Health Act.
•  Lack of psychiatric beds may lead to delay of patients’ admissions to the point 
where their deterioration requires admission under the Mental Health Act.
•  Due to lack of psychiatric beds mental health professionals may have become 
more conscious about the safety of the patients and the public, especially, after 
publicised  scandals  of homicides  committed  by  people  with  mental  health 
problems.
An important finding of the present study was that participants with two or more 
previous  admissions  were  almost  two  and  a  half times  more  likely  to  be  re­
admitted under section than those with one or no previous admissions. The above 
hypotheses could explain this finding.
Another  significant  change  in  the  official  figures  for  sectioned  admissions 
between  1988-1999,  which  was  also  apparent  in  this  trial,  was  the  increase  in 
detentions  of male  patients.  The  Office  for National  Statistics  for  England  and 
Wales  (2002),  has  reported  that  this  trend might be  due  to  the  effect  of 1980s 
recession that drove more men than women to unemployment (160). An increase 
in one-person households (that has been among men under the age of 65) and male 
actual  or  attempted  suicide  rates  may  be  another  underlying  factor  of  these 
changes in the Act.  In the present study statistical analysis showed, that someone 
who lived alone was approximately twice as likely to be re-admitted as someone 
who lived with a partner, parent or other.  This  finding is in accordance with the 
above trends and might be explained by social changes in the last decade.
More specific targeting of particular groups might lead to increased usefulness of 
psychiatric advance statements.
230Assessment of  mental capacity
A formal test of assessment of sectioned patients’ mental capacity was not part of 
the study because one of the inclusion criteria for the study was competent adults 
of 18 years and over. Clinicians indicated to me patients that they considered to be 
competent before  I  approached  any participant.  I relied on this  opinion and my 
own  assessment  that  the  patients  understood  the  process  and  content  of the 
interview  and they were  able to weigh the pros  and cons of participation in the 
trial by re-stating in their own words their understanding of the concepts and the 
processes  involved.  Although  this  may  be  a  limitation  of the  study,  I  do  not 
believe  it  undermines  its  validity  because  clinicians  always  determine  the 
competence of the sectioned population in the first place. According to the clinical 
teams  at  St  Ann’s  and  the  Royal  Free  hospitals,  a  significant  proportion  of 
sectioned  patients,  especially  those  with  the  most  chronic  illness,  were  not 
competent  to  participate  in  the  study.  The  reasons  for  exclusion  included  the 
patients’  impaired  cognitive  abilities  to  understand,  retain,  believe  and  weigh 
evidence in relation to their treatment and arrive at informed choices.  Clinicians 
who worked closely with these patients gave me a number of examples relating to 
the above functions.  Of the patients they referred to the study, only six were not 
able  to  comprehend  the  information  presented  to  them  thus  excluded  from  the 
study. I therefore considered the clinicians assessment to be adequate to satisfy the 
inclusion criteria.
However, I believe that future research should incorporate a formal assessment of 
competence. Research evidence has shown that the most appropriate instrument to 
date  for  the  evaluation  of  mental  capacity  is  the  MacArthur  Competence 
Assessment Tool  for Treatment Decisions  (MacCAT-T) which assesses  abilities 
related to each of the four legal standards for mental capacity. This instrument is 
valid and reliable and requires  15-20min to administer (114). The most important 
advantage of using a scale such as MacCAT-T for research purposes, is to clarify 
decisions  about competence in borderline  situations.  Using the  scale will ensure 
that researchers have covered the full range of abilities that should be considered 
in  making  competence  judgements,  it  will  provide  documentation  of  the 
researchers’ care in informed consent disclosure and inquiry, it will help structure
231the  researchers’  reasoning  about  mental  capacity,  and  it  will  equip  researchers 
with evidence they could use to explain to third parties how the final judgement 
was made. Use of scales also ensures studies are comparable. The disadvantage of 
using a mental capacity test in studies like ours is that they will prolong an already 
lengthy interview process which may discourage patients from continuing in the 
study.
232Effect of the booklet
The decision that the patients  should prepare the psychiatric  advance statements 
outside the Care Programme Approach meetings was based on three main factors:
•  The limited time and expertise of clinicians in issues of advance care planning,
•  The belief that mental health professionals outside the patient’s team would be 
unbiased and more likely to advocate the patient’s rights and preferences.
•  The unclear legal status of psychiatric advance statements in this country at the 
time the study began.
The first factor was made clear to our research team during the meetings we had 
with  the  mental  health  teams  at  the  two  hospitals.  Early  research  findings  in 
studies  of the medical  advance  statements  suggested the  second  factor might be 
relevant  (53;64).  However,  our  study  suggests  that  developing  the  psychiatric 
advance statement outside these meetings and placing the record at the front of the 
hospital notes may not be the most appropriate way to evaluate the effectiveness 
of such  instruments.  Some  may  argue  that  filling  out  a piece  of paper will  not 
work  unless  the  treating  team  is  involved.  This  was  not  the  case  in  this  study 
because I and the other researcher went to great lengths (e.g. talking to nurses and 
psychiatrists both face-to-face and on the phone about the advance statement) to 
make  sure  that  the  treating team was  aware  of the patients’  preference  for care 
booklet.  We  also  sent  copies  of the  booklet  to  all  parties  responsible  for  the 
patient’s  care.  Our  findings  are  supported  by  the  Bradford  Advance  Statement 
project that involved a considerable amount of developmental work with mental 
health  professionals  and  service  users  for  the  advance  statements  to  be 
implemented  (29;75;196).  Despite  the  extensive  developmental  work,  the 
Bradford  Advance  Statement  project  also  failed  to  develop  a  model  of good 
practice for the use of psychiatric advance statements because advance statements 
were not incorporated into existing Trust policy.  As the authors suggest, “due to 
the current legal status of advance statements, accountability for the inclusion of a 
statement  in  decisions  made  about  an  individual’s  care  and  treatment  would 
ideally  come  from  within  Trust  policy.  This  would  involve  the  acceptance  of 
advance statements as a useful tool of communication between service users and 
service providers.”(29) (p.3) Greater involvement of professionals and patients in 
the emerging design of any future studies would be essential.
233A  further  reason  that  might  have  contributed  to  the  lack  of awareness  of the 
advance  statement  in  this  study,  was  that  the  participating  psychiatric  units 
suffered the lack of resources typical of inner-city areas and the professionals were 
struggling  to  cope  with  the  administration  of the  Care  Programme  Approach, 
which  formalises  the  process  of  community  psychiatric  care  in  England  and 
Wales. Frequent changes of key-worker might also have led to confusion about the 
purpose  of  the  statements  or  the  ignorance  of  their  existence  which  the 
professionals’  views revealed. Key-workers in one psychiatric service were often 
not allocated before patients were discharged, which might also have reduced the 
impact  of  the  booklets.  Moreover,  the  advance  statement  was  sometimes 
regarded as an administrative burden by staff, who assumed that their management 
already took into account of patients’ wishes. These difficulties, however, are not 
uncommon features of psychiatric services in large metropolitan areas, and are an 
expected  part  of  any  realistic  setting  in  which  advance  statements  would  be 
implemented.
Another reason for the lack of incorporation of the psychiatric advance statements 
into  the  clinical  work  of  the  mental  health  professionals  might  be  that  they 
considered that they had  already incorporated patients’  views adequately.  Future 
studies,  could  test  these  claims  by  asking  mental  health  professionals  to  guess 
patients’  preferences  for  treatment  and  comparing  them  with  actual  ones. 
However,  data  from  studies  in  general  medicine  have  shown  that  primary  and 
secondary care clinicians were not accurate in predicting their patients’ treatment 
or non-treatment preferences (70;71).
Unfortunately,  however,  use  of  the  Mental  Health  Act  may  make  sectioned 
patients in the study group fearful and suspicious of service personnel. Agreeing 
advance statements with their own mental health professionals may mean that they 
feel unable to be frank about their care with those who deliver it. In this study, the 
advance  statement  was  therefore  drawn  up  with  someone  independent  of the 
patient’s  care.  To  achieve  such  independence  in  routine  settings,  a  patient 
advocate might be involved. Due to limited funding of this study, this could not be
234incorporated.  However,  this  could  risk  diminishing  the  treating  professionals’ 
sense  of ‘ownership’,  or commitment to  honour the terms  of the  statement  and 
might have an  effect on distal  outcome measures  such  as patient re-admissions. 
The  latter  and  the  confusing  legal  guidelines  for  the  implementation  of  such 
instruments  in  this  country  minimise  any  effect  interventions  such  as  the 
preference for care study may have. As the only successful study in this area has 
shown,  for advance  statements to be  successfully implemented,  they have to be 
incorporated into existing Trust policy and formulated jointly by the patient and 
his/her mental health team (e.g. care co-ordinator, psychiatrist and project worker)
(19).
235Findings from the Preference for Care booklets
Limitations of content analysis
Although the  advance  statements had no  impact on subsequent compulsory and 
voluntary  admissions  to  hospital,  content  analysis  of the  data  provided  a  rich 
source  of information  about  sectioned patients’  views  on  first  signs  of relapse, 
their  preferences  for  care  and  advance  refusals  of specific  treatments  if they 
became  ill  again,  who  to  contact  if they  relapsed,  and  specific  preferences  if 
relapse could not be prevented and they became hospitalised again.  One limitation 
related to  the content  analysis  of the preference  for care booklets  surrounds the 
development  of the  codes/themes  under the  different  statements  of the  booklet. 
One could  argue that the researchers’  background in psychology and psychiatry 
may have contaminated the data in that we developed categories that  ‘squeezed’ 
the data into pre-defined categories similar to those in the diagnostic manuals in 
psychiatry instead of allowing the categories to emerge from the data (191-194). 
For example, when a patient made a reference of “I notice I am becoming ill again 
when  I  hear  voices”,  both  researchers  created  the  code/theme  of  ‘Positive 
psychotic  symptoms’.  A  researcher  with  a  different  academic  and  professional 
background  may  have  provided  a  code/theme.  However,  the  funding  for  the 
preference for care study did not allow for the employment of another researcher 
who  could  undertake  that responsibility.  Future  studies  could  explore this  area 
further.
Another  limitation  of  the  content  analysis  of  this  study  refers  to  lack  of 
triangulation  because  the  nature  of  the  study  did  not  allow  for  respondent 
validation (191).
The findings on signs of relapse
Answers to the first two statements of the preference for care booklet showed very 
clearly  that  sectioned  patients  had  adequate  insight  and  understanding  into  the 
precipitating  factors of their lapses  and relapses.  According to their statements, 
precipitating  factors  included  exacerbation  of their  psychiatric  symptoms  (e.g. 
positive  and/or negative psychotic  symptoms),  non-compliance with medication,
236use  of alcohol  and  drugs,  relationship  problems  and  social,  financial  and  work 
problems. None of the few existing studies on the content of advance statements 
has  reported  what  psychiatric  patients’  first  signs  of relapse  are  which  makes 
comparison  of our  findings  difficult  (18;25;85;92).  However,  the  precipitating 
factors cited by our sample are within the range of expected signs of relapse for 
that group of psychiatric patients.
The  findings  on  patients’  preferences  for  care  if they  relapsed  and  were 
admitted to hospital again
The  core  preferences  of patients  included  more  talking  therapies,  more  service 
input,  support  to  take  their  medication,  family  and  social  support,  informal 
hospital  admissions  and  treatment  in  the  community,  increased  and  better 
communication with mental health professionals. When the patients were asked to 
express their preferences  for care in case they were re-admitted to hospital they 
requested  better  hospital  facilities  (e.g.  “a  room  without  traces  of violence”), 
alternative therapies, avoidance of coercion, improved human rights, more say and 
explanations  in  treatments.  Our  findings  are  in  accordance  to  those  of similar 
studies  (25;85;92).  Amering  et  al’s  (2005)  study suggested,  that “much thought 
was  given  to  ensuring  that  the  advance  directives  were  feasible  and  that 
preferences  fell  reasonably  within  the  range  of  options  of  the  mental  health 
system.” (85) (p. 249) The preference for care study also supports this finding.
However, as mentioned in chapter 1, advance preferences for psychiatric care no 
matter how reasonable and  feasible they may appear to be, don’t have any legal 
weight  under  the  new  Mental  Capacity  Act  2005  or  the  report  of the  expert 
committee on the review of the Mental Health Act 1983 (27;28). As the preference 
for care study and the Bradford advance statements project have shown, the legal 
situation  in  this  country  influences  the  validity  of designing  and  implementing 
such documents outside existing Trust policies (29;31).
The findings on patients’ refusals
As previous studies on other psychiatric populations suggested, sectioned patients 
did not use the advance statements as an opportunity to refuse all treatment as is
237popularly supposed by their critics (18;25;85;92). This is an important finding that 
suggests that psychiatric  advance  statements could be used to  evaluate patients’ 
choice and compliance with different forms of treatment.
The  majority  of  our  patients  expressed  their  opposition  to  use  of 
force/coercion/intrusion. One patient wrote: “I wouldn’t want to be handled by the 
police or handcuffed”.  Another one wrote:  “I wouldn’t want people to  force me 
with their strength to take medication”.  Patients also reported that they wouldn’t 
want particular treatments  (mainly Haloperidol  and depot injections  due to their 
side-effects) and to be admitted to hospital by unknown staff. A few patients also 
reported boundary rules (e.g. unwanted contact from certain family members and 
others to be informed about their illness). These findings are also in accordance to 
those of similar studies (18;25;85;92).
Similarly  to  advance  preferences  for  psychiatric  care,  advance  refusals  for 
psychiatric care are not legally binding in this country (27;28).  As the draft code 
of practice  for  the  Mental  Capacity  Act  2005  suggests,  treatment  for  mental 
disorder could be given under the Mental Health Act  1983  without the patient’s 
consent “and even where the patient is making or has made a decision to refuse a 
particular treatment  for that particular condition.”(30)  (p.  91)  In contrast  to  the 
USA, where a few states have legally recognised the validity of advance refusals 
for  psychiatric  treatment  for  a  certain  period  of time  (up  to  45  days)  before 
treatment  could  be  given  under  the  Mental  Health  Act,  in  the  UK  the  current 
legislation still undermines psychiatric patients’  autonomy and self-determination 
by preventing them their right to exercise their wishes (33).
The findings on patients’ preferences to contact another individual in case they 
relapsed
In  response  to  the  statement  “I  would  like  you  to  contact...”,  52%  of patients 
asked  for  one  or  more  family  members  to  be  contacted.  In  addition,  48%  of 
patients asked for certain friends and certain professionals involved in their care to 
be  contacted  (e.g.  GP,  consultant psychiatrist,  lawyer,  social worker and  CPN). 
Only  one patient  stated  that no-one  must be  contacted.  These  findings  are  also 
supported  by  those  of  similar  studies  (18;25;85;92).  These  findings  could  be
238useful  for  the  treating  teams  who  could  focus  on  interventions  that  would 
strengthen the patients’  existing relationships. Furthermore, statistical analyses of 
the predictors of outcome in chapter 7, showed that patients who lived alone were 
twice  as  likely  to  be  re-admitted  as  someone  who  had  a  different  household 
composition.  Psychiatric  advance  statements  could  be  used  as  means  of 
identifying or even providing a proxy decision maker for the patient who could in 
turn monitor the management of their illness.  Such a proxy decision maker could 
obviously influence social support systems too.
In summary, the content of the patients’  advance statements in the preference for 
care  study was very similar to  that reported  in other studies.  Sectioned patients 
showed adequate insight and understanding into the precipitating factors of their 
lapses  and  relapses  and  chose  feasible  and reasonable  treatment preferences.  In 
addition,  they  did  not  use  the  advance  statements  to  refuse  all  psychiatric 
treatment, undermining a common criticism of the opponents of implementation of 
such documents.
239Patients’ views
Three-quarters of the patients at follow-up remembered that they had drawn up an 
advance statement. However, over half of them either did not remember what had 
become of it or had lost it. This suggests a lack of understanding of the importance 
of the instrument or a lack of affirmation of the booklet by staff (see below). The 
short feasibility phase of the preference for care study showed that the interview 
process was already long enough.  To add another long structured instrument that 
would  test  the  patients’  understanding  of  all  the  concepts  would  make  the 
interview process unmanageable by the patient within the context of this study. In 
addition, myself and the other researcher used our professional judgement to test 
the patients’  understanding by  asking  the patient  to  re-state  in their own  words 
what they understood when there were cues that the patient was uncertain about 
certain  concepts  and  procedures.  However,  a  different  study  design  such  as  a 
qualitative interview could  incorporate a test to check patients’  understanding of 
psychiatric  advance  statements  and  of randomised  controlled  trials  such  as  this 
one.
A  small  percentage  of patients  found  advance  statements  useful  mainly  as  a 
‘reality check’  to help them evaluate their condition, or as a way of seeking care 
and  engaging  themselves  in  activities  that  improved  their  condition  and,  as  a 
consequence, their quality of life. Three patients also mentioned the usefulness of 
the  booklet  as  a  means  for  improving  communication  with  ‘important  others’. 
These  factors  demonstrate the potential therapeutic value of psychiatric  advance 
statements in the promotion of patients’  self-determination in, and planning for, a 
time of anticipated incapacity.
Why did over 40% of our sample not find the advance statements useful? As the 
patients suggested this may have occurred because the professionals involved in 
their care did not refer to it or take account of it. As the study by Henderson et al 
(2004)  showed, joint  crisis  plans  that  are  developed  by the  patient  and  his/her 
mental  health  team  have  the  potential  to  reduce  compulsory  admissions  and 
increase  compliance  with  treatment  for  severe  mental  illness  (19).  In  addition,
240educational  interventions  tailored  at  improving  psychiatric  staff  awareness, 
involvement  of  service  providers  in  development  of  advance  statements  and 
ensuring that the various treatment providers (e.g. outpatient, inpatient, emergency 
and  crisis  services)  are  aware  of them  may  influence  the  effectiveness  of such 
instruments.  Education,  legal  aid  and clear,  concise training material would also 
help  patients  to  construct  effective  and  useful  psychiatric  advance  statements. 
Research  findings  regarding  medical  advance  statements  suggested  that 
counselling  by  hospital  patient  representatives  improved  recognition  and 
execution of the statements in acute medical wards (64). Brown et al (1999) have 
shown that mailing of written materials to participants increased placement of an 
advance statement in patients’ medical records substantially (65).
Furthermore, when the patients were asked if they would want to use the booklet 
again and if they would recommend it to other patients the majority of them said 
yes. This finding is in accordance to other findings reported by similar studies and 
may be interpreted  as  a genuine belief in the usefulness of such documents or a 
bias on the part of the patient to please the researcher (18;25;92). Future studies 
could incorporate an in-depth interview to explore this area further.
When  the  patients  were  asked  about  the  ways  in  which  the  advance  statement 
could be improved they suggested that a smaller size (e.g. like a bus pass) could be 
easier to  carry around and more time to  fill it in would help them to personalise 
the booklet. Both of these recommendations have been made by other psychiatric 
patients  in  other  studies  and  could  be  used  as  a  guide  for  future  research 
(18;85;92).  Some  patients  also  suggested  that  if the  booklet  had  more  clout  it 
could be more effective.  However,  lack of clarity surrounding the legal status of 
advance  statements  when  the  preference  for  care  study began,  undermined  the 
importance  of the  booklet  in  the  patients’  care.  Even  within  the  current  legal 
guidelines  (e.g.  the  report of the  expert  committee  on the review of the Mental 
Health  Act  1983  and  the  Mental  Capacity  Act)  implementation  of  advance 
statements would be problematic. Although these statements are recommended as 
part of good clinical practice,  the  final responsibility for their implementation is 
placed  on  the  different  Mental  Health  Trusts  without  the  provision  of  clear 
guidance as how to implement them (27;28;30).
241Finally, two patients reported that their instructions were not honoured and seven 
said  they did  not  need  to  invoke  them because  they did not  have  a relapse.  As 
other studies have reported, not honouring the patients preferences can undermine 
both the trust of the patients in the  study and their confidence  and trust in their 
clinical team (18;25).
242Professionals’ views
The response rate of mental health professionals to the follow-up questionnaire on 
the  usefulness  of psychiatric  advance  statements  was  very  low.  As  a result  the 
generalisability of our findings is limited.
In only five instances did the psychiatric consultants who returned questionnaires 
find  the  advance  statement  useful  for  the  patient’s  care  by  increasing  their 
understanding of the patients’  values and subjective experiences and serving as a 
tool for patients’ empowerment.
Some  mental  health  professionals  believed  that  the  patients  would  have  given 
unrealistic  preferences,  something  that  does  not  fit  with our data  from patients. 
Only  one  mental  health  professional  explained  what  they  meant  by  unrealistic 
preferences (e.g.  “unfortunately his preferences  were quite unrealistic  due to his 
lack of insight into how he gets ill”). In hindsight, an in-depth interview to identify 
what the consultants  and key-workers meant by unrealistic preferences would be 
more useful than just a semi-structured questionnaire. Unfortunately, the funding 
and  design  of the  preference  for  care  study  did  not  allow  for  more  in  depth 
qualitative work to be undertaken. Future studies could incorporate that element.
The majority of consultants who returned questionnaires did not find the booklet 
useful in the management of the patients often because they claimed that they were 
not  aware  of  its  existence,  despite  the  fact  that  the  booklets  were  displayed 
prominently at the  front  of each patient’s  case-notes throughout the  study.  I  and 
the other researcher identified the booklets at the front of the case-notes during the 
follow-up  phase,  a  year  after the patients’  discharge.  Many of those  who  were 
aware of the booklet still did not find it useful, claiming that it was not integrated 
into the patient’s care plan or they were not involved in the process of drawing up 
the booklet. Although in keeping with other published accounts of use of advance 
statements (53;66),  it is  surprising that briefing of health professionals about the 
statements, sending a copy for each patient to them and placing a further copy at 
the front of the medical notes, did not increase their awareness of the existence and 
possible usefulness of the booklets.  A consensus approach to the development of 
such  instruments  prior  to  any  study  (e.g.  pre-clinical  justification  for  the
243intervention  and  modelling-defining  the  intervention  and  understanding  the 
relationships between the  component parts)  might provide  a more  fertile ground 
for the  successful  implementation of the  advance  statements.  Unfortunately the 
funding of the preference for care study did not allow for such an extensive work 
to take place before the study began. However, as the Bradford advance statement 
project has shown, involving professionals and extensive education of patients still 
failed  to  enthuse  their  service  users  to  take  up  the  use  of advance  statements 
(29;75).  As  Thomas  (2004)  wrote,  “this  implies  a  more  fundamental  problem 
relating  to  power  and  powerlessness.  Psychiatry,  unlike  any  other  branch  of 
medicine, is the only specialty in which treatment is regularly given for extended 
periods  against  the  person’s  wishes.  Many  service  users  do  not  consider 
themselves  ill,  yet  find  themselves  forced  to  take  medication.  Another  way  of 
understanding  the  reluctance  of  service  users  to  plan  ahead  is  that  they  feel 
demoralised, disempowered, and oppressed by years of compulsion in the mental 
health  system.  We  must  be  circumspect  in  hoping  that  interventions  such  as 
advance  statements  will  change  the  situation.  Psychiatrists  are  not  the  only 
oppressors;  we  include  here  the  panoply  of  state  control  of  deviance, 
stigmatisation  by  society,  and  our  collective  social  intolerance  of difference.” 
(75)(p.  123)
Successful implementation of advance statements as Henderson et al (2004) have 
shown requires  a culture  change  and  a more  collaborative way of working with 
psychiatric patients (18; 19). Joint crisis cards and advance agreements may be the 
way forward. However, more studies are needed to confirm that Henderson et al’s 
(2004)  results  can  be  replicated  in  other  locations  and  different  settings  and 
preferably with patients leading the process of implementation rather than mental 
health professionals.  In addition, as Srebnik and Brodoff (2003) have suggested, a 
computerised  form  of the patients’  statements that would be  available to mental 
health  professionals  24  hours  a  day  and  specific  training  to  staff  on 
implementation issues before they are faced with such documents might help the 
psychiatric staff to comply with it (87).
244Summary of methodological issues
This  study has  increased our understanding of the design and implementation of
psychiatric advance statements.  I realise however, that it could have increased our
knowledge  even  further,  if certain  factors  had  been  incorporated  in  the  study’s
design. These could be summarised as follows:
•  A pilot phase that would justify and model the intervention.
•  A different sample of the psychiatric population and a different study design 
(e.g.  a  cluster  randomised  controlled  trial  with  inpatients  under  the  care  of 
community mental health teams and assertive outreach teams).
•  Choice  of  proximal  outcomes  (e.g.  therapeutic  alliance,  compliance  with 
treatment, strengthened relationships) rather than distal outcomes.
•  An  assessment  of  competence  for  making,  applying  and  revoking  the 
directives.
•  An assessment of the patients’ understanding of the importance of psychiatric 
advance statements.
•  A  pre-and-post-treatment  evaluation  of specific  self-efficacy beliefs  and  the 
implementation of a more complex psychological model that would take into 
account  the  whole  process  of  advance  care  planning  rather  than  the  end 
product of it which is the design and implementation of advance statements.
•  Incorporation  of  the  advance  statements  within  the  Mental  Health  Trust’s 
policy.
•  Involvement  of patients’  mental  health  professionals  and  advocates  in  the 
execution and implementation of such instruments.
245Future directions of research
The preference  for  care  study has  shown  that the  design  of psychiatric  advance 
statements by sectioned patients before they are discharged from section with the 
help  of an  independent  mental  health  researcher  does  not  have  any  impact  on 
future  voluntary  or  involuntary  admissions.  Throughout  this  discussion,  I  have 
considered  how  future  evaluations  could  be  modified  in  order to  maximise  the 
chances of success when undertaking studies in this area in the future. In summary, 
the  only  successful  trial  on  implementation  of  such  documents  so  far  by 
Henderson et al (2004) showed that future studies should incorporate and research 
different  types  and  forms  of advance  statements  such  as joint  crisis  cards  and 
advance agreements  (19).  However,  it is not clear from Henderson et al’s (2004) 
study who had control of the process of selection and initiation of joint crisis cards 
(e.g.  service  users  or  research  staff?)  and  what  training,  preparation  and 
development  work  took  place  with  users  and  staff (19).  Future  studies  should 
explore these areas further. In addition, future studies should explore integration of 
the  advance  statements  into  existing  Mental  Health  Trusts’  policies  in  different 
geographical  locations  in  the  UK  (e.g.  inner  city  versus  rural  areas)  and  with 
different  patient  groups  (e.g.  early  intervention  services  versus  long  term 
psychiatric  facilities).  Finally,  there  should  be  more  qualitative  assessments  of 
both mental  health professionals  and psychiatric patients before and  after  future 
trials that  involve  implementation of psychiatric  advance  statements.  Qualitative 
data could be gathered during in-depth interviewing in order to identify the issues 
that  are  involved  in  the  processes  that  facilitate  and/or  hinder  the  design  and 
successful implementation of advance statements.
246Chapter 10
Conclusions
Advance  statements  for psychiatric  care,  as implemented in this  study, had little 
impact on subsequent admission to hospital or on other secondary outcomes such 
as  clinical  and  social  status.  In  addition,  the  data  that  was  obtained  from  the 
advance  statements,  and  from  patients  and  professionals  in  relation  to  the 
statements,  reveal  that  patients  did  not  always  realise  the  importance  of  the 
booklets and were not encouraged to do so by mental health clinicians who were 
uncertain of their relevance and/or usefulness.
This  study,  is  probably  telling  us  that  without  buy-in  commitment  from 
professionals  and  patients,  psychiatric  advance  statements  will  not  affect 
outcomes. The only successful study from Henderson et al (2004) provides proof 
that  if mental  health  professionals  who  recognise  the  importance  of psychiatric 
advance  statements  are  in  administrative  positions  to  lead  projects  on  the 
implementation  of such  instruments,  studies can be  effective but not necessarily 
patient led. Most initiatives to do with patient choice now must be led by patients. 
Therefore the generalisability of Henderson et al’s (2004) study needs to show that 
the initiative can be led by patients (19).
Government legislation is also pushing towards more patient choice but American 
experience shows that legislation without clear guidelines of implementation and 
lack  of  24  hour  access  to  psychiatric  advance  statements  by  mental  health 
providers “may do little more than the act of scrawling ‘help’ on a scrap of paper, 
stuffing it into a bottle, and hurling it into the ocean.”(25) (p. 439)
Advocacy is one solution but it is difficult without equality of status. As the study 
by  Meier  et  al  (1996)  on  medical  advance  directives  has  shown,  providing 
counselling  to  patients  by  counsellors  from  the  hospital’s  office  of  patient
247representatives  who  are  trained  on  the  legal  aspects  of the  documents,  is  an 
effective way of increasing rates of completion in secondary care (64).
Finally,  gradual  change  in  society to  give more  emphasis to patients’  rights  and 
wishes and increasing desire for empowerment by patients, might provide fertile 
ground for successful implementation of psychiatric advance statements.
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263APPENDIX 1: Summary of the preference for care study
PREFERENCE FOR CARE STUDY
University Department of Psychiatry 
Royal Free Hospital 
 
Tel:  Ext. 
Fax: 
This study aims to demonstrate whether preferences for care provided by patients with severe 
mental illness have a positive impact on pathways to subsequent care including greater 
compliance with medication, less use of involuntary admissions and increased patient and 
professional satisfaction with services.
All patients admitted under sections 2, 3 and 4 to the acute psychiatric units of the Royal Free 
Hospital Hampstead Trust and St. Ann's Hospital, Tottenham will be eligible to take part. As 
close as is practicable to discharge from the section, each patient who gives informed consent 
will take part in a structured interview. This will assess the type of care encountered on the 
pathway to admission, their current mental state and their social functioning.  Information 
from the casenotes will also be recorded. After this assessment interview, patients will be 
randomly allocated into 2 groups. Patients in group 1  will not be asked any further questions 
and will receive standard care. Patients in group 2 will be asked in an open fashion about the 
circumstances of their admission under Section, their views about the procedure and how such 
a situation might have been managed differently. They will then be asked to complete a one 
page preference form in which they will state their wishes should the circumstances arise in 
the future that might lead to similar use of the Mental Health Act. Where possible, a close 
relative, friend  or carer will be involved in helping the patient identify preferences for future 
care, and the research fellow will liaise with relevant professionals to check the feasibility of 
the patient's choices. It will be stressed to patients (and relatives) that the preferences for care 
have no legal status. Neither patients nor professionals will be in any way bound by them. The 
preference forms obtained from patients in group 2 will be distributed to the patient and 
(where possible a relative/carer), their key worker, responsible medical officer, CPN, and 
general practitioner.
Follow-up: All patients will be followed up to 12 months. The follow-up will involve 
examination of the patients hospital records over the past year, and an interview involving 
brief questions about pathways to recent care and a structured questionnaire concerning their 
satisfaction with services over the previous year. Those in the preference for care group will 
also be asked whether their preferences were ever invoked and their view of the relevance and 
importance of what was contained in the preference form. The views of the relevant staff (key 
worker, consultant, CPN and GP) will also be obtained as to whether the preferences for care 
were ever acted upon, their views as to their usefulness for each patient, and the number of 
community visits they have made concerning each patient over the follow-up period.
If you would like further information please contact:
Alexia Papageorgiou, Research Fellow, Tel:   ext. 
264APPENDIX 2: Informed consent
STUDY OF PATIENTS’ ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Dear Sir/Madam,
We are studying people who have been admitted to hospital on section.
We would like you to take part in a short interview about how you are now. This 
includes your feelings as well as how you are getting on in the world socially.
Some of you will be asked to give us your instructions regarding what you would like 
done should you be faced with another compulsory admission in the future.
We will want to contact you again for a brief interview in about 12 months. We will 
also want to look at your records at that time.
If you do not wish to take part in this study your decision will not affect your care in 
any way.
Thank you for your help.
Prof Michael King  Dr Oliver Davidson
I _________________________________________________________________________
of_______________________________________________________________________
agree to take part in this study
Signed__________________________________   Date________________________
265APPENDIX 3: Basis-32 questionnaire
BASIS  32-C
Copyright  1985  by  Evaluative  Service  Unit,  McLean  Hospital
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273APPENDIX 5: Hospital Service Satisfaction scale
Hospital-Service Satisfaction
Listed below are a number of items relating to the care given by the hospital 
staff. We would like to know how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with all aspects 
of this service. Please make sure you answer all questions.
“What is your overall feeling about.................”
1. The amount of help you received.
5 excellent  4 mostly satisfied  3 mixed  2  mostly dissatisfied  1  terrible
2. The kind of service (offered).
5 excellent  4 mostly satisfied  3 mixed  2  mostly dissatisfied  1 terrible
3. How this service may have helped improve the relationship between you and your 
relatives/close friends.
5 excellent  4 mostly satisfied  3 mixed  2  mostly dissatisfied  1  terrible
4. How this service may have helped you to cope with your problems.
5 excellent  4 mostly satisfied  3 mixed  2  mostly dissatisfied  1  terrible
“What is your overall feeling about............... ”
5. How this service may have helped you establish good relationships with people 
outside your family (e.g. friends, neighbours, etc).
5 excellent  4 mostly satisfied  3 mixed  2  mostly dissatisfied  1   terrible
6. Willingness of the staff to understand your problems.
5 excellent  4 mostly satisfied  3 mixed  2 mostly dissatisfied  1   terrible
7. Respect given by staff for your rights as an individual.
5 excellent  4 mostly satisfied  3 mixed  2 mostly dissatisfied  1   terrible
8. In an overall or general sense, how satisfied are you with the service you have 
received.
5 excellent  4 mostly satisfied  3 mixed  2 mostly dissatisfied  1   terrible
9. To what extent do you think that the psychiatric treatment that are now 
receiving/have received is right for you?
5 excellent  4 mostly satisfied  3 mixed  2 mostly dissatisfied  1   terrible
274APPENDIX 6: Baseline additional information form
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
HOSPITAL NUMBER 
Name and Address of participant
Tel:
1. First ever section?  Yes__________No_________
2. Diagnosis_________________________________________
3. Name of Consultant___
4. Name of key-nurse____
5. Last ever job and when
6.  Name, address and telephone number of GP
7.  Name, address and telephone number of Social Worker
8. Date and Nature of discharge from section
i.e. a) Expired
b) Discharged by consultant
c) By Mental Health Tribunal
9. On Supervision Register? Yes_______ No_______
10. Number and length of previous admissions whether formal or informal in 
last five years________________________
275APPENDIX 8: Letter to patients’ GP
Date:
Re:
Dear Dr
We are studying patients who during their recent psychiatric admission to hospital 
have been on a Section. The above named patient has completed a “Preference for 
care” booklet which details early warning signs of illness and their wishes should their 
condition deteriorate. A copy of the booklet has been given to the patient, their key­
worker, and one placed in the medical notes. Enclosed is a copy for your notes. It is 
hoped that the instructions will be acted on whenever appropriate.
Patients will be followed up 1 year after entering the study, and we will assess 
whether the patient’s instructions had an impact on subsequent care e.g. improved 
satisfaction, compliance or less compulsory admissions. This may involve accessing 
minimal information from GP notes but we will contact you nearer the time if 
required.
Thank you for your help and participation in this study. Please contact me at the 
above number (ext.  ) if you require further information.
Yours sincerely
Alexia Papageorgiou (Research Fellow)
278APPENDIX 9: Follow-up letter to patients
29/10/99
Dear,
You may remember that in October 1998 you took part in the Preference for Care 
Study. As it was mentioned to you at the time I would like to see you a year later to 
find out how you have been, and whether you are happy with the care you have 
received.
I have already spoken to your CPA key-worker who suggested that if I could visit you 
at your place, it would be more convenient for you. I could come around your place 
next Thursday 4/11/99 at about lunchtime.
I would appreciate it if you could call me on   or   ext. 
 in order to confirm the appointment.
I am looking forward to hearing from you.
Yours sincerely
Alexia Papageorgiou 
Research Fellow
279APPENDIX 10: Follow-up letter to mental health professionals
Date:
Re:
Dear
We are studying patients who during their recent psychiatric admission to hospital 
have been on a Section of the Mental Health Act. The above named patient has 
participated in this study, the Preference for Care Study, and has been followed-up.
Enclosed is a short questionnaire and I would be grateful if you could complete it and 
return it to me at the address below (specify Block  ).
Thank you for your help and participation in this study. Please contact me at the 
following number  ) if you require further information.
Yours sincerely
Alexia Papageorgiou 
Research Fellow
280APPENDIX 11: Self-efficacy questionnaire
GENERALISED SELF-EFFICACY SCALE 
NAME:  ____  _____
DATE: RECORD NUMBER:
Not at  Barely  Moderately  Exactly 
all true  true  true  true
1.1 always manage to solve difficult 
problems if I try hard enough.
2. If someone opposes me, I can find 
means and ways to get what I want.
3. It is easy for me to stick to my aims 
and accomplish my goals.
4 .1 am confident that I could deal 
efficiently with unexpected events.
5.  Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know 
how to handle unforeseen circumstances.
6.1 can solve most problems if I invest the 
necessary effort.
7.1 remain calm when facing difficulties 
because I can rely on my coping abilities.
8. When I am confronted with a problem,
I usually find several solutions.
9. If I am in a bind, I can usually think of 
something to do.
10.No matter what comes my way, I am 
usually able to handle it.
11.1 can manage my own mental health.
12.1 can make decisions about my 
future care.
13.If I need hospitalisation in future 
I can voluntarily admit myself.
14.1 can contact my GP/KW/outpatient 
clinic, the next time I begin to relapse.
281APPENDIX 12: Patients’ follow-up questionnaire
Do you remember drawing up a preference for care booklet?
Do you still have it?
Could you show it to me?
If No what happened?
Was it ever used in your care the last year?
If yes whose idea was to use it?
Was it helpful?
If Yes how?
If No why not?
Would you want to use it again?
Would you recommend it to other patients?
In what way do you think it could be improved?
282APPENDIX 13: Semi-structured questionnaire on mental health professionals’ views regarding 
patients’ preference for care booklets
Do you remember if this patient had a preference for care booklet?
Did you ever see it?
Did you ever use it in the management of this patient? 
Did you find it useful in the management of this patient? 
If Yes why?
If No why not?
How usefiil do you think this instrument is? 
How do you think it would be improved? 
Would you want to use it again?
283APPENDIX 14: Follow-up additional information form
FOLLOW-UP
HOSPITAL NO_________
DATE:__________________
PATIENT’S DETAILS
NAME__________________
ADDRESS______________
TELEPHONE  "
NEXT OF KIN ADDRESS
TELEPHONE__________________
DISCHARGE DETAILS
DATE OF ADMISSION________ _
DATE OF DISCHARGE________
MEDICATION AT DISCHARGE
MEDICATION AT FOLLOW-UP
INITIAL TYPE OF SECTION  2 ^   2-3 ^   3 n   4 ^   4 -2 ^   4 -3 ^
DATES ON EACH SECTION_______________________________________________
DATES OF DISCHARGE FROM SECTION__________________________________
NATURE OF DISCHARGE FROM SECTION
a)  Expired
b)  Discharged by consultant
c)  By Mental Health Tribunal
WARD______________STUDY  NO____  P /C
D.O.B.
284DATES AND TYPES OF SECTIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT ADMISSION:
1)___ DATE____________________________TYPE OF SECTION
2)  DATE____________________________TYPE OF SECTION
3)  DATE____________________________TYPE OF SECTION
4)  DATE___________________________ TYPE OF SECTION
5)  DATE  TYPE OF SECTION
OUTPATIENT INFORMATION
NUMBER OF OUTPATIENT APPOINTMENTS BOOKED_____________________
NUMBER OF OUTPATIENT APPOINTMENTS KEPT_________________________
COMPLIANCE WITH DEPOT
REGIMEN (i.e. 1 weekly)_____________________________________________________
NO OF DEFAULTS__________________________________________________________
MENTAL HEALTH ACT
WHAT WAS THE CPA STATUS AT DISCHARGE? 1 ^   2 n   3 n   S R °  
FOR PATIENTS ON SUPERVISION REGISTER
DATE OF DISCHARGE OFF REGISTER_____________________________________
WHAT WAS THE SECTION RATE FROM ENTRY TO THE STUDY TO 
FOLLOW-UP?
285APPENDIX 15: An example of a completed preference for care booklet
Preference for care booklet #150
Statement 1: “I notice I am becoming ill again when I  ”
•  Loose my sleep
•  Take on too many tasks without completing them
Statement 2: “Things that happened just before I was placed on a section and/or 
started to become ill were..
•  Bursting out in tears
•  Take on too many tasks without completing them
•  I was not making any sense when talking to people 
Statement 3: “If I do seem to be becoming ill again I would like...”
•  To talk to someone who will understand my problems e.g. a counsellor
•  To be informed before sectioning about the reasons for being sectioned
•  My next of kin to have a saying in whether or not I  should be sectioned
Statement 4: “I would like you to contact...”
•  My mother
•  My brother
•  A counsellor or any social worker or my community nurse 
Statement 5: “I wouldn’t want..
•  To be sectioned again
•  To be put on Halloperidol
Statement 6: “If I have to be admitted to hospital again I would like...”
•  In the ward round things to be discussed rather than me being interrogated
•  My own room
•  To receive regular counselling
Statement 7: “In hospital I would also like...”
•  To be allowed to go out when I  feel like doing it
•  To have an independent advocate
•  To know more about the decisions regarding my care and have a saying about 
these decisions
Please see a hard copy of a preference for care booklet at the 
back of thesisAPPENDIX 16: Published papers
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